Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence after he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant's prior conviction for burglary under the Illinois statute used a broader definition of "building" than Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and thus defendant's conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Byas" on Justia Law

Southern petitioned for review of the Board's decision ordering the company to bargain with the union. The Eighth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Southern violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by making a number of unlawful campaign statements that threatened plant closure; by making promises of benefits to employees who voted to decertify the union; by promulgating an unlawful reporting rule; by creating the impression that protected activities were under surveillance; and by unlawfully interrogating employees. However, the Board erred by determining that Southern violated section 8(a)(1) by communicating to employees that continued unionization was futile; by disparaging the union; and by threats of discipline, job loss, and other reprisals. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the Board's determination that Southern violated section 8(a)(3) because the company was motivated by anti union animus, and Southern did not prove otherwise. The Board did not err in determining that the company violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally restricting union meetings to a cubicle because the union's meeting space was a subject of mandatory bargaining. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to support the Board's findings that the 2012 petition was tainted by the company's unfair labor practices. View "Southern Bakeries, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action, alleging that State Farm's practice of deducting "labor depreciation" from estimated replacement cost in determining actual cash value breached the insurance contract. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of State Farm's motion to dismiss and certify a class. Although the court did not rule out the possibility that State Farm's use of the estimating methodology tool would produce an unreasonable estimate of the actual cash value of some partial losses, this issue may only be determined based on all the facts surrounding a particular insured's partial loss. Therefore, there were no predominant common facts at issue. Furthermore, the district court's order upholding premature classwide discovery was vacated. The court remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint and held that State Farm's petition for writ of mandamus was moot. View "In Re: State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's order holding that CRP holds a judicial lien against the real property of debtor and avoiding that lien under Bankruptcy Code 522(f)(1). The panel held that CRP's recording of its judgment fastened an existing, but presently unenforceable lien on the property. Furthermore, the fact that an unenforceable lien exists was buttressed by CRP's belief that upon the death of debtor's wife, it will have an enforceable lien that will survive the bankruptcy. View "CRP Holdings v. O'Sullivan" on Justia Law

An administrative panel's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction typically is the law of the case, ordinarily to be adhered to in the absence of clear error or manifest injustice. After the Eighth Circuit affirmed petitioner's sentence for a drug offense, he then filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court denied the motion, but granted a certificate of appealability. Seeing no error or manifest injustice, the court proceeded to the merits of the case and held that, because petitioner made the same Rule 11 argument in his direct appeal, the court declined to relitigate the issue; petitioner has not shown that the government's silence regarding a twelve-year sentence amounted to a promise that induced him to plead guilty; and defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because he failed to point to sufficient contemporaneous evidence to support his post hoc assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty absent his attorney's advice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of petitioner's section 2255 motion. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity against a trooper who shot and killed plaintiff's dog when the dog ran onto a highway and obstructed traffic. The court held that the issue was not whether the trooper had the authority to seize the dog, but whether the degree of force he employed was reasonable to accomplish the necessary seizure. In this case, the trooper's actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he was entitled to qualified immunity. Even assuming a constitutional violation, the trooper was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. Plaintiff has not cited, and the court has not found, any case concluding that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he shot and killed an unrestrained, unsupervised dog creating a serious risk to public safety and avoiding numerous attempts to control him without force. View "Hansen v. Black" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting the Union's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In this case, plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Union had engaged in unfair labor practices, in violation of section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4). The court held that the Union's conduct did not violate the statute absent a "cease doing business" object beyond the disruption of relationships with customers and suppliers, which any picketed business would suffer. The cessation of business between the Markets and their customers and suppliers was not an object prohibited by section 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). The court held that enmeshing a secondary party in the union's conflict with the owner of a now-defunct business was not conduct sufficient to constitute a violation of the statute. View "Wartman v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 653" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction of two violations of 36 C.F.R. 261.3(c), which prohibits threatening, intimidating, or intentionally interfering with any Forest officer. In this case, the citations charged defendant with harassment, which was not prohibited by section 261.3(c), and interference. Therefore, the verdict was permissible only if it rested on the theory that defendant intentionally interfered with the officers. The court held that the district court plainly erred by subjecting defendant to a constructive amendment that materially and substantially affected defendant's right to notice of the charges against him. In this case, sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions on the grounds that he intimidated the officers. Because defendant was convicted of a crime for which he was not charged, and the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McDill" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 as time-barred. The court held that the state did not knowingly and intelligently waive its statute-of-limitations defense; the district court properly analyzed the state's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) in analyzing whether to address the state's statute-of-limitations defense; the court rejected petitioner's claim that the district court incorrectly applied 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) as the trigger for his one-year limitations period; petitioner was not entitled to tolling under section 2244(d)(1)(B); the district court did not fail to toll the statute of limitations for any time during which petitioner's application was "pending" and thus his habeas petition was not timely filed under section 2244; and, whether or not the court applied the stop-clock approach, petitioner was not eligible for equitable tolling. View "Coulter v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Defendants Parker, Veltrez Black, Johnson, and Bender appealed their convictions for conspiring to possess firearms in a conspiracy involving gang members with felony convictions who enlisted "straw purchasers." In regard to Veltrez Black's contentions, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying his motion for a mistrial; the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government's statements, nor did it abuse its discretion in allowing evidence to support these statements; the court rejected Veltrez Black's remaining evidentiary contentions; the evidence was sufficient to support Veltrez Black's conviction for conspiracy; but the court vacated Veltrez Black's firearm possession conviction due to insufficient evidence and remanded for resentencing. In regard to Bender's contentions, the court affirmed defendant's conviction but vacated defendant's sentence because it was procedurally unsound due to a Guidelines calculation error. Finally, the court affirmed Parker and Johnson's convictions. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law