Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The National Credit Union Administration Board ("NCUAB"), the self-appointed conservator of Citizens Community Credit Union ("Citizens"), repudiated a letter of credit Citizens issued to Granite Re, Inc. Granite filed a complaint for damages against the NCUAB, claiming wrongful repudiation and wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit. The NCUAB moved to dismiss with prejudice, arguing 12 U.S.C. 1787(c) authorized it to repudiate the letter of credit with no liability for damages, and section 1787(c) preempted conflicting North Dakota Law. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Eighth Circuit determined that were it to adopt the NCUAB's construction of section 1787(c), the NCUAB could "quietly appoint itself conservator and repudiate letters of credit with no liability to the injured beneficiary. Absent the ability to predict an impending conservatorship, a clean letter-of-credit beneficiary like Granite is subject to repudiation with no recourse." The Court determined NCUAB's construction was inconsistent with the language of the statue, which provided a limited remedy for damages determinable at the point of conservatorship, but did not negate recovery entirely. The Court also determined it was premature to declare section 1787(c) preempted North Dakota law. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Granite Re, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Adm. Board" on Justia Law

Based on a report by the burglary victim, Goffin’s uncle, Officer Ashcraft tried to arrest Goffin for burglary and stealing handguns, bullets, and prescription pain medication. Before the arrest, several witnesses told Ashcraft that Goffin was armed, possibly intoxicated, and dangerous. When Goffin broke free from arrest, fled toward a group of bystanders, and moved as though he was reaching into his waistband, Ashcraft shot him once in the back. Goffin claims (and Ashcraft disputes) that he was patted down by another officer (Hines) just before he fled. The pat-down removed nothing from Goffin; the officer failed to discover that Goffin was carrying a loaded magazine and extra bullets. Officer Hines claims that Goffin fled before he completed the pat-down. Stolen guns were discovered within reach of where Goffin had been sitting in acar, but Goffin did not have a weapon on him. In Goffin’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Officer Ashcraft is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the shooting that a pat-down that removes nothing from a suspect eliminates an officer’s probable cause that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. View "Goffin v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo, a U.S. corporation, entered into a structured trust advantaged repackaged securities transaction (STARS) with Barclays, a United Kingdom corporation. Wells Fargo asserts its purpose was to borrow money at a favorable interest rate, to diversify its funding sources, to reduce its liquidity risk, and to provide a stable source of funding for five years. The government claimed that STARS was an unlawful tax avoidance scheme, designed to exploit the differences between the tax laws of the two countries and generate U.S. tax credits for a foreign tax that Wells Fargo did not, in substance, pay. Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits on its 2003 federal tax return arising from STARS. The IRS disallowed those credits and notified Wells Fargo that it owed additional taxes. Wells Fargo paid the resulting deficiency and sued to obtain a refund. The government sought to impose a “negligence penalty” as an offset defense because Wells Fargo underpaid its 2003 taxes after claiming this credit.The Eighth Circuit affirmed that Wells Fargo was not entitled to a tax credit and was liable for a “negligence penalty.” The "sham-transaction" or "economic-substance" doctrine allows the IRS and courts “to distinguish between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to obtain a tax benefit, which is legitimate, and creating a transaction to generate a tax benefit, which is illegitimate.” STARS’s trust component had no real potential for profit outside of its tax implications and Wells Fargo had no valid purpose other than tax considerations. View "Wells Fargo & Company v. United States" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying Murray's motion to enforce the order confirming debtors' third amended plan of reorganization and to enjoin parties from asserting claims barred by the third amended plan. Murray claimed that their purchase of debtors' assets "free and clear" under section 363, together with the release provision in the confirmed plan, precluded their liability for indemnification payments for litigation expenses accruing after the effective date of the plan. The bankruptcy court held that neither 11 U.S.C. 1141(d), Kentucky law, nor the language of the confirmed plan released Murray from its contractual or contingent indemnity obligations.The panel held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in determining the confirmed plan requires Murray to comply with the contractual indemnity obligations. The court held that the bankruptcy court followed principles of contract assignment and interpretation in reaching its conclusions about which obligations Murray assumed and which were released, upholding the agreements and the confirmed plan as written, rather than as Murray wants to rewrite them. View "Murray Kentucky Energy, Inc. v. Ceralvo Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While not diminishing petitioner's tragic experience of being threatened at gunpoint while helplessly watching her son be beaten and abducted, the court held that the record does not compel a finding that such an experience constitutes persecution. In this case, petitioner was never physically harmed and the kidnappers' threat was non-specific and lacking in immediacy.The court rejected petitioner's argument that the harm suffered by her son constitutes direct persecution of her; petitioner failed to present any