Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Matthew Mungai, a Black man of Kenyan origin, sued the University of Minnesota, alleging racial discrimination and harassment while he was a student. He claimed violations under Title VI, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence. Mungai detailed several incidents of racial harassment by students and staff over three years, including derogatory comments and threats. He reported some incidents to university staff and the Student Conflict Resolution Center (SCRC).The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Mungai's claims, finding that his amended complaint failed to state a claim. Mungai appealed, focusing on his Title VI claim and challenging the dismissal with prejudice of his Title VI, MHRA, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court adopted the deliberate indifference standard for third-party harassment claims under Title VI, similar to Title IX. To establish liability, Mungai needed to show that the University was deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment by individuals under its control. The court found that Mungai's allegations did not plausibly show that he reported the incidents to an appropriate person with authority to take corrective action. Additionally, the court found that Mungai did not provide sufficient facts to establish that the University acted with deliberate indifference.The court also upheld the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Mungai's MHRA, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983 claims. The MHRA claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Fourteenth Amendment claim could not be brought directly, and the University was not a "person" under § 1983.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Mungai v. University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

Lugene Shipp and Dione Mobley were charged with conspiring to distribute heroin resulting in death and distribution resulting in death after M.W. died of heroin intoxication. M.W. had purchased heroin from Kami Kinzenbach, who sourced it from Shipp and Mobley. M.W. was found dead in his bedroom with heroin and fentanyl residue. An autopsy confirmed heroin intoxication as the cause of death. Kinzenbach's testimony and electronic messages linked Shipp and Mobley to the heroin sold to M.W.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa conducted a bench trial, convicting Shipp on both counts and Mobley only on the conspiracy count. Shipp and Mobley challenged their convictions based on evidentiary rulings, the Confrontation Clause, and sufficiency of the evidence. Mobley also argued that the district court erroneously relied on acquitted conduct at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not err in admitting the electronic messages from M.W. and Sidnee, as they were either not hearsay or fell under hearsay exceptions. The court also concluded that the admission of these statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause since they were not testimonial. Additionally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the heroin distributed by Shipp caused M.W.'s death, rejecting the defendants' speculative claims about other potential sources of heroin.Regarding Mobley's sentencing, the court determined that the district court properly considered M.W.'s death and drug quantities associated with the conspiracy, as Mobley was convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin resulting in death. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences of both Shipp and Mobley. View "United States v. Shipp" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of in-state and out-of-state precious metal traders and their representatives (the "Bullion Traders") challenging Minnesota Statutes Chapter 80G, which regulates bullion transactions. The Bullion Traders argued that the statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause due to its extraterritorial reach, as defined by the term "Minnesota transaction."The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota initially found that Chapter 80G violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was then remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for a severability analysis. The district court concluded that striking portions of the "Minnesota transaction" definition cured the extraterritoriality concern and complied with Minnesota severability law.The Bullion Traders appealed, arguing that the severed statute still applied extraterritorially and that the district court erred in applying Minnesota severability law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the severed definition of "Minnesota transaction" no longer regulated wholly out-of-state commerce and that the statute, as severed, was complete and capable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court correctly severed the extraterritorial provisions from Chapter 80G, and the remaining statute did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court also agreed that the severed statute complied with Minnesota severability law, as the valid provisions were not essentially and inseparably connected with the void provisions, and the remaining statute was complete and executable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Styczinski v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Principal Springer was involved in drug dealing within 1,000 feet of a school and had multiple firearms in his apartment. Following a lengthy investigation, a search of his apartment revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms. He was charged with conspiring to deal drugs within a school zone and unlawfully possessing firearms due to his drug use and a prior misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction. Springer moved to dismiss the firearm count, arguing that the restrictions violated the Second Amendment. The district court disagreed, and Springer pleaded guilty while reserving the right to appeal his Second Amendment challenges. He was sentenced to 110 months in prison.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Springer’s motion to dismiss the firearm count. Springer then pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issues. He received concurrent sentences of 110 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statute prohibiting drug users from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is not facially unconstitutional, referencing its previous decision in United States v. Veasley. The court also rejected Springer’s as-applied challenge to the statute prohibiting domestic abusers from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), noting that a conviction under any one of the § 922(g) categories is sufficient. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to grant a downward variance in sentencing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Springer" on Justia Law

Crabar/GBF, Inc. (Crabar) sued Mark Wright, Wright Printing Co. (WPCO), Mardra Sikora, Jamie Frederickson, and Alexandra Kohlhaas for trade secret violations and related claims. Crabar alleged that after purchasing WPCO's folder business, WPCO retained and used confidential information, including customer lists and sales data, to launch a competing folder business. Crabar also claimed that former employees Kohlhaas and Frederickson took and used Crabar's confidential information to aid WPCO's new business.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska held an eleven-day trial, where the jury found all defendants liable on each count, awarding Crabar over five million dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages. Post-trial motions led to a final amended judgment of roughly four million dollars against the defendants. Defendants appealed, challenging several of the district court’s rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, including the denial of WPCO's motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding a contractual damages limitation, finding WPCO waived the argument by not raising it in the final pretrial order. The court also upheld the enforceability of confidentiality agreements signed by Frederickson and Kohlhaas, and found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference, and causation of damages.The Eighth Circuit also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on damages, as the expert's assumptions were not fundamentally unsupported. The court found no error in the jury's award calculations, rejecting the argument of double recovery and affirming the sufficiency of evidence linking defendants' actions to Crabar's damages. The court concluded that the jury's awards were not excessive or the result of passion or prejudice. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Crabar/GBF, Inc. v. Wright" on Justia Law

