Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 190 month sentence imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. The court held that revising a sentencing recommendation for a legitimate reason during a sentencing hearing is not prosecutorial vindictiveness and there was no prosecutorial vindictiveness in this case. Regardless, defendant cannot show that his substantial rights were affected where the district court considered the sentencing factors at length, stressing those important to the sentence.The court also held that the district court did not err by deciding that defendant's four prior serious drug offenses were "committed on occasions different from one another." Furthermore, defendant's argument that this determination is a fact to be decided by a jury, not the judge, is foreclosed by precedent. Therefore, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Years of litigation resulted from Debtor's spouse's personal guarantee of a lease of real property from Lariat. One suit resulted in a state court judgment holding Debtor and Debtor's spouse jointly and severally liable for fraudulent transfers from Debtor's spouse to Debtor. In Debtor's subsequent chapter 11 bankruptcy, Lariat asserted a claim for $1,030,916.74 based on that judgment. The bankruptcy court overruled Debtor's objection but found Lariat's claim was for damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property (the lease Debtor's spouse had personally guaranteed) and was subject to 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6)'s cap on such claims. The Eighth Circuit held that Lariat held a claim for $308,805.00 (plus interest). Lariat filed a complaint under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A); the bankruptcy court excepted the Lariat claim from discharge, finding seven badges of fraudThe Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The evidence supported findings that the transfer was to an insider; the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer; before the transfer was made, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer; the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred. View "Lariat Companies, Inc. v. Wigley" on Justia Law

In 2006, Cain was convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Guideline changes reduced his sentence to 151 months. His five-year term of supervised release began in 2016. Within 14 months, he was revoked for testing positive for cocaine nine times over a six-month period. Cain pled guilty, in state court, to attempted possession of 19.7 grams of methamphetamine, indicating attempted sales because his addictions were to cocaine and alcohol, not meth. Cain admitted violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court sentenced him to 48 months' imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence as substantively reasonable, rejecting Cain’s argument that the district court should have given more weight to the guidelines range of five-11 months and to his probation officer's recommendation of eight months plus 24 months of supervised release. The district judge, who had presided over his trial and prior revocation, used the court’s “wide latitude” to weigh the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and to assign some factors greater weight. The court did not indicate that Cain’s revocation sentence is a punishment for his new criminal conduct but emphasized that his multiple violations demonstrate that he cannot be adequately supervised outside prison, where he can receive drug or alcohol treatment. The court mentioned the new criminal conduct only to show that the “conduct requiring revocation is associated with a high risk of new felonious conduct.” View "United States v. Cain" on Justia Law

Avitso, a citizen of Togo, entered the U.S. as a student in 2004 and married a U.S. citizen. In 2011, USCIS denied a Petition for Alien Relative filed by Avitso’s wife and an application for adjustment of status filed by Avitso, concluding they had entered into a fraudulent marriage to procure immigration benefits, which made Avitso removable, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A). Notice of removal proceedings was mailed to Avitso at the address where USCIS investigators had been told he resided. In 2012, DHS mailed notice to a different address. The immigration court also mailed notice; it was returned, marked “moved left no address.” Avitso failed to appear. The IJ entered a removal order.In 2019, remarried and represented by new counsel, Avitso moved to reopen, alleging that he “did not personally receive" notice but a copy was forwarded to him by his then-attorney. The motion cited ineffective assistance of counsel. The IJ denied the motion, concluding Avitso failed to meet case law requirements to establish ineffective assistance and even if those requirements were satisfied, the outcome would not have been different. The BIA dismissed Avitso’s appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Avitso’s motion to reopen included no evidence that he notified former counsel of his ineffective assistance claims, provided her an opportunity to respond, or filed a complaint with disciplinary authorities. The BIA enforces those requirements to discourage baseless allegations and deter meritless claims. View "Avitso v. Barr" on Justia Law

