Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 where petitioner was convicted in 2012, after trial by general court-martial, of rape committed in 1998. At the time of petitioner's conviction and direct appeals, there was no statute of limitations for prosecution of rape under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held for the first time that a five-year statute of limitations applied to rape in United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220, 222-24 (C.A.A.F. 2018). However, in United States v. Briggs, 2020 WL 7250099, at 2 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020), the Supreme Court held that there is not a statute of limitations under the UCMJ for rapes committed between 1986 and 2006. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction was not untimely. View "Hill v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant, a police officer, alleging civil rights claims related to her conduct during an investigation into an alleged interstate sex-trafficking scheme. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated their Fourth Amendment rights by submitting a false affidavit causing their arrest. The district court concluded that plaintiffs may proceed on both a Bivens claim and a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Eighth Circuit concluded that this case is meaningfully different from a Bivens action in four ways: first, the sorts of actions being challenged here are different; second, defendant's role in the arrests was different; third, although the mechanism for inquiry is a closer call, there is still one meaningful difference; and fourth, proving these claims would require a different type of showing. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the district court to dismiss plaintiffs' Bivens claims and to determine whether their case can proceed under section 1983. View "Ahmed v. Weyker" on Justia Law

Dassault hired Gipson in 2004; he was promoted in 2006. In 2011, Gipson received a poor evaluation from his supervisor. Gipson complained to HR about his supervisor. Later, Gipson and his supervisor had an argument which ended with security escorting Gipson to HR. Gipson filed an EEOC charge but did not sue. Dassault assigned Gipson a different supervisor. In 2012, Gipson reported to HR a racially offensive email sent by a colleague. The sender was suspended. In 2013, Gipson’s team leader resigned. Gipson assumed some team leader duties. Dassault claims that Gipson was not given “personnel/ supervisor responsibilities.” In 2014, Dassault promoted Gipson to senior manufacturing engineer. Months later Dassault posted an open team leader position. Gipson applied but HR responded that he was not qualified because he had not served as a senior manufacturing engineer for at least 12 months. His application was never forwarded to the decision-makers. Another African-American was selected for the promotion.Gipson claimed that he did not receive the promotion because of his race and because he filed a 2011 EEOC complaint. Dassault later terminated Gipson’s employment as part of a reduction in force. Gipson contends that two Caucasian senior manufacturing engineers, who he alleges had less seniority than him, were offered voluntary demotions in lieu of termination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Dassault on claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. View "Gipson v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp" on Justia Law

Zerba agreed to sell a half-pound of marijuana to Beener. The drug deal resulted in the shooting death of Beener’s associate, Plotz. Zerba pled guilty to conspiring to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), 846, and to possessing a weapon in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), 2. The plea agreement states: Defendant ... will be required to pay full restitution to all victims of the offense(s) including relevant conduct victims. The court ordered Zerba to pay $5,611.55 in restitution for Plotz’s funeral costs.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that federal courts are permitted to order restitution only when authorized by statute and that Plotz was not a “victim” under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663. The Act allows restitution to be ordered in a plea agreement. The plea agreement phrase “including relevant conduct victims” goes beyond the Act's definition of "victim." “Relevant conduct” is defined in the Sentencing Guidelines and includes the acts of others that occurred during or in preparation for the offense. Clemens, the shooter, was present and armed at the direction of Zerba, was a member of the conspiracy to distribute marijuana, and committed the crime of use, carry, brandish, and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy to distribute marijuana. View "United States v. Zerba" on Justia Law

Ricker traveled from South Dakota to Texas to sexually abuse the seven-year-old twin daughters of an acquaintance. He took photos and videos of the abuse. Months later, South Dakota officers received information that cheer_dad17 sent and received child pornography via online chat. The internet provider disclosed that cheer_dad17 was accessing the internet from Ricker’s address. Officers obtained a search warrant. During the search, Ricker made incriminating statements and confirmed that he was "user cheer_dad17." Officers seized several devices; forensic review revealed approximately 30,000 images and more than 100 videos of child pornography and child erotica, including images of the twins.Ricker was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child who had not attained the age of 12 years; travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct; and counts related to the transportation, distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography. He was deemed competent to stand trial. His evaluation included diagnostic impressions of autism spectrum disorder and major depression. The court found that Ricker had a prior conviction for possession or distribution of child pornography and sentenced him to 600 months’ imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Ricker did not assert his Fifth Amendment rights by saying that his attorney was at a funeral and that his father wanted his attorney to be present. Ricker being on the autism spectrum and English being his second language did not make his statements involuntary. The court properly excluded from the courtroom Ricker's father, a potential witness. Any error in admitting evidence cover sheets was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence. The sentence was reasonable, given that this was “one of the worst child pornography cases that the Court has seen.” View "United States v. Ricker" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and three individual school officials in an action brought by a student, alleging claims of sexual abuse and harassment by a teacher and coach, Johnna Feazell.Where, as here, a complaint involves allegations against school officials brought under both Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983, this court has held that an official in these circumstances must have actual notice of the alleged sexual harassment or sexual abuse by a school employee to meet the standard for liability. In this case, a searching review of the summary judgment record reveals no evidence to indicate school officials had actual notice of sexual harassment or abuse by Feazell prior to the events at issue. Rather, when plaintiff's mother met with the school principal with the cell phone containing text messages evidencing a sexual relationship between plaintiff and Feazell, school officials took immediate action by contacting law enforcement and placing Feazell on administrative leave. Therefore, the district court did not improperly weigh the evidence and the summary judgment record established that no genuine dispute exists as to whether the District or any school official had actual notice of sexual abuse or harassment prior to October 13, 2014. View "KC v. Mayo" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his vehicle. Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.The court held that the state trooper's discovery that defendant's driver's license had been suspended justifiably extended the lawful scope of the traffic stop because of defendant's legal inability to remove the vehicle from the scene and the consequential need for a licensed driver or a tow truck to do so; officers had probable cause to believe that defendant's car contained evidence of trafficking while the trooper was addressing the issue of defendant's suspended license and related vehicle removal; and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permitted the officer to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's car following its removal from the scene. Finally, defendant was not in custody during the traffic stop and the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his unMirandized statements. View "United States v. Soderman" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress firearms and drugs after defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. In this case, the district court credited the officers' account that they observed or inferred that defendant failed to stop at a stop sign over defendant's experts' recreation of the incident ostensibly showing that was not possible. The court concluded that this was not clearly erroneous, and the officers' testimony was no so incredible or inconsistent as to justify disturbing the district court's finding. Having accepted the district court's findings of fact, the court concluded that the officers had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a traffic violation. View "United States v. Holly" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Defendant was convicted of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening.The court held that plaintiff clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation; as soon as he manifested this clear and unequivocal invocation, the proceedings should have paused, and the trial court should have conducted a proper Faretta hearing; and thus the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. The court also held that the record does not support a finding that plaintiff engaged in serious and obstructionist misconduct, and the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary is objectively unreasonable. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that defendant was attempting to manipulate, subvert, or delay the trial process. Finally, the state waived its argument that there was a determination that plaintiff was incapable, under Faretta, of waiving his right to counsel. View "Finch v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court first concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during this arrest. In this case, detectives saw defendant shove another man and shout threatening words at him, which is itself potentially a crime under Missouri law. Because the detectives witnessed defendant committing what looked like an assault, they had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The court also concluded that defendant has not shown that, but for the error in the jury instructions in light of Rehaif v. United States,139 S. Ct. at 2200, the outcome of his case would have been different. Therefore, defendant cannot establish plain error. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law