Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Cedar Hills Investment Co., L.L.C. leased part of the ground under the Battlefield Mall in Springfield, Missouri, to Battlefield Mall LLC. Cedar Hills suspected that Battlefield was improperly deducting certain costs from revenue-sharing payments owed under the lease. Cedar Hills sued Battlefield, and the district court found that Battlefield had improperly deducted capital expenditures and some administrative costs from shared revenue. The court approved the deduction of security costs and other administrative costs but held that Battlefield failed to state charges to subtenants for deducted costs separately as required by the lease. Cedar Hills was awarded approximately $3.5 million in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Cedar Hills on several points, including the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the court also found that Battlefield's deduction of security costs was permissible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings regarding the improper deduction of capital expenditures and the failure to separately state charges. However, the appellate court found that the district court misidentified which administrative costs were deductible and miscalculated Cedar Hills's damages. The Eighth Circuit held that Battlefield's deduction of capital expenditures breached the lease, and the failure to separately state charges also breached the lease. The court affirmed the district court's finding that security costs were common area maintenance costs. The case was remanded for further proceedings to correctly identify deductible administrative costs and recalculate damages. The appellate court granted the parties' joint motion to supplement the record. View "Cedar Hills Investment Co. v. Battlefield Mall, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case involves a large methamphetamine conspiracy centered in Kansas City, Missouri. Trevor Scott Sparks, the alleged leader, was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and firearms-related offenses. Markus Michael A. Patterson and Gerald L. Ginnings pled guilty to similar charges. They appealed various issues, including evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, Sentencing Guidelines calculations, and the reasonableness of their sentences.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri handled the initial proceedings. Sparks was convicted by a jury and sentenced to two concurrent life terms plus additional imprisonment. Patterson and Ginnings pled guilty and received sentences of 560 months and 520 months, respectively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Sparks raised five issues on appeal, including the admission of evidence related to uncharged murders, sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, application of a Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference for first-degree murder, and the reasonableness of his life sentence. The court found that the evidence of the murders was intrinsic to the conspiracy and not unfairly prejudicial. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Sparks' convictions and upheld the jury instructions given. The application of the murder cross-reference was deemed appropriate based on Sparks' involvement in the murders. The court also found Sparks' life sentence reasonable given his leadership role and violent conduct.Patterson challenged the application of the murder cross-reference and the drug quantity calculation. The court found sufficient evidence to support the cross-reference and upheld the drug quantity calculation. Ginnings argued that the district court erred in calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. The court found no error in the district court's reliance on trial evidence and upheld the sentence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in each case. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Diana Delgado owed money on a department store credit card, and Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased the debt and sued her in Minnesota state court. Delgado did not respond to the summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of Midland. Instead of seeking reconsideration or appealing the default judgment, Delgado filed a federal lawsuit against Midland, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including that Midland tried to collect the debt without owning it.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Delgado's case, concluding that the issue of debt ownership had already been resolved in the state-court action and gave the default judgment issue-preclusive effect. Delgado appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a Minnesota state-court default judgment can have issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit. The court relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Herreid v. Deaver, which established that a default judgment is conclusive on the facts essential to its existence, even if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The court found that Midland's ownership of the debt was essential to the default judgment and that Delgado had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the default judgment was a final determination on the merits and that applying collateral estoppel did not work an injustice in this case. View "Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

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McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

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Sandra Jones, representing the estate of her deceased son Antonio Jones, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arkansas state law against Faulkner County, Arkansas, and jail officials Garry Stewart, Karen Grant, and Leanne Dixon. She claimed that the officials exhibited deliberate indifference to Antonio’s serious medical needs, violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that Stewart committed medical malpractice. Jones also alleged that Faulkner County’s policies contributed to Antonio’s death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s medical needs and that Jones could not establish a medical malpractice claim against Stewart due to the absence of a doctor-patient relationship. The court also dismissed the municipal liability claim against Faulkner County, concluding that no jail policy caused Antonio’s death.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the actions taken by Grant and Dixon did not constitute deliberate indifference. Grant responded to Antonio’s symptoms by placing him on a medical watch and took appropriate actions based on the information available to her at the time. Dixon, who was not a medical professional, followed her superior’s instructions and did not disregard any substantial risk of harm. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the municipal liability claim, as there was no constitutional violation by the county employees. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim against Stewart. View "Jones v. Faulkner County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

