Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Missouri inmate Barr filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that state-contracted health care providers violated the Eighth Amendment when they stopped administering his multiple sclerosis medication. Barr’s medical record indicated that he was being followed “for high suspicion of multiple sclerosis” but had discontinued taking Avonex “on his own due to undesirable side effects.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. While inmates have a right to adequate medical care, they have no right to receive a particular or requested course of treatment. Defendants’ decision to halt Barr’s Avonex injections did not rise to a level akin to criminal recklessness and was probably not even negligent. Even if Barr did not refuse his injections, Defendants had good reason to end them. Three different health care providers wrote in Barr’s medical record that he had complained to them about side effects; it was well within Defendants’ independent medical judgment to stop administering Avonex. Barr does not allege that any harm occurred after the injections ended. After Barr’s injections were halted, Defendants continued to provide medical care—prescribing other medication, scheduling follow-ups, and requesting additional diagnostic tests. No rational trier of fact could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent. View "Barr v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Phillips, who resided with Coleman, called 911, stating that Coleman had punched her and had a gun. North Little Rock Officer Crowder responded, finding Phillips outside the residence with facial injuries. Phillips opened the door. She and Crowder entered the residence, where Crowder confronted and arrested Coleman after a struggle that involved the use of a taser. Crowder found a large bag of white substance and a large amount of cash in Coleman's pockets, small baggies of white powder on the stairwell, and a handgun and another bag of cocaine in a loveseat near where Coleman was arrested. Additional officers responded and discovered firearms and drugs during a protective sweep of the residence and a warrant search the following day. At a hearing, Phillips contradicted Officer Crowder, denying stating that Coleman struck her and was armed, and denying opening the door and escorting Crowder inside. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress; Coleman’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), and his 161-month sentence. Phillips’s testimony established that she possessed common authority over the premises. The court explicitly credited Crowder’s testimony as more accurate. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Wilkins committed multiple violations of his supervised release, including an assault on his wife. The district court revoked Wilkins’s supervised release and sentenced him to 12 months’ imprisonment with three years’ supervised release, with a condition that prohibited Wilkins from contacting his wife, either directly or indirectly, during the full term of his supervision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. District courts have discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release “so long as the conditions are reasonably related to the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, and are consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s pertinent policy statements.” Wilkins has a long criminal history and has had numerous violations of supervised release. The court made the appropriate individualized inquiry and concluded that Wilkins “ha[s] a very serious problem with aggression” and that he was “a risk to harm other people, particularly [his] wife.” The court also ordered the probation office to work with Wilkins and his wife to try to set up a method by which the children could have visitation. View "United States v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Jackson pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846 and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court applied U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, the Career Offender Guideline, and increased Jackson’s offense level due to two prior state court convictions for a “controlled substance offense.” The court specifically found that Jackson’s 2015 Missouri conviction for possession of a controlled substance (heroin) with intent to distribute was a qualifying conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the sentencing range was properly calculated and that the sentence imposed is substantively and procedurally reasonable. The court noted that it has previously rejected an argument that Mo. Rev. Stat. 195.211 criminalizes conduct broader than the Guidelines definition. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Reggs and two others robbed a Minneapolis store, Reggs pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting a robbery that interfered with commerce and aiding and abetting the discharge of a firearm during that robbery. In calculating Reggs's sentence, the court increased his offense level by two levels, finding that Reggs "recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer," USSG 3C1.2. