Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The district court concluded that defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence for the firearm conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had sustained at least three prior convictions for a "serious drug offense." The prior convictions at issue arose from charges that defendant sold drugs in Missouri on three occasions in 1996.The court concluded that defendant's collateral attack on the Missouri convictions was foreclosed by Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994), which held that a defendant has no right to collaterally attack prior convictions in the course of his federal sentencing proceeding. The court also concluded that, even assuming for the sake of analysis that defendant's offenses of conviction required only a mental state of recklessness, the district court did not plainly err by counting them as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error by ruling that defendant's convictions in Missouri were qualifying predicate offenses. View "United States v. Lyman" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit previously affirmed an interlocutory ruling that several counterclaims were non-arbitrable. See Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Williams, 915 F.3d 507, 510–12 (8th Cir. 2019).The primary issue on appeal here is whether the district court "improperly rewrote" its original order by enjoining defendants from seeking damages in arbitration in excess of fees owed. Although the court could review the district court's decision, the court declined to overturn it, explaining that all the district court did was clarify its original order, which it had the authority to do. In this case, the original order stated that the counterclaims were arbitrable to the extent they reduced the amount defendants owed to the firm, and the district court clarified on remand that this restriction applied to the breach-of-contract claim too. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the remaining claims. View "Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Williams" on Justia Law

Business Leaders in Christ filed suit against the University and others, alleging that the University defendants violated its First Amendment rights through the application of the University's Policy on Human Rights. This action arose from the University's investigation of Business Leaders' refusal to allow a gay member to become an officer in the religious organization. The district court held that the University defendants violated Business Leaders' First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion; granted Business Leaders permanent injunctive relief and thus prohibited the University defendants from enforcing the Policy against Business Leaders under certain conditions; but granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' money damages claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-speech and expressive-association claims. In this case, the law was clearly established at the time the individual defendants acted that the University's recognition of registered student organizations constituted a limited public forum, that the university may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a limited public forum, and that Business Leaders had a right not to be subjected to viewpoint discrimination while speaking in the University's limited public forum. However, the district court correctly granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-exercise claim, because the law was not clearly established at the time that the individual defendants' violated Business Leaders' free-exercise rights. View "Business Leaders In Christ v. The University of Iowa" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a petition for review of the denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court held that petitioner's 2003 Missouri marijuana conviction is not a categorical match for the corresponding federal offense in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), and thus the 2006 conviction for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 1326 does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(O). Therefore, petitioner is not statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lopez-Chavez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied petitions for review of the reinstatement of a 1998 removal order by the DHS and the denial of a motion to reopen the 1998 removal proceedings by the BIA. The court rejected petitioner's contention that his reinstated 1998 removal order was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, because his counsel was ineffective. The court concluded that petitioner's contention is untimely because it was not raised within thirty days of the underlying removal order, as required by 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1). The court also concluded that there is substantial evidence supporting the existence of a prior removal order, and petitioner's reentry was unlawful because he reentered within ten years of his removal without the Attorney General's permission to reapply for admission.The court concluded that the Board correctly determined that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to reopen the 1998 proceedings. The court explained that an alien ordinarily has a right to file one motion to reopen within ninety days of a final removal order, but an alien forfeits that right by illegally reentering the country. Petitioner's motion also came well after the expiration of the ninety-day time limit for an alien’s motion. Finally, the court agreed with the Board that current law does not allow for a miscarriage-of-justice exception to the statutory prohibition on reopening a reinstated removal order. View "Gutierrez-Gutierrez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an officer in the Minneapolis Police Department, filed suit against more than forty local government entities and employees for, among other things, violating the Driver's Protection Privacy Act (DPPA).The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err by denying the City's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the 72 vicarious-liability claims against it. In this case, the dismissals of the 72 underlying claims against the officers were not "judgments on the merits" under the meaning of section 217B(2) and that section does not prohibit the City from being held vicariously liable for them. The court also concluded that defendants are entitled to a new trial on the basis that the admitted evidence of 850 accesses that were not committed by the 58 MPD officers whose alleged DPPA violations were at issue; the admitted evidence of harassment, retaliation, and failure to investigate by the City; and the instructions to the jury that the City would indemnify Officers Young and Olson. The court vacated the judgment, reversed, and remanded for a new trial due to the erroneous admission of evidence and faulty jury instruction that affected defendants' substantial rights. View "Krekelberg v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to producing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2251 and to committing a felony against a minor while being a registered sex offender under 18 U.S.C. 2260A. The court concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence of 300 months' imprisonment for the section 2251 conviction, which is a 60-month downward variance from the Guidelines range. As required, the district court added 120 months' imprisonment to the sentence based on defendant's section 2260A conviction, running consecutively. In this case, the district court did not give improper weight to the facts of the case, and the district court considered the mitigating factors, as well as potential sentencing disparities. The court explained that the district court has substantial latitude to determine how much weight to give each 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factor and the district court did not exceeds its substantial latitude here. The court also concluded that, although the district court plainly erred by imposing a life term of supervised release that exceeds three years, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights. View "United States v. Gifford" on Justia Law

After police officers interrogated L.G. at her high school, she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the school resource officer had unconstitutionally seized her by escorting her to the office for questioning. Once L.G. was in the office, defendant left her alone with the officers and closed the door.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order rejecting defendant's request for qualified immunity and remanded with directions to dismiss the section 1983 claim against defendants. The court respectfully disagreed with the district court that it was clearly established that the school setting makes no difference for Fourth Amendment purposes when the seizure occurs at the behest of police. In this case, defendant's involvement in the alleged seizure was minimal and ministerial. Furthermore, the incident occurred in a public school setting where it would not necessarily be clear at what point a student has been unreasonably seized for constitutional purposes. Therefore, the court did not think existing circuit precedent, such as Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2013), and Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987), would have alerted every reasonable officer in defendant's position that she was violating L.G.'s constitutional rights. The court also concluded that L.G. has not successfully demonstrated a robust consensus of persuasive authority that created a clearly established right, and this is not the rare case where a general constitutional rule applies with "obvious clarity." View "L.G. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the City of Davenport's Special Events Policy against him. In this case, plaintiff seeks to protect his right to share his religious messages in public spaces within Davenport. The district court found that the Street Fest was a traditional public forum and that law enforcement's decision to move plaintiff to an adjacent location was likely a content-neutral limitation on the time, place, and manner of his speech.The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining the Special Events Policy was a content-neutral permitting scheme. Furthermore, even if it the court assumed for purposes of this appeal, without deciding, that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the court found that plaintiff's inability to demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm heavily weighs against granting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Sessler v. City of Davenport" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion to begin involuntary treatment of defendant under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Defendant suffers from amphetamine-induced psychotic disorder, with onset during intoxication, and was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and defendant declined medication.The court found that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Treatment Plan will significantly further the important state interests. In this case, the government met its burden in showing that the medication was substantially likely to render defendant competent to stand trial and it was substantially unlikely to have side effects that would interfere significantly with defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense. Finally, the district court did not clearly err in finding that involuntary medication is medically appropriate for defendant. View "United States v. Coy" on Justia Law