Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Russell, Daniel, and Carson co-owned a business. Under a succession plan, the company was to purchase life insurance. If a shareholder died, the company would use the proceeds to buy the deceased shareholder’s stock. Daniel died. The company received insurance proceeds and kept the money. Elizabeth, Daniel’s widow, sued Russell and Carson for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. A Kansas court issued a judgment against Russell for $822,900.77. Russell and Carson had expected Liberty to defend and indemnify them under their Directors, Officers and Company Liability Coverage and Fiduciary Liability Coverage. Liberty cited a “Personal Profit Exclusion” for claims based upon "gaining ... any profit, remuneration or financial advantage” to which they are “not legally entitled” and a “Contract Exclusion” regarding claims "attributable to any actual or alleged liability under or breach of any contract.” Russell and Carson sued Liberty in Missouri state court for bad-faith. Elizabeth joined the suit. Liberty, a corporate citizen of Massachusetts and Illinois, removed the case to federal court. Russell and Carson sought remand, arguing that in “direct action[s]” against insurers, the insurer takes the citizenship of those it insures, 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1); if the Trust’s equitable garnishment claim was a direct action, Liberty shared Russell’s Missouri citizenship.The district court held that the equitable garnishment claim required Russell as a defendant, but Russell’s bad-faith claim required him as a plaintiff. The court severed the suit: Russell and Carson could sue for bad-faith failure to defend and indemnify; the Trust could separately sue Liberty and Russell. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the bad faith claim. Because the Missouri statutory claim is not a direct action, complete diversity exists. The district court had jurisdiction over the bad-faith claim. The policy exclusions applied. View "Russell v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

Following a guilty plea to possession of heroin with intent to distribute, the court sentenced Hamilton to 81 months imprisonment. Hamilton’s PSR criminal history score, used to calculate his Guidelines range, included a previous Illinois felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The Eighth Circuit vacated Hamilton’s sentence because part of the Illinois statute of conviction had been declared unconstitutional. At resentencing, the district court stated that the scope of resentencing was limited to Hamilton’s previous Illinois conviction and concluded that this conviction was properly part of Hamilton’s criminal history score because Hamilton was convicted under a statutory provision that remained in effect. The court reimposed the 81-month sentence.The Eighth Circuit vacated. The court rejected Hamilton’s argument that, in determining his criminal history score, the court relied on documents that did not satisfy precedent to determine that Hamilton had a valid conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The court examined an Order Assessing Fines, Fees and Costs, and the official charging document, which conclusively demonstrated that Hamilton was not convicted under the invalidated subsection. The district court was not limited on remand to consideration of only the Illinois conviction. Failure to understand the scope of authority and discretion at sentencing is a significant procedural error. The district court was not prohibited from considering Hamilton’s attempt to challenge the PSR’s statement of relevant conduct and the government’s original request for an upward departure or variance. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

A “confidential reliable informant” told police that Oliver and his co-conspirators would mail packages of cocaine to Minnesota from Maricopa, Arizona. The postal inspector found one package from Maricopa, Arizona and another with similar handwriting from Chandler, Arizona. With a search warrant, officers found cocaine inside each. The informant stated that Oliver would be transporting cocaine in a BMW that would arrive in Minneapolis on November 30, 2014. On that date, police stopped and impounded a BMW that belonged to Oliver. Days later, with a warrant, police searched the vehicle and discovered six kilograms of cocaine, and executed a warrant to search Oliver's hotel room, where they recovered cell phones but no drugs. Oliver’s co-conspirator (Williams) testified that he made multiple trips to Arizona at Oliver’s request to transport cash for buying drugs and that in November 2014, he and another co-conspirator each mailed cocaine from different towns in Arizona at Oliver’s direction. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, Oliver was sentenced to 204 months' imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the government’s key witness—Williams—lacked credibility and that the district court erred in denying Oliver's motions to dismiss the second indictment, to disclose the identity of the informant, and to suppress the searches of his BMW and hotel room. Williams also unsuccessfully argued that the court should have given the jury an accomplice instruction regarding Williams’s testimony and that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy appellate panel dismissed debtor's appeal based on lack of jurisdiction, because debtor failed to show that she was a person aggrieved by the bankruptcy court's order overruling her objection to the trustee's final report. Therefore, debtor did not have standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's order. In this case, debtor did not challenge in her objection, nor on appeal, the amount the trustee reported had been returned to her following dismissal of her case. Furthermore, debtor has not demonstrated that the bankruptcy court's order directly and adversely affected her pecuniarily. View "Marshall v. McCarty" on Justia Law