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The PSR explains that shortly after receiving the report of the robbery, officers located the getaway car, shined a flashlight into the car, and ordered the occupants to put their hands up; Reggs's co-conspirator drove the car away with Reggs and the third co-conspirator as passengers. After crashing into a parked car, the co-conspirators fled on foot. His co-conspirators were apprehended after a short foot chase; Reggs escaped. Reggs was arrested days later. Even if the flight of the car "recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury," that does not mean that Reggs created the risk. Application Note 5 to the reckless-endangerment guideline specifies that "the defendant is accountable for the defendant's own conduct and for conduct that the defendant aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused." The enhancement does not apply to the reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators. Mere acquiescence is insufficient; there must be some evidence of direct or active participation. View "United States v. Reggs" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension obtained a state court warrant to place a GPS tracker on Lopez-Zuniga's car for 60 days. The officer provided an affidavit detailing a drug investigation into Garcia-Jimenez, noting several controlled drug transactions involving Garcia-Jimenez; sometime before a controlled drug transaction at the apartment complex where Garcia-Jimenez was believed to live, the officer saw someone in Lopez-Zuniga's car "drop off an individual who resembled Garcia-Jimenez." Another agent later observed Lopez-Zuniga and Garcia-Jimenez get into the same car at the apartment complex and drive to a restaurant. After 60 days, the agent obtained a second warrant, citing the same information plus the results of tracking the car and of a pen register on Garcia-Jimenez's phone, showing that he and Lopez-Zuniga had 154 "contacts" over about two months. Charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846, Lopez-Zuniga successfully moved to suppress evidence obtained from the tracking devices. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the suppression of evidence obtained from the first two warrants. The first warrant application was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief in its existence would have been entirely unreasonable, and the search is not saved by the good-faith exception. The second warrant application was still insufficient. The court erred in suppressing the fruits of the third and fourth warrant applications, which were supported by information regarding controlled sales to a confidential informant. View "United States v. Lopez-Zuniga" on Justia Law

Escobar, Jackson, and Cruz were convicted of federal crimes related to a methamphetamine distribution operation; Rojas-Andrade and Garcia pleaded guilty. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions and their sentences of 137 to 330 months. Evidence seized during a search made pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant was admissible under the good-faith exception, as the totality of the circumstances showed the officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. There was no error in the denial of a motion to suppress wiretap evidence; the wiretap affidavit established that normal investigative techniques had not been successful in exposing the full extent of the drug conspiracy. The district court properly admitted recorded out-of-court statements of co-conspirators and properly imposed a two-level enhancement against Escobar for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1). Rojas-Andrade's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied; a misunderstanding of how the guidelines would apply is not a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea. There was no error in denying Jackson's motion to sever conspiracy and possession counts and no error in admitting evidence of Jackson's prior drug convictions as they were not too remote in time and were relevant under Rule 404(b). Garcia did not object to the drug quantity calculation in his PSR or at his sentencing and cannot challenge the quantity on appeal.. View "United States v. Escobar" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the district court's denial of debtor's motion for summary judgment seeking a discharge of her NCSLT debt under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8). The panel held that the district court made ample findings based on undisputed facts to support its conclusion that the loan was an educational loan within the meaning of section 523(a)(8)(A). However, the panel held that the bankruptcy court's inference in NCST's favor that TERI "funded" the loan was not reasonable because it was not supported by the evidence. Therefore, the panel remanded the issue regarding TERI's guarantee of the loan and funding of the program for further consideration. View "Page v. National Collegiate Student Loan Trust" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence on remand for convictions related to his involvement in a fraudulent real estate investment scheme. The court held that the district court's determination that M.U. was a victim under USSG 2B1.1 was not erroneous where M.U. sustained a monetary loss because of defendant's scheme. The court rejected defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 3742(g)(1), and held that the district court's application of the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of defendant's original sentencing did not violate the Constitution. Finally, defendant's remaining issues regarding the award of restitution and reasonableness of his sentence were not raised in his initial appeal and could not be raised now. View "United States v. Binkholder" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy trustee filed suit against Opportunity Finance and DZ Bank, seeking to avoid as fraudulent transfers under the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA) over $250 million in loan payments made to PettersCB, prior to Thomas Petters's acquisition of Polaroid. A second amended complaint (SAC) alleged that PHC and PCE were the successors in interest to Petters CB.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the SAC failed to state a claim of actual or constructive fraudulent transfers under MUFTA. In this case, the trustee erred in failing to adequately plead claims under the MUFTA. Rather, the trustee relied on the ponzi scheme presumption rejected by Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 645-53 (Minn. 2015). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint. View "Stoebner v. Opportunity Finance, LLC" on Justia Law