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Bob Robison Commercial Flooring Inc. (BRCF) was hired to install a vinyl gym floor at a middle school in Trumann, Arkansas. BRCF subcontracted the painting of volleyball and basketball lines to Robert Liles Parking Lot Services (Liles). Liles's work was faulty, leading to the rejection of the gym floor. BRCF had to remove and replace the floor, incurring a cost of $181,415.39. BRCF submitted a claim to RLI Insurance Company (RLI) under its builder’s risk policy, which RLI denied, citing an exclusion for losses caused by workmanship errors.BRCF filed a lawsuit in state court for declaratory judgment and breach-of-contract damages. RLI removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The district court denied RLI’s motion to dismiss, finding that BRCF had stated plausible claims. However, after limited discovery, the district court granted RLI’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for damage resulting from defective workmanship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. BRCF argued that the policy’s ensuing loss clause should restore coverage for the replacement cost of the vinyl gym floor. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the policy was not ambiguous and that the ensuing loss clause did not apply because the damage was solely caused by the excluded peril of faulty workmanship. The court concluded that BRCF failed to identify a separate covered peril that would trigger the ensuing loss clause, and thus, the entire loss was excluded from coverage. View "Bob Robison Commercial Floor v. RLI Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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James M. Saylor, an inmate, sued the Director of Nebraska’s Department of Correctional Services, alleging deprivation of accommodations, unlawful placement in solitary confinement, and discrimination based on his disability (PTSD). Saylor had previously been assaulted by other inmates in 2002, leading to his PTSD diagnosis. He had won a $250,000 judgment in 2010 for the Department's failure to prevent the attack and provide adequate care. Saylor had filed multiple lawsuits in federal and state courts regarding his confinement conditions, all of which were dismissed.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed Saylor's current complaint, concluding that his claims were barred by res judicata. Saylor argued that his claims were based on new facts occurring after his previous lawsuits, specifically the rescission of accommodations and his placement in solitary confinement in 2018.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Saylor's claims were barred by res judicata because they arose from the same nucleus of operative facts as his previous lawsuits. The court noted that Saylor's proposed amended complaint in his earlier federal case (Saylor I) included an ADA claim based on the same facts, and thus, he could have brought the ADA claim at that time. The court also found that Saylor's new allegations did not constitute new specific discriminatory events but were merely additional evidence of the same ongoing issues.The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Saylor's motions for an extension of time to amend the complaint, to alter or amend the judgment, and for leave to file a third amended complaint, as these motions were either procedurally deficient or futile. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Saylor v. Jeffreys" on Justia Law

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Najawaun Quinn, Dimetri Smith, and three others were charged with 18 counts of racketeering and firearm offenses related to their association with the Savage Life Boys Gang (SLB Gang) in Davenport, Iowa. The other three defendants pleaded guilty. After a trial, Quinn was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. Smith was found guilty of two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and two counts of use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The district court denied their motions for judgment of acquittal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that the SLB Gang constituted an "enterprise" under the racketeering statute, as it had a common purpose, relationships among members, and sufficient longevity. The court also found that Quinn and Smith committed the violent assaults to maintain or increase their positions within the gang. The court rejected the argument that the SLB Gang lacked the necessary structure to be considered an enterprise.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the SLB Gang was an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity and that Quinn and Smith committed the violent assaults to maintain or increase their positions within the gang. The court also upheld the jury instructions and sentencing decisions, finding no abuse of discretion or plain error. The court concluded that the district court's factual determinations were supported by the evidence and that the defendants were not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law

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A native and citizen of Mexico, Lilia Salinas, who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2007, was convicted in North Dakota state court in 2011 for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. She received a suspended sentence of 360 days’ imprisonment. In 2021, she was convicted again in North Dakota state court for two counts of aggravated assault of a victim under 12 years of age, receiving a 10-year sentence with one year suspended. Based on these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against her in 2022, charging her with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a controlled substance violation and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for a crime of child abuse.An immigration judge (IJ) found Salinas removable under both charges, applying the categorical approach to determine that her marijuana conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under federal law. The IJ compared the North Dakota definition of marijuana at the time of her conviction with the federal definition in effect at that time, concluding they were substantially similar. The IJ also pretermitted her application for cancellation of removal, as her 2011 conviction stopped the clock on her period of continuous residence, making her ineligible for relief.Salinas appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the IJ should have compared the state statute to the federal definition in effect at the time of her removal proceedings. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the appropriate comparison was with the federal definition at the time of conviction and that the state and federal definitions were a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court held that the proper comparison for determining removability under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is between the state statute at the time of conviction and the federal Controlled Substances Act in effect at that time. The court also rejected Salinas’s argument that the North Dakota definition of marijuana was overbroad compared to the federal definition. Consequently, the petition for review was denied. View "Salinas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

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Roberto Williams was convicted by a jury of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. The charges stemmed from two separate incidents. In the first incident, on July 31, 2020, St. Cloud police officers stopped a car in which Williams was a passenger and found a handgun in the glove compartment. In the second incident, on November 13, 2020, after a fatal shooting involving Williams's fiancée's son, police found two firearms in a garbage bin outside Williams's home.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied Williams's pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained during the July 31 stop and from a warrant search of his cell phone. The court also denied his motion to exclude evidence of five prior Illinois convictions, which Williams argued were invalid and could not serve as predicates for the felon-in-possession charges. Williams was sentenced to concurrent 120-month sentences on each count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Williams's motion to suppress evidence from the July 31 stop, concluding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress evidence from the cell phone search, applying the Leon good faith exception. Additionally, the court rejected Williams's argument that his prior Illinois convictions were invalid, holding that his motion was an impermissible collateral attack on the state convictions, which had not been vacated by an Illinois court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, maintaining Williams's convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law