Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against defendants in an action alleging claims under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-25. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims against Defendant Kopp as untimely under the applicable statute of limitations; plaintiff failed to state a claim for direct municipal liability against Duluth because she failed to plead sufficient facts supporting an inference that the City knowingly allowed Kopp to access the database for any reason other than her official duties; and plaintiff failed to preserve any vicarious liability claim. View "Loeffler v. City of Duluth" on Justia Law

Federal filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment determining the parties obligations and any priority coverage in an underlying wrongful death suit. The Eighth Circuit held that repeatedly shooting, and encouraging others to shoot, a handgun "in the general direction" of a small lake in a residential area of Kansas City, Missouri, which results in a young child's death, qualified as "gross negligence." In this case, the employee of the insured was convicted of reckless killing and his criminal conduct was determined through state court criminal proceedings. The court held that, because the conduct constituted gross negligence under the relevant indemnity clause, defendant Great American was not liable for the loss, and the district court erred in relying on the clause to require Great American to indemnify Federal and Zurich. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Federal Insurance Co. v. Great American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and declined to adopt a "gilding exception" to the Speedy Trial Act and, even if it did, dismissal of defendant's claim would be unwarranted; defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court carefully considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and ultimately found that defendant's sentence was necessary because of defendant's extremely high risk of recidivism and lack of respect for authority; and the Special Condition 3 of his supervised release, which deals with gang association, was unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the court vacated the condition and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of a decision finding petitioner removable from the United States. The court held that the BIA did not err by concluding that petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance and an aggravated felony. In this case, petitioner's prior Missouri conviction for possession of a controlled substance in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 195.202 made him removable. View "Bueno-Muela v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of a decision finding petitioner removable from the United States. The court held that the BIA did not err by concluding that petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance and an aggravated felony. In this case, petitioner's prior Missouri conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 195.211 made him removable. View "Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence of life without parole for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that defendant's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment; the district court did not plainly err in admitting the fingerprint testimony of a government expert; any error in admitting the testimony did not affect defendant's substantial rights in light of the additional evidence presented; defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance in South Dakota met the statutory requirements as a prior felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. 841(b); the amendment of the information prior to sentencing merely corrected a clerical mistake; and, given the gravity of the offense and in light of defendant' felony convictions, defendant's sentence was constitutional. View "United States v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

Apple acquired the Rogers, Arkansas Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar, and offered its employees a benefits package that included Guardian life insurance. Megan Moore alleged that employee James Moore enrolled for “basic life coverage” equal to 150% of his $62,000 annual salary, and “voluntary term life coverage” equal to five times his salary ($310,000). Megan, his designated primary beneficiary, alleged that Apple withheld premiums for the voluntary coverage from Moore’s salary until he died in 2013, but “failed to pay over those premiums” and to forward Moore’s application to Guardian. Mehan filed a proof of claim with Guardian, which indicated that premiums had not been received. Megan sued, asserting state law claims for breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and promissory estoppel and seeks actual and punitive damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), preempted all of Moore’s claims. “Allowing state law claims premised on the existence of an ERISA plan to proceed against the plan administrator would affect relations between primary ERISA entities and impact the administration of the plan.” The court noted that Moore's Second Amended Complaint alleging claims under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) for wrongful denial of plan benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel, remains pending. View "Moore v. Apple Central, LLC" on Justia Law

Patrolling I-30, Arkansas State Police Corporal Goodman stopped a Tornado bus for following too closely. Goodman regularly received High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area summaries that reported seizures from Tornado buses; traffickers were storing drugs in unlabeled luggage. Goodman observed that bus driver was “pretty nervous” and said he was driving to Milwaukee from southern Texas while passenger manifest indicated the destination was Chicago. Goodman thought it suspicious that the company would undertake a costly cross-country trip with only four passengers. The driver consented to a search and opened doors to a luggage compartment. Goodman saw six bags with name tags plus “a black bag all by itself with no apparent markings" and no name tag. Goodman opened the black bag and reached inside, feeling what he believed was a false bottom. While trying to access the hidden compartment, Goodman saw a tag bearing Tuton’s name trapped beneath the bag’s collapsed handle. Goodman stopped searching, requested a canine unit, and questioned the passengers. Goodman testified that Tuton was “very nervous,” said his journey began in El Paso, and gave answers that “didn’t make sense.” Goodman did not ask Tuton for consent to search. About four minutes after Goodman requested the canine unit, Corporal Rapert arrived with his dog, Hemi. Hemi jumped into the luggage compartment and immediately showed behavioral changes. Rapert concluded Hemi had given a “profound alert,” but did not give a “final indication” on any bag. Rapert advised Goodman that Hemi’s behavior provided probable cause to search. Officers searched all the bags and, in Tuton’s, found eight pounds of cocaine under the false bottom. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Tuton’s motion to suppress. Discovery of the cocaine was not caused by Goodman’s prior unlawful search of the bag; Hemi’s sniff and alert were unaffected by that search. View "United States v. Tuton" on Justia Law

Rosales-Martinez was charged with sexual abuse in the second degree for inappropriately touching his step-daughter, A.C. Before trial, the state sought a protective order for A.C.’s deposition, requiring that Rosales-Martinez be separated from her by a one-way mirror and that she not be told he is on the other side. Rosales-Martinez consented to the mirror but requested A.C. be told he was present and could hear her. After hearing testimony from the child’s therapist and her foster mother, the court denied Rosales-Martinez’s request, finding that A.C. would suffer serious trauma caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant and that it would impair A.C.’s ability to communicate. Before trial, the state sought a protective order for A.C.’s testimony. Rosales-Martinez agreed to A.C. testifying by closed-circuit television, but again requested she be told he was present and could hear her. Relying on the previous findings, the judge denied Rosales-Martinez’s request. The jury deadlocked. Before retrial, A.C.’s guardian ad litem told the court that the previous procedure was still necessary based on conversations with A.C. The court reiterated its previous findings. Rosales-Martinez was convicted. Iowa courts affirmed and denied post-conviction relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a federal habeas petition. After a proper finding of necessity, a child witness may testify by use of a special procedure if under oath, subject to full cross-examination, and “observed by” the judge, jury, and defendant. View "Rosales-Martinez v. Ludwick" on Justia Law

In 2007-2010, the Hargises bought and operated nursing homes. Bobby was the sole owner of corporations that operated the homes (Operating Corporations), which were S corporations. Brenda owned interests in companies that bought and leased the homes to the Operating Corporations (Nursing Home LLCs). The Nursing Home LLCs were partnerships under 26 C.F.R. 301.7701-3(a). All the entities had net operating losses, which the Hargises deducted on their joint tax returns for 2009 and 2010. The Commissioner issued the Hargises a notice of deficiency, disallowing their deduction of most of the nursing home losses, due to the Hargises’ insufficient basis in their companies. The Hargises owed $281,766. The Tax Court ruled for the Commissioner. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Tax Court correctly denied Bobby any basis in the indebtedness of the Operating Corporations, finding “no convincing evidence that any of the lenders looked to [Bobby] as the primary obligor on the loans.” The Commissioner properly calculated Brenda’s basis from the Nursing Home LLCs’ tax returns (Schedule K-1). Her deduction of their losses is limited to “the adjusted basis of [her] interest in the partnership.” View "Hargis v. Koskinen" on Justia Law