Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Camron Jordan Henry pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). The district court sentenced him to 46 months in prison. Henry appealed the sentence, specifically challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement for "reckless endangerment during flight" under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. This enhancement applies if the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person while fleeing from law enforcement.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri applied the enhancement, noting that Henry fled from police with a loaded gun in his pocket, which posed a substantial risk of accidental discharge. The court inferred that there was a crowd present during Henry's flight, which increased the potential danger. Henry did not object to this inference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's findings for clear error. The appellate court noted that other circuits have required "something more" than mere possession of a firearm during flight to support the enhancement, such as the firearm being loaded or cocked. The Eighth Circuit found that Henry's case met this criterion because he carried a loaded, chambered, unholstered gun, which created the possibility of accidental discharge. The presence of bystanders further supported the application of the enhancement.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the application of the sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight was appropriate given the circumstances of Henry's case. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. sought to build a natural gas pipeline through McKenzie County, North Dakota. After obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, WBI attempted to acquire the necessary easements through voluntary sales. When one family refused to sell, WBI filed a federal condemnation action under the Natural Gas Act. After three years of negotiations, the parties agreed on the amount of just compensation for the easement, but the issue of attorney fees remained unresolved.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled that WBI was responsible for the family's attorney fees based on North Dakota law, which allows for such fees in condemnation proceedings. The district court relied on the precedent set by Petersburg School District of Nelson County v. Peterson.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the availability of attorney fees depends on whether state or federal law governs the compensation due. The court concluded that federal law applies because WBI was exercising the federal eminent-domain power delegated under the Natural Gas Act. The court noted that the Fifth Amendment's requirement for just compensation does not include attorney fees unless explicitly provided by statute. The Natural Gas Act does not mention attorney fees, and thus, the default rule under the Fifth Amendment applies. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees, holding that WBI is not obligated to pay the family's attorney fees. View "WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 rods in Twsp. 149" on Justia Law

Lisa and Peter Woodward incurred a debt of $2,214.44 for their child's dental care, which was placed with Credit Service International Corporation (CSIC) for collection. CSIC filed a claim in conciliation court, but the Woodwards did not receive notice as the summons was sent to their previous address. CSIC obtained a default judgment and attempted to garnish the Woodwards' wages. The Woodwards hired attorney Kevin Giebel, who filed a lawsuit claiming violations of Minnesota garnishment laws and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). CSIC and Muske removed the case to federal court and offered a judgment of $2,002.00 plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, which the Woodwards accepted.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the Woodwards' motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $12,075.00 out of the $29,139.00 sought. The court used the lodestar method to determine the reasonable fee, concluding that $350 per hour was appropriate and that only 34.5 of the 72.4 hours claimed were reasonable. The Woodwards requested permission to file a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied, stating that the request did not meet the standard for reconsideration and merely reargued previously considered matters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no merit in the Woodwards' arguments regarding the denial of their initial motion for attorney’s fees, the reduction of the hourly rate, and the number of hours deemed reasonable. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings and that the fee award was appropriate given the circumstances of the case. View "Woodward v. Credit Service Intl. Corp." on Justia Law