Arkansas Act 629 criminalized many previously legal hemp products. A coalition of affected businesses sued state officers, alleging that Act 629 is unconstitutional. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the state's motion to dismiss the Governor and Attorney General.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Supremacy Clause and due process claims. The court concluded that the 2018 Farm Bill likely preempted Act 629 and that the Act was likely void for vagueness. The court also found that the Governor and Attorney General were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were sufficiently connected to the enforcement of Act 629.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the 2018 Farm Bill did not expressly preempt Act 629 because the Act's savings clause allowed for the continuous transportation of hemp through Arkansas. The court also found that Act 629 did not conflict with the 2018 Farm Bill's purpose of legalizing hemp production, as the federal law allows states to regulate hemp production more stringently. Additionally, the court concluded that Act 629 was not unconstitutionally vague, as the terms "continuous transportation," "synthetic substance," and "psychoactive substances" were sufficiently clear.The court further held that the Governor and Attorney General were entitled to sovereign immunity because they did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of Act 629. The court vacated the preliminary injunction, reversed the order denying the motion to dismiss the Governor and Attorney General, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bio Gen LLC v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Reginald Robinson, Jr. entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment and a motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release. Robinson appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress based on an invalid Miranda waiver and lack of reasonable suspicion, and his motion to dismiss the indictment challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3).The district court denied Robinson’s motion to suppress, concluding that Officer Siferd did not circumvent Miranda and that Robinson’s waiver of his rights was knowing and voluntary. The court also found that Officer Siferd had reasonable suspicion to detain Robinson based on the Walmart employee’s report and the odor of marijuana. The district court denied Robinson’s motion to dismiss the indictment, relying on Eighth Circuit precedent that upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court found no evidence that Officer Siferd engaged in an orchestrated effort to circumvent Miranda and concluded that Robinson’s waiver of his rights was knowing and voluntary. The court also held that Officer Siferd had reasonable suspicion to detain Robinson based on the shoplifting report and the odor of marijuana. Additionally, the court upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3), noting that Robinson’s challenges were foreclosed by circuit precedent. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Leslie Isben Rogge, aged 85, filed a motion for compassionate release in 2022, citing his age, deteriorating health, and need for specialized care as extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. Rogge argued that his release would be consistent with applicable sentencing policy statements. The district court denied the motion without prejudice, stating that Rogge was not eligible to request relief himself under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA).Rogge was convicted and sentenced in five separate armed bank robbery cases between 1984 and 1997. In July 2021, he filed a pro se motion for compassionate release, which was denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He filed a second motion in July 2022, and the court appointed a Federal Public Defender, who filed an Emergency Motion for Reconsideration. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Rogge failed to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances and that his criminal history weighed against release. The district court concluded that Rogge was an "old law" inmate, ineligible to seek compassionate release under § 3582(c) until at least October 25, 2025, and denied the motion without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that defendants who committed their crimes before November 1, 1987, are not eligible to move for § 3582(c) compassionate release relief on their own behalf. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing with other circuits that the FSA did not alter the exclusion of offenses predating November 1, 1987. Therefore, only the Bureau of Prisons may initiate a compassionate release request for Rogge, and it did not do so in this case. View "United States v. Rogge" on Justia Law

Donterious Stephens was present when Officer Juanita Mills arrested his mother, Mary Stephens, at her workplace. Donterious approached the scene and asked Officer Mills why his mother was being arrested. Officer Mills warned him not to walk up on her, and Donterious complied by standing back. After Mary was placed in a police vehicle, Donterious's father, Warren Stephens, was also arrested. Donterious then spoke to Officer Mills again, and she ordered his arrest. Donterious was arrested but not charged. Mary Stephens and another plaintiff sued Officer Mills, alleging that Donterious's arrest was unlawful.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Officer Mills's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Donterious's arrest was lawful. Officer Mills appealed this decision, arguing that the undisputed material evidence showed she did not violate Donterious's rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that Officer Mills did not have actual or arguable probable cause to arrest Donterious for obstructing government operations. The court found that Donterious's mere presence at the arrest scene and his questioning of Officer Mills did not provide probable cause for his arrest. The court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment and qualified immunity for Officer Mills, concluding that Donterious's actions did not amount to obstruction under Arkansas law. View "Willis v. Mills" on Justia Law

Kevon Spratt was charged with nine counts related to a series of robberies in western Iowa during the fall of 2022. The charges included four robberies or attempted robberies and associated firearm offenses, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Spratt moved to dismiss one count and to suppress evidence seized from his car, but the district court denied both motions. The jury acquitted him on two counts but convicted him on the remaining charges. Spratt appealed his convictions and sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Spratt's motions to dismiss and suppress evidence. The jury found him guilty on seven counts, leading to a total sentence of 432 months and five years of supervised release. Spratt appealed these decisions, arguing errors in the denial of his motions, the admission of evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying Spratt's motion to suppress, as the officers had probable cause based on collective knowledge and communication. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss Count 8, ruling that attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a crime of violence. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged robberies under Rule 404(b) and determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Spratt's convictions. The court also upheld the district court's sentencing decisions, finding no procedural or substantive errors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Spratt's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Spratt" on Justia Law