Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
BCC Partners, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America
BCC Partners, LLC ("BCC") contracted with Ben F. Blanton Construction, Inc. ("Blanton") to build an apartment complex in Creve Coeur, Missouri. Blanton obtained an insurance policy from Travelers Property Casualty Company of America ("Travelers"), naming Blanton as the "Named Insured" and BCC as an "Additional Named Insured." A retaining wall failure during construction led to damage and delays, resulting in multiple insurance claims. Travelers paid $1.3 million into an escrow account, which was divided among claimants. BCC later sought coverage for loss of rental income and soft costs due to the delays, but Travelers denied the claim after an initial advance payment of $200,000.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Travelers, concluding that BCC was not entitled to the demanded payments under the Policy. BCC appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under the plain meaning of the Policy, only a "Named Insured" is covered for losses of rental income and soft costs. BCC, as an "Additional Named Insured," did not qualify for such coverage. The court found that the Policy's language was clear and unambiguous, and BCC's arguments to the contrary were unavailing. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling that Travelers did not breach the Policy and that BCC's claim for vexatious refusal to pay also failed. View "BCC Partners, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Insurance Law
Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Conmac Investments, Inc., an Arkansas company, owns, leases, and manages farms. Between 2004 and 2013, Conmac purchased farmland and negotiated to receive rights to "base acres," which entitle the owner to subsidy payments from the USDA. Initially, Conmac did not claim deductions for amortization of these base acres on its tax returns from 2004 to 2008. In 2009, Conmac began amortizing its base acres without filing an "Application for Change of Accounting Method" and claimed amortization deductions for the years 2009 through 2014. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions, leading Conmac to petition the Tax Court.The United States Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, determining that Conmac's decision to amortize base acres constituted a change in the method of accounting, which required IRS approval. Conmac appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that Conmac's initiation of amortization for base acres in 2009 was indeed a change in the method of accounting. According to Treasury Regulation § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2), changing the treatment of an asset from nonamortizable to amortizable is a change in the method of accounting. The court rejected Conmac's argument that the change was due to a change in underlying facts, noting that Conmac's realization about the amortization of base acres did not constitute a change in underlying facts but rather a change in the timing of cost recovery.The court also addressed the Section 481 adjustment, concluding that the "year of the change" was 2013, when the Commissioner changed Conmac's method of accounting, thus triggering the adjustment to prevent duplicated deductions or omitted income. The judgment of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Agriculture Law, Tax Law
United States v. Drum
A 13-year-old girl reported to her school principal that her mother’s ex-boyfriend had inappropriately touched her in a bathtub on tribal land. During a forensic interview, she described being touched on the outside of her vaginal area and feeling the man’s penis on her back. The accused denied the allegations but later admitted to being naked in the bathtub with the children, claiming he left immediately. In a subsequent law enforcement interview, he responded “mmhmm” to statements that he had touched the girl’s vagina, which an agent interpreted as acknowledgments rather than admissions. At trial, the girl testified about two incidents: one in a bathtub when she was seven, and another in a bedroom where she awoke bleeding. The government introduced a recording of the “mmhmm” responses, and the jury was instructed that silence or failure to deny an accusation could be considered an admission.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 12 and abusive sexual contact of a child. The defendant moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. The district court denied acquittal but granted a new trial, citing concerns about leading questions during testimony, the prejudicial effect of the “mmhmm” responses and related jury instruction, and the mandatory minimum sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by granting a new trial on grounds not raised in the defendant’s Rule 33 motion, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellate court reversed the order granting a new trial, reinstated the convictions, and remanded the case for sentencing. View "United States v. Drum" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Native American Law
United States v. Tate
A police officer in Bismarck, North Dakota, smelled marijuana in a hotel and traced the scent to Room 118, occupied by Leonard Tate. The officer obtained a search warrant based on the smell and Tate's criminal history. The search revealed fentanyl, cash, firearm parts, and other items. Tate was charged with three drug-related crimes and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and the search exceeded its scope. The district court denied the motion, and Tate pled guilty to one count of conspiracy, preserving his right to appeal the suppression order.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, the search did not exceed the warrant's scope, and the good-faith exception applied. Tate appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that the search exceeded its scope.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the smell of marijuana alone provided substantial support for probable cause, especially given the officer's training and experience. The court also found that the search did not exceed the warrant's scope, as the items seized were in plain view and their incriminating nature was immediately apparent. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Tate's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Brokken v. Hennepin County
Petra Brokken sued her employer, Hennepin County, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and wrongful discharge under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute. Brokken claimed that the County's Covid-19 vaccine and testing policy conflicted with her religious beliefs. After initially granting her a religious exemption, the County revised its policy, threatening termination and loss of accrued benefits if she did not comply. Brokken retired under duress and subsequently filed her lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Brokken's claims. The court ruled that she failed to plead an adverse employment action, did not plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with the County’s policy, and that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. Additionally, the court found that Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute does not create a private right of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim under Minnesota’s Refusal of Treatment statute, agreeing that it does not create a private right of action. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Brokken’s Title VII and MHRA claims. The appellate court held that Brokken plausibly pled an adverse employment action and sufficiently alleged that her religious beliefs conflicted with the County’s policy. The court also recognized that the MHRA provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Brokken v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Labor & Employment Law
United States v. McKinney
Booker Deon McKinney pleaded guilty to possession of ammunition as an unlawful drug user, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 120 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. McKinney later moved to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss his indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied his motion.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa initially reviewed the case. McKinney was indicted in January 2023 and pleaded guilty in June 2023. In January 2024, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, which the district court denied. McKinney was sentenced on January 26, 2024, and subsequently appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. McKinney argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the indictment, miscalculated his base offense level, relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence, and improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing. The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decisions. The court held that there was no intervening change in the law that justified McKinney's belated request to withdraw his plea. The court also upheld the district court's calculation of the base offense level and its reliance on hearsay evidence, finding it sufficiently reliable. Finally, the court found McKinney's sentence substantively reasonable, noting that the district court had appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. McKinney" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Couser v. Shelby County
Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances imposing various requirements on pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, arguing they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the enforcement of the ordinances.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA and Iowa law preempted the counties' ordinances. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances. The counties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story County ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances were safety standards, which are preempted by the PSA. Additionally, the court held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) had granted a permit. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "Couser v. Shelby County" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law
Kale v. Aero Simulation, Inc.