evidence to suggest that this alleged persecution of her son was on account of his family relationship, rather than an extortionate demand; petitioner failed to meet the rigorous burden of showing a well-founded fear of future persecution; and thus substantial evidence supported the BIA's denials of petitioner's requests for asylum and withholding of removal. Finally, the court held that substantial evidence in the record likewise supports the BIA's denial of petitioner's request for relief under the CAT. View "Cano v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus in part and directed the district court to dissolve a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the State from enforcing a COVID-19-related health directive against a provider of surgical abortions. The Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) issued a directive requiring that all non-medically necessary surgeries be postponed in response to Executive Order 20-03, directing the ADH to do everything reasonably possible to respond to and recover from the COVID-19 virus.After adopting the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in In re Abbott, No. 20-50264, 2020 WL 1685929 (5th Cir. April 7, 2020), the court held that the State is entitled to mandamus relief because it has satisfied its burden in demonstrating that it has no other means to obtain the relief that it seeks, the State is clearly and indisputably entitled to the writ, and entry of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court held that, when faced with a public health crisis, a state may implement measures that infringe on constitutional rights, subject to certain limitations. The court found that the district court's failure to apply the Jacobson framework produced a patently erroneous result. In this case, the directive bears a real and substantial relation to the State's interest in protecting public health in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic; the directive is not, beyond all question, a prohibition of pre-viability abortion in violation of the Constitution because it is a delay, not a ban, and contains emergency exceptions; and the district court clearly abused its discretion in finding that the provider is likely to prevail on its argument that the directive will likely operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion in a large fraction of the cases in which the directive is relevant. The court declined to exercise its mandamus power to direct the district court to dismiss the supplemental complaint, and denied the emergency motion to stay the ex parte TRO and for a temporary administrative stay as moot. View "In Re: Leslie Rutledge" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for unlawful use of an identification document and misuse of a social security number. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions where a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant knew the permanent resident card bearing his name and photograph had been forged, counterfeited, falsely made, or unlawfully obtained when he used it to secure employment. Furthermore, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant made the false representation regarding his purported social security number in order to deceive Midwest Concrete in order to obtain a job with the company. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Esparsa" on Justia Law

After Murphy Oil sold an oil refinery to Valero, a fire occurred on the property. Valero demanded indemnification from Murphy, and Murphy sought a defense from its general commercial liability insurer, Liberty Mutual. After Liberty Mutual refused, Murphy Oil filed suit for a declaratory judgment and damages.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court properly ruled that there is no possibility that the policy covers the property damage alleged in the complaint, and thus there is no duty to defend. In this case, Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Ark. 1998) (Unigard I) controls, because the statute of limitations for tort liability ran before Valero filed its complaint. Furthermore, like in Unigard I, any liability of Murphy Oil in the underlying suit represents the "economic loss" from Murphy Oil's breach of contract and is not covered by the policy. The court also held that the general contract liability exclusion specifically precludes coverage of the breach-of-contract claim, and exceptions to the contractual liability exclusion do not apply. Finally, the court rejected Murphy Oil's "customized" Alienated Premises Endorsement claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Liberty Mutual. View "Murphy Oil Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter after he struck and killed his nephew with his truck. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, because a reasonable jury could find defendant grossly negligent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury that actual knowledge is an essential element of the offense that is separate from gross negligence, because the instructions, viewed as a whole, accurately and adequately defined the essential elements of the offense. View "United States v. Bolman" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of law enforcement officers and the City, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff after the death of her son. The court held that the officers' actions did not amount to constitutionally excessive force. In this case, the undisputed facts show that the officers discovered the son acting erratically, and even though the son was held in a secure cell, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to fear that he would intentionally or inadvertently physically harm himself. Furthermore, the son actively resisted the officers' attempts to subdue him, and officers held him in the prone position only until he stopped actively fighting against the restraints and the officers. Therefore, the court held that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's excessive force claim. View "Lombardo v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law