Jesse received a suspended sentence and probation for possession of methamphetamine, second offense. Due to several probation violations and arrests, she spent more than 332 days in custodial settings. She was arrested again in June 2003. A state court imposed a revocation sentence of an indeterminate term not to exceed two years’ incarceration. Jesse’s attorney had consulted with the Iowa Department of Corrections, which indicated that Jesse would fully serve her sentence in no more than 332 days; based on her time in custodial settings, she had already served more than that amount of time. The Department advised that Jesse should not be transported to the Classification Center and that counsel should apply for an order discharging Jesse’s sentence. The court granted that order.At sentencing following her guilty plea to federal methamphetamine charges, the issue was whether the state sentence was for more than one year and one month for purposes of calculating criminal-history points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(a); 4A1.2(e)(1). The court found that the state sentence was two years, which resulted in an advisory range of 188-235 months. Applying 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the court noted Jesse’s personal history and imposed a 175-month sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Courts should rely on the judgment imposing sentence, rather than evidence of time actually served when calculating criminal history points. The state judge expressly vacated the order regarding Jesse’s transport to prison but did not vacate the sentence and did not believe himself to be amending, retracting, or replacing the sentence. View "United States v. Jesse" on Justia Law

Thomas was charged with a 10-year conspiracy involving kidnapping, forced labor, hate crimes, and racketeering-related violent crimes. The court rejected his guilty plea and ordered competency restoration under 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). Thomas was evaluated at a Medical Center for Federal Prisoners. Clinical Psychologist Chavez concluded Thomas was unlikely to become competent in the foreseeable future; 18 U.S.C. 4246(d) required commitment if, due to Thomas's mental deficiencies, his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property damage. A Risk Assessment Panel diagnosed Thomas with an unspecified neurocognitive disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and adult antisocial behavior, finding that Thomas “show[ed] a pattern of violating the rights of others,” and had previously been convicted of sexual assault, and implied that his professional boxing career suggested violent tendencies. The Panel explained that Thomas was easily manipulated by his domestic partner (the conspiracy’s ringleader). Thomas’s denials of past violence indicated a lack of empathy. The court granted Thomas’s request for an independent examination. Clinical Psychologist DeMier largely agreed with the diagnosis but concluded that Thomas’s dangerousness primarily stemmed from his manipulability, not his mental defects and did not warrant commitment.The court noted Chavez and the Panel spent significantly more time evaluating Thomas and because DeMier’s opinion was inconsistent. Thomas was committed to the Attorney General’s custody. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. That DeMier’s “less-than-robust opinion” is contrary to the court’s conclusion does not warrant clear-error reversal. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Garvens contracted with Debtor and DRMP for home repairs and improvements. Unhappy with the results, the Garvens sued Debtor and DRMP in state court and obtained a default judgment against them. At the Garvens' request, the sheriff levied a writ of execution on Debtor's ownership interest in DRMP and scheduled an execution sale. At the execution sale, the Garvens purchased Debtor's ownership interest and became the sole owners of DRMP. Upon learning of the execution sale, Debtor allegedly began withdrawing assets from DRMP and transferring them to a different entity. Debtor then filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay to allow the Garvens and DRMP to commence a state court action against Debtor and related third parties to avoid the allegedly fraudulent transfers. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed an appeal. The Garvens and DRMP filed their motion for relief from the automatic stay on June 5, 2019. The bankruptcy court rendered its final decision on September 19, 2019, more than 60 days after the motion was filed. The 60-day period was not extended, so the automatic stay was terminated by operation of law on August 5, 2019, rendering the order lifting the stay superfluous. View "Paczkowski v. Garven" on Justia Law