Rufus E. Dennis was convicted by a jury of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and possession of a stolen firearm. He was sentenced to 270 months in prison. Dennis appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed his robbery conviction and two firearm convictions but vacated his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor. The case was remanded for resentencing.On remand, the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska imposed a 240-month sentence. Dennis appealed again, arguing that the district court erred procedurally and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. He contended that the district court improperly applied a five-level enhancement under USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) for brandishing or possessing a firearm during the robbery, despite not having obtained a handgun. The district court found that Dennis intended to possess a firearm during the robbery, based on his repeated discussions and actions to acquire one.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the enhancement, as Dennis's conduct demonstrated with reasonable certainty his intent to possess a firearm. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an above-range sentence, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the potential harm to vulnerable individuals. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Cedar Hills Investment Co., L.L.C. leased part of the ground under the Battlefield Mall in Springfield, Missouri, to Battlefield Mall LLC. Cedar Hills suspected that Battlefield was improperly deducting certain costs from revenue-sharing payments owed under the lease. Cedar Hills sued Battlefield, and the district court found that Battlefield had improperly deducted capital expenditures and some administrative costs from shared revenue. The court approved the deduction of security costs and other administrative costs but held that Battlefield failed to state charges to subtenants for deducted costs separately as required by the lease. Cedar Hills was awarded approximately $3.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Cedar Hills on several points, including the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the court also found that Battlefield's deduction of security costs was permissible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings regarding the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the appellate court found that the district court misidentified which administrative costs were deductible and miscalculated Cedar Hills's damages. The Eighth Circuit held that Battlefield's deduction of capital expenditures breached the lease, and the failure to separately state charges also breached the lease. The court affirmed the district court's finding that security costs were common area maintenance costs. The case was remanded for further proceedings to correctly identify deductible administrative costs and recalculate damages. The appellate court granted the parties' joint motion to supplement the record. View "Cedar Hills Investment Co. v. Battlefield Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a large methamphetamine conspiracy centered in Kansas City, Missouri. Trevor Scott Sparks, the alleged leader, was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and firearms-related offenses. Markus Michael A. Patterson and Gerald L. Ginnings pled guilty to similar charges. They appealed various issues, including evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, Sentencing Guidelines calculations, and the reasonableness of their sentences.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri handled the initial proceedings. Sparks was convicted by a jury and sentenced to two concurrent life terms plus additional imprisonment. Patterson and Ginnings pled guilty and received sentences of 560 months and 520 months, respectively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Sparks raised five issues on appeal, including the admission of evidence related to uncharged murders, sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, application of a Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference for first-degree murder, and the reasonableness of his life sentence. The court found that the evidence of the murders was intrinsic to the conspiracy and not unfairly prejudicial. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Sparks' convictions and upheld the jury instructions given. The application of the murder cross-reference was deemed appropriate based on Sparks' involvement in the murders. The court also found Sparks' life sentence reasonable given his leadership role and violent conduct.Patterson challenged the application of the murder cross-reference and the drug quantity calculation. The court found sufficient evidence to support the cross-reference and upheld the drug quantity calculation. Ginnings argued that the district court erred in calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. The court found no error in the district court's reliance on trial evidence and upheld the sentence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in each case. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Diana Delgado owed money on a department store credit card, and Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased the debt and sued her in Minnesota state court. Delgado did not respond to the summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of Midland. Instead of seeking reconsideration or appealing the default judgment, Delgado filed a federal lawsuit against Midland, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including that Midland tried to collect the debt without owning it.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Delgado's case, concluding that the issue of debt ownership had already been resolved in the state-court action and gave the default judgment issue-preclusive effect. Delgado appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a Minnesota state-court default judgment can have issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit. The court relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Herreid v. Deaver, which established that a default judgment is conclusive on the facts essential to its existence, even if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The court found that Midland's ownership of the debt was essential to the default judgment and that Delgado had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the default judgment was a final determination on the merits and that applying collateral estoppel did not work an injustice in this case. View "Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

Sandra Jones, representing the estate of her deceased son Antonio Jones, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arkansas state law against Faulkner County, Arkansas, and jail officials Garry Stewart, Karen Grant, and Leanne Dixon. She claimed that the officials exhibited deliberate indifference to Antonio’s serious medical needs, violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that Stewart committed medical malpractice. Jones also alleged that Faulkner County’s policies contributed to Antonio’s death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s medical needs and that Jones could not establish a medical malpractice claim against Stewart due to the absence of a doctor-patient relationship. The court also dismissed the municipal liability claim against Faulkner County, concluding that no jail policy caused Antonio’s death.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the actions taken by Grant and Dixon did not constitute deliberate indifference. Grant responded to Antonio’s symptoms by placing him on a medical watch and took appropriate actions based on the information available to her at the time. Dixon, who was not a medical professional, followed her superior’s instructions and did not disregard any substantial risk of harm. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the municipal liability claim, as there was no constitutional violation by the county employees. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim against Stewart. View "Jones v. Faulkner County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Bob Robison Commercial Flooring Inc. (BRCF) was hired to install a vinyl gym floor at a middle school in Trumann, Arkansas. BRCF subcontracted the painting of volleyball and basketball lines to Robert Liles Parking Lot Services (Liles). Liles's work was faulty, leading to the rejection of the gym floor. BRCF had to remove and replace the floor, incurring a cost of $181,415.39. BRCF submitted a claim to RLI Insurance Company (RLI) under its builder’s risk policy, which RLI denied, citing an exclusion for losses caused by workmanship errors.BRCF filed a lawsuit in state court for declaratory judgment and breach-of-contract damages. RLI removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The district court denied RLI’s motion to dismiss, finding that BRCF had stated plausible claims. However, after limited discovery, the district court granted RLI’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for damage resulting from defective workmanship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. BRCF argued that the policy’s ensuing loss clause should restore coverage for the replacement cost of the vinyl gym floor. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the policy was not ambiguous and that the ensuing loss clause did not apply because the damage was solely caused by the excluded peril of faulty workmanship. The court concluded that BRCF failed to identify a separate covered peril that would trigger the ensuing loss clause, and thus, the entire loss was excluded from coverage. View "Bob Robison Commercial Floor v. RLI Insurance Company" on Justia Law