Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 46 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. Even if the court assumes that the district court's statement at sentencing about gun violence in the Quad Cities was plainly erroneous because it was unsupported by the sentencing record and the PSR, defendant could not show that the error affected his substantial rights. In this case, there was no reasonable probability that but for the alleged error his sentence would have been lower. The court also held that defendant's sentence is not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including mitigation circumstances such as defendant's mental health history and his considerable post-offense rehabilitation efforts. View "United States v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 190 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two drug counts, one for conspiracy and another for possession. The court held that the district court did not err in rejecting defendant's contention that his prosecutions in South Dakota and Iowa violated double jeopardy. The court explained that when defendant pleaded guilty in the Iowa case, he had not yet pleaded guilty in the South Dakota case. Therefore, jeopardy had not attached. Under this unusual scenario, the court stated that defendant should have filed the motion to dismiss in South Dakota, after he pleaded guilty in Iowa. Accordingly, the district court could not have erred when it refused to dismiss the Iowa conspiracy charge. The court also held that defendant's sentence is not substantively unreasonable where the district court did not abuse its discretion by not varying downward. View "United States v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the tax court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment in an action where the Commissioner determined that because Judith S. Coffey was not a bona fide resident of the United States Virgin Islands (USVI), she and James L. Coffey owed federal income tax for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. The Coffeys invoked the three-year statute of limitations in 26 U.S.C. 6501(a), and the USVI intervened.The court held that the statute of limitations in section 6501(a) begins only when a return is filed. In this case, because the Coffeys did not meticulously comply with requirements to file with the IRS, the court concluded that the statute of limitations never began. The court rejected the Coffeys' and the USVI's contentions that filing returns solely with the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue began the three-year statute of limitations in section 6501(a). The court explained that without a filing, the documents are not an honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the tax law and are not filed returns. View "Coffey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

DNF purchased a debt that plaintiff owed to a retailer, hired a law firm, and brought a collection action in state court. Plaintiff hired her own lawyer and moved to dismiss for insufficient process and service of process. The state court dismissed the claim after DNF did not respond. DNF then hired RGS, a licensed debt collection agency, and RGS sent plaintiff a letter offering to settle.Plaintiff then filed this action alleging, inter alia, that DNF violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (AFDCPA). Plaintiff claimed that RGS contacted her directly without consent of her attorney. The district court denied DNF's motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the question of DNF's liability. Plaintiff then accepted a $4,000 offer of judgment and final judgment was entered in her favor.Having considered the plain meaning of the statute's text, together with the structure of the FDCPA, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that DNF is a "debt collector" under 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). The court does not hold that any purchaser of defaulted consumer debt qualifies as a "debt collector" under the "principal purpose" definition. The court also does not hold that any debt buyer that hires an independent debt collector thereby becomes a debt collector under section 1692a(6).The court held that plaintiff cannot recover from DNF based on a theory of vicarious liability for RGS's action because it is undisputed that RGS did not have knowledge plaintiff was represented by an attorney. Furthermore, RGS's acts cannot be imputed to DNF to establish direct liability. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reygadas v. DNF Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, distributing methamphetamine, conspiring to commit money laundering, and tampering with a government witness. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court explained that, although defendant's argument relies in part on decisions that were issued after his sentencing, his challenge to the career offender determination was still a challenge to his sentence. Furthermore, a federal inmate generally must challenge a sentence through a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, and a post-judgment motion that fits the description of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence should be treated as a section 2255 motion. In this case, because defendant did not seek authorization to file a successive motion as required by section 2255(h), the district court correctly determined that defendant's challenge to his career offender determination was an unauthorized successive habeas petition. The court rejected defendant's other asserted ground for a sentence reduction, post-conviction rehabilitation. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason. View "United States v. Fine" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping Maria Eloiza and her five-year-old son, resulting in the deaths of both. Defendant was 16-years-old at the time he committed the offense, and the district court sentenced him to the statutorily mandated term of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), that a mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Based on Miller, the district court granted defendant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. After the district court sentenced defendant to 50 years' imprisonment, defendant appealed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendant competent to proceed with resentencing. In this case, the district court was entitled to base its competency determination on the BOP doctor's psychological evaluation concluding that defendant had been restored to competency. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by calculating an advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment under USSG 2A1.1; the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, including defendant's youth; and defendant's sentence, a downward variance from the Guidelines range of life, was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Barraza" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and vehicle after his arrest. Defendant conditional pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearms offenses. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm, which justified an investigative seizure. In this case, the informant's tip contained a detailed description of a weapon allegedly in defendant's possession and the officers were able to corroborate elements of the informant's tip. Furthermore, defendant's furtive behavior in the parking lots further supported reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. View "United States v. LaGrange" on Justia Law

Tile Shop Holdings settled multiple lawsuits with its shareholders and then sought indemnification under its directors-and-officers insurance policies. Allied World, Tile Shop's excess insurer, denied coverage.The Eighth Circuit held that Allied is neither liable for the losses from the prior acts it has excluded in its own policy nor those excluded under the primary policy. Under the first prior-acts exclusion, Tile Shop's wrongful acts started well before August 20, 2012, the policy's retroactive date, which made any losses from them excludable under the relation-back clause. View "Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. v. Allied World National Assurance Co." on Justia Law

After Federal issued a Financial Institution Bond to COR, COR paid $2,080,000 to settle claims by investors that a former COR registered representative had conspired with others to defraud investors by carrying out a "pump-and-dump" scheme in a risky penny-stock called VGTel. COR then filed a claim with its liability insurer for VGTel and other settlement payments, which it later settled for $3,625,000 above the policy's deductible. COR also filed a claim under Federal's Bond to recover its losses for the VGTel settlements. Federal denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action.The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that Auto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilini Ford, Inc., 854 A.2d 378 (N.J. 2004), stands for the proposition that, under New Jersey law, COR's payments to settle third-party liability claims based on an employee's dishonest acts directed at the third parties were not a direct loss under Insuring Clause 1.B of the Bond. Furthermore, the district court did not err in dismissing COR's Clause 1.D counterclaim because COR failed to show that admissible evidence would be available at trial to prove that the employee personally committed a covered dishonest act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Federal Insurance Co. v. Axos Clearing LLC" on Justia Law

After the Fishery received two citations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the OSHA Commission dismissed them. The citation stemmed from an incident where a Fishery boat capsized on the reservation in Lower Red Lake and two employees drowned.The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip. & Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1993), was controlling here. The court concluded that OSHA was inapplicable to the Tribe because enforcement of the Act would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government recognized in the applicable treaty which gave the Tribe fishing rights in the reservation. Even if OSHA applied to Indian activities in other circumstances, OSHA does not apply to an enterprise owned by and consisting solely of members of perhaps the most insular and independent sovereign tribe. View "Scalia v. Red Lake Nation Fisheries, Inc." on Justia Law