Dolgencorp's Auxvasse, Missouri store employed six people. Price, a sales associate, contacted the Union. Myers, an organizing director, obtained authorization cards and filed an election petition. The Union and Dolgencorp agreed to the terms of an election to be held on December 8, 2017. On November 17, 2017, Myers created a group text message conversation between himself, Price, and employees Miles and Durlin. Through the election date, Miles and Durlin actively participated in group conversations and never expressed opposition to Union representation. The six eligible employees voted, 4-2, to unionize. After the election, Miles and Durlin told Dolgencorp’s vice president they voted in favor of the Union but that Price and Myers pressured them using threats and bribes. Dolgencorp filed objections, alleging Price acted as an agent of the Union and engaged in misconduct that materially affected the election result. The NLRB certified the Union as the exclusive representative. Dolgencorp refused to recognize the Union.The Eighth Circuit upheld the Board’s finding that Dolgencorp engaged in an unfair labor practice (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5)). Conclusions that Price's comments were not meant to be intimidating or to influence witness testimony and that Price was not acting as a union agent or with apparent authority were supported by substantial evidence. An alleged tire-slashing threat occurred outside the critical period; the offer of an unconditional $100 loan did not substantially impair an employee's free choice in the election. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Paskert, an Auto$mart sales associate, was supervised by Burns. Bjorkland was also a sales associate. Paskert alleges she was prevented from completing her training. Burns frequently lost his temper with everyone, he ridiculed and screamed at his employees, he referred to female customers using derogatory names, and threw objects. Bjorkland and Paskert heard Burns remark that he “never should have hired a woman” and wonder whether he could make Paskert cry. Burns openly bragged at work about his purported sexual conquests. Bjorkland witnessed Burns attempt to rub Paskert’s shoulders. Burns stated, “Oh, if you weren’t married ... I could have you.” Paskert and Bjorkland reported these incidents to the Director. After a few months on the job, Paskert was demoted. Three days later, she was discharged for insubordination, a poor sales record and use of profanity. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission issued a right-to-sue letter. Paskert’s federal complaint cited sex discrimination based on a hostile work environment and retaliation.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Burns’s alleged behavior, while reprehensible and improper, was not so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of Paskert’s employment. Paskert failed to exhaust her retaliation claim. Because hostile work environment claims are separate from sex discrimination claims, and because Paskert failed to make any separate arguments regarding sex discrimination in her briefs, the claim was not before the court. View "Paskert v. Burns" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motions for dismissal and for summary judgment, granting summary judgment to the law firm. The court applied a five-factor test to determine the sufficiency of defendant's contacts and held that, when all of the circumstances are viewed in the aggregate, defendant had fair warning that he could be subject to jurisdiction in Arkansas. In this case, defendant's contacts with Arkansas involved more than just his guaranty; the language of the contract provided for Cuker to perform its obligations in the Western District of Arkansas; and, as personal guarantor of Cuker's performance, it was reasonable and foreseeable for defendant to anticipate being haled into that same court if Cuker failed to perform.The court rejected defendant's claim that his personal guaranty is unenforceable as a matter of law because his obligations are not adequately specified. The court held that the express terms of the legal services agreement evidence an intent to hold defendant liable to the same extent as Cuker's liability. Finally, the court applied state, not federal elements of estoppel in diversity cases, and held that the district's reasoning and the record supported equitable estoppel. View "Henry Law Firm v. Atalla" on Justia Law