Following a shooting, police went to Roberts’s apartment to execute a search warrant on the residence and a Durango vehicle. Officers found firearms. An officer stated Roberts was not under arrest. Roberts admitted he brought the guns into the residence from the Durango, where “Mike” had left them. The officers noted possible federal firearm charges because they knew Roberts was a felon. The officers did not arrest Roberts, but read his Miranda rights, despite Roberts saying “you don’t have to.” Officers asked if Roberts wanted to continue to talk. Roberts replied, “Not really,” but continued the interview. He admitted driving a man to the crime scene on the night of the shooting in the Durango. Roberts was arrested hours later. Roberts entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit supplied with the search warrant application gave the judge probable cause to believe that Roberts drove the vehicle associated with a shooting on the night of the shooting and that evidence of the crime would be found in the truck or his residence. Roberts’s incriminating statements before receiving Miranda warnings were admissible; he was not in custody and the statements were voluntary. Roberts's prior Illinois and Iowa convictions were controlled substance offenses for purposes of sentencing under Guidelines 4B1.1(a). View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial where the government's closing argument was permissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); there was no error in admitting forensic testimony by the government's experts because their testimony on the absence of DNA and fingerprints on the firearms and ammunition was relevant and helpful to the jury; and there was no error in admitting a photo of defendant in handcuffs where the district court gave a cautionary instruction.The court further held that the district court did not err by sentencing defendant as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1(a); by imposing an enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a drug premises; and by imposing an enhancement under USSG 3B1.1 for leadership role in the offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Court denied the State's claim filed on behalf of unnamed charities for lack of standing, and denied the State's claim on behalf of Team Makers on the equitable doctrine of laches.The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held that the State failed to show the requisite injury to a substantial segment of North Dakota's population, and affirmed its ruling that the State did not have parens patriae standing to file a claim on behalf of Team Makers and other charities. While the panel agreed with the Bankruptcy Court that finality is a very important interest, particularly in a case of this duration, the panel held that laches does not apply to tardily-filed claims that are filed in time to permit distribution under Section 726(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for reconsideration. View "North Dakota v. Bala" on Justia Law

After Primerica filed an interpleader action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 in order to resolve competing claims to Garvin Reid's life insurance proceeds, the district court awarded summary judgment and the insurance proceeds to Ila Reid, Garvin's widow. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Primerica on Ila's counterclaim against Primerica for breach of contract stemming from the disputed life insurance policy.The Eighth Circuit held that there is a legitimate dispute over the question of fault in creating the competing claims to Garvin's life insurance proceeds, and circuit precedent has not previously required a fault determination in the interpleader context. In this case, there is an active dispute on appeal regarding whether the competing claims to Garvin's insurance proceeds arose because of Primerica's failure to process the 2002 Multipurpose Change Form or because of Garvin's failure to respond when Primerica sought more information in 2002. Accordingly, the court remanded for a fault determination by the district court and further proceedings. View "Primerica Life Insurance Co. v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's revocation sentence, holding that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. In explaining the revocation sentence it was imposing, the district court discussed defendant's history and characteristics, observing that his criminal history was "replete with violence and assaultive behavior," and assaultive incidents illustrated defendant's "impulsive and violent behavior." The district court also took into account and considered all the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors that apply in a revocation hearing, directly responding to the "disrespect" complaint in defendant's allocution. Therefore, the district court neither gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor nor abused its substantial discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

This case arose from a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Thomas Petters from 1994 to 2008 through his company, PCI. These appeals involve the Trustee’s separate claw back claims against defendants. The Trustee asserted claims under 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1), which permits a trustee to "avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor . . . that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim." In this case, the applicable law is the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (MUFTA).The Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the Supreme Court of Minnesota's controlling MUFTA decision in Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2015), and the Minnesota law of void contracts. Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment against Papadimos and Kanios. The court also reversed and remanded in the Boosalis case because the district erred in instructing the jury on the MUFTA elements of "good faith" and "reasonably equivalent value." In both cases, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that Minnesota rather than federal law governed the award of prejudgment interest. The court rejected defendants' other arguments. View "Kelley v. Boosalis" on Justia Law