Matthew Kale sued his employer, Aero Simulation, Inc. (ASI), alleging religious and disability discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Constitution, and state law. ASI required all employees to receive the Covid-19 vaccine, with non-compliance resulting in disciplinary action, including termination. Kale requested a religious exemption, citing his belief that his body is a temple of the Holy Spirit and should not be subjected to unwanted intrusions. ASI denied his request, and Kale was terminated. He filed a charge with the EEOC, which issued a right to sue letter.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed Kale’s claims, ruling that he failed to plausibly plead religious beliefs conflicting with ASI’s Covid-19 policy, did not allege that ASI regarded him as disabled due to his unvaccinated status, and that his proposed amended complaint was futile. Kale appealed the dismissal of his federal law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Kale failed to allege facts showing that ASI’s testing requirement conflicted with his bona fide religious beliefs. The court noted that Kale’s complaint did not adequately connect his objection to testing with specific religious principles. Additionally, the court found that Kale did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his ADA claim, as he only asserted religious discrimination in his EEOC charge. The court also upheld the denial of Kale’s motion to amend his complaint, deeming it futile as it contained the same deficiencies as the original complaint. The judgment was affirmed. View "Kale v. Aero Simulation, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Stewart v. Garcia
Clayton Stewart was involved in a police incident where Officer Victor Garcia of the Jonesboro, Arkansas police department tased him while he was climbing a fence. Stewart fell and was paralyzed as a result. Stewart filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Garcia, Jonesboro Chief of Police Rick Elliot, and the City of Jonesboro, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, and Stewart appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Stewart argued that Garcia lacked probable cause to arrest him, used excessive force, and was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. He also claimed that Elliot was liable as Garcia’s supervisor and that the police department’s policies were unconstitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Garcia had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Stewart for misdemeanor assault and fleeing. Regarding the excessive force claim, the court found that while tasing Stewart in an elevated position could be considered deadly force, Stewart’s right to be free from such force was not clearly established at the time of the incident, entitling Garcia to qualified immunity. On the deliberate indifference claim, the court concluded that although a reasonable jury could find Garcia was aware of Stewart’s serious medical needs, Stewart failed to show that the right was clearly established, granting Garcia qualified immunity. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the supervisory liability claim against Elliot and the municipal liability claim against the City of Jonesboro, finding no evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional acts or inadequate policies. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Stewart v. Garcia" on Justia Law
Sprafka v. Medical Device Bus. Services
Julie Sprafka underwent knee replacement surgery in August 2016 using the ATTUNE knee replacement system designed by DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Four years later, she required revision surgery due to the debonding of the tibial baseplate. Sprafka filed a lawsuit against DePuy, claiming strict liability, negligent products liability, and breach of warranties. She later withdrew the warranty claims and proceeded with the products liability claims, alleging defective design and failure to warn.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. DePuy moved to exclude the opinions of Sprafka’s design defect expert, Dr. Mari S. Truman, and for summary judgment. The district court granted DePuy’s motions, excluding Dr. Truman’s opinions for failing to meet the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert standards. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of DePuy, as Sprafka could not prove her design defect claim without expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Dr. Truman’s opinions were unreliable and speculative. The appellate court noted that Dr. Truman’s opinions were not based on independent research and lacked scientific scrutiny. The court also found that Sprafka did not preserve the argument that Dr. Kristoffer Breien’s expert opinion alone could support her design defect claim. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, as Sprafka failed to provide sufficient expert testimony to support her claims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Sprafka v. Medical Device Bus. Services" on Justia Law