Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). As an initial matter, defendant's proximity to the stolen vehicle and his demeanor when the officer approached him provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for weapons. The court concluded, however, that the officer’s seizure of the key fob in defendant's pant pocket exceeded the appropriate scope of a Terry frisk, and it should have been suppressed. In this case, while defendant was relatively close to the stolen vehicle and behaving nervously, circumstances which make this question close, feeling an unidentified key fob in defendant's pocket did not provide the officer with probable cause to conclude that the key fob belonged to the stolen Pontiac. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Craddock" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, filed suit against the City and Gatso, alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates their right to procedural due process, their fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code 602.6101, and causes unjust enrichment for the City and Gatso. The City contracted with Gatso to install and operate the ATE system. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that plaintiff Hughes lacks Article III standing where he does not allege that he has incurred any costs to mitigate or avoid the threat of ATE enforcement, or that the threat of an ATE citation is sufficiently imminent, and plaintiff Mazgaj lacks third party standing where he failed to show a hindrance to his wife’s ability to protect her own interests. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff Lee's claims are ripe where he was found guilty of violating the ordinance and no further factual development is necessary. Thus, Lee has the hardship of citation and the cost of litigation. The court further concluded that the district court never had jurisdiction of Hughes and Mazgaj’s claims and therefore their claims should be remanded to state court. Plaintiffs Robinson, Sparks, Northrup, Yarpezeshkan, French, and Stimpson have established standing to bring procedural-due-process claims. However, these plaintiffs failed to state a violation of their procedural due process rights. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the system violated their substantive rights, Equal Protection claim, and unjust enrichment claim. Because the City’s appeal of the IDOT’s ruling is still pending, this claim is not ripe. Therefore, the district court should dismiss without prejudice the drivers’ state-law claims based on the alleged violation of IDOT rules. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six drivers, filed suit against the City alleging that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have relied on Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids because the facts here are materially different. The court concluded that Cedar Rapids and Des Moines offer direct access to the district court or an optional administrative proceeding with de novo appellate review. Based on this court’s holding, the other differences that the drivers allege are irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims are addressed in the Hughes opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Haiti, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that he was ineligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In this case, petitioner argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ because the IJ applied the wrong legal standard when it failed to grant petitioner a presumption that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution based on past persecution. The court concluded that a showing of past persecution does not establish a presumption under the law regarding the likelihood of future torture upon removal. Therefore, neither the BIA nor the IJ applied the wrong legal standard in petitioner's case. To the extent that petitioner's arguments challenge the agency's factual determinations, the court lacks jurisdiction to review such claims under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D). Finally, when considering petitioner's CAT claim, the immigration courts were required to determine the likelihood that petitioner would suffer future torture if removed to Haiti, and they did not err in citing or relying on relevant case law. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Martine v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, seven counts of distributing methamphetamine, and one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that he would have entered into a plea agreement with the government and received a lesser sentence had trial counsel provided proper information and advice prior to trial. The court concluded that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to properly explain petitioner's opportunity to obtain “safety valve” sentencing relief where petitioner failed to show Strickland prejudice because he did not establish that he would have truthfully provided the government with all the information and evidence he had regarding the offense. In this case, petitioner maintained his innocence and refused to accept the Plea Agreement or cooperate with the government, stating he would proceed to trial. Finally, the district court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on petitioner's pretrial threat of physical harm directed at a co-defendant who testified for the government at petitioner's trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Arteaga Talavera v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former building commissioner of the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the city. The court concluded that the present record does not support a conclusion that the city is liable because a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. In this case, plaintiff maintains that the city is liable because her harm stemmed from an official municipal policy or an unofficial municipal custom. The court explained that plaintiff tangentially refers to other evidence of the custom that she claims victimized her, but the materials cited reveal only unsubstantiated suspicions. Because no reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable dispute about the presence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct that led to her termination, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bolderson v. City of Wentzville" on Justia Law

Warner filed suit claiming that AVELA infringed their trademarks and engaged in unfair competition by licensing iconic pictures and phrases from films. On appeal, AVELA challenges a permanent injunction prohibiting them from licensing images from the films Gone with the Wind and The Wizard of Oz, as well as the animated short films featuring cat-and-mouse duo Tom and Jerry. The court concluded that AVELA’s Seventh Amendment claim is not properly before the court and thus the court declined to consider it; the court rejected AVELA's alternative claim that the $2,570,000 statutory damages award is disproportionate to the offense, insufficiently reasoned, and in violation of this court’s ruling in the previous appeal; the doctrine of judicial admissions does not bar Warner’s trademark claims; likewise, judicial estoppel does not apply; Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. does not bar Warner's trademark claims; AVELA has waived the functionality and fair use defenses; the likelihood of confusion does not always require a jury trial and, on the merits, the district court did not err by rendering summary judgment on the likelihood of confusion; the court rejected AVELA's challenges to the permanent injunction; and the district court’s order is not inconsistent with the court's ruling in the prior appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Warner Bros. Entertainment v. X One X Productions" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and then appealed the district court's conclusion that his prior conviction for second degree robbery under Missouri state law qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence solely because "robbery" was included in the commentary to USSG 4B1.2, and the court thus rejected the government's argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud and then challenged the district court's application of a two-level sentencing enhancement. The court agreed that the direct evidence of the details of how defendant's theft resulted in the victim's substantial financial hardship are, on this record, thin, and that the district court relied on some degree on inference to make such a finding. However, the court concluded that it was not clear error for the district court to have done so. Accordingly, the court upheld the substantial financial hardship enhancement under USSG 2B1.1. View "United States v. Brandriet" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court concluded that the district court properly denied defendant's request for a reduction under USSG 3B1.2 where defendant admitted in the plea agreement to involvement in the conspiracy for two and a half years and operated with another individual who admitted to distributing 45 pounds of meth. The court also concluded that the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable where the district court heard from both parties at sentencing, adequately explained his sentence, and cited all the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors at sentencing. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law