Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's revocation of his term of supervised release and imposition of two years of imprisonment. The court concluded that the district court did not procedurally err by relying on the violent facts set out in the presentence investigative report (PSIR) underlying defendant's prior arrests. The court explained that specific facts underlying the arrests may be considered for an upward departure and so should be fair game for a variance as well. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence where it gave proper consideration to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and in reaching the sentence it did. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of identification documents and misuse of a social security account number. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict for both convictions. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence related to his selective-prosecution defense because defendant waived the argument by raising it during trial instead of by pretrial motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Machorro-Xochicale" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was removed from the Associate Degree Nursing Program for behavior unbecoming of the profession and transgression of professional boundaries after CLC received student complaints about plaintiff's posts on his Facebook page. Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of his First Amendment rights and due process. After some defendants were dismissed, the district court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. The court concluded that, given the strong state interest in regulating health professions, teaching and enforcing viewpoint-neutral professional codes of ethics are a legitimate part of a professional school’s curriculum that do not, at least on their face, run afoul of the First Amendment; plaintiff made no allegation, and presented no evidence, that defendants’ reliance on the Nurses Association Code of Ethics was a pretext for viewpoint, or any other kind of discrimination; college administrators and educators in a professional school have discretion to require compliance with recognized standards of the profession, both on and off campus, so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns; plaintiff's contention, that his offensive Facebook posts were unrelated to any course assignment or requirements, is factually flawed where the posts were directed at classmates, involved their conduct in the Nursing Program, and included a physical threat related to their medical studies; plaintiff's statements had a direct impact on the students' educational experience and had the potential to impact patient care; and the First Amendment did not bar educator Frisch from making the determination that plaintiff was unable to meet the professional demands of being a nurse. The court rejected plaintiff's due process and remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keefe v. Adams" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a class action complaint against Clean Harbors, alleging state tort claims related to a chemical release of hazardous waste storage and treatment facility operated by Clean Harbors. The district court granted respondents' motion to remand their putative class action complaint to state court. The court held that, in the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3), context, the thirty-day removal period set forth in section 1446(b)(3) does not begin to run until the defendant receives from the plaintiff an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper “from which the defendant can unambiguously ascertain” that the CAFA jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. In this case, the court concluded that Clean Harbors's removal was timely; the settlement letter did not provide the necessary detail and clarity from which Clean Harbors could unambiguously ascertain that CAFA’s class-size and amount-in-controversy jurisdictional requirements had been satisfied and that the case had become removable, and thus it did not constitute “other paper” sufficient to trigger section 1446(b)(3)’s thirty-day removal period; and respondents’ expert report constituted “other paper” from which Clean Harbors could first unambiguously ascertain that CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements had been satisfied such that section 1446(b)(3)’s thirty-day removal period was triggered. Therefore, section 1446(b)(3)’s thirty-day removal period began to run only upon Clean Harbors’s receipt of the report, rendering Clean Harbors’s May 9, 2016, notice of removal timely. The court granted the petition for permission to appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gibson v. Clean Harbors Environmental" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to sex trafficking of a child and was sentenced to 144 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not err by applying a two-level enhancement because USSG 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) (using a computer to solicit customers to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor) itself expressly covers defendant's conduct. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that Note 4 is inconsistent with the guideline itself. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by applying a five-level enhancement under USSG 4B1.5(b) (engaging in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct) because defendant's arguments are foreclosed by the court's precedent in United States v. Rojas. In Rojas, the court held that subsection (b) may apply where there is no prior sex offense conviction and the only pattern of conduct is conduct involved in the present offense of conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's convictions for second-degree murder and first-degree robbery were vacated, plaintiff filed suit against several detectives who investigated the murder. In this interlocutory appeal, the detectives challenge the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because the court concluded that the detectives raised the qualified-immunity issue on the face of the papers, the court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In considering that motion, the court explained that the district court can decide as a preliminary matter whether the detectives discussed the issue of qualified immunity in sufficient detail and with sufficient citations to undisputed record evidence to enable the district court to rule on the matter. View "Ferguson v. Short" on Justia Law

After Steve Walker died in a motorcycle accident, his wife, Ronda, filed a wrongful death action against the driver of the other vehicle. The parties settled for the driver's liability policy limit and then Ronda filed suit against the couple's insurer, Progressive, to recover underinsured motorist insurance (UMI) under two policies. The district court granted Progressive's motion for summary judgment. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the policies' "owned vehicle" exclusion simply and unambiguously precludes coverage for damages sustained while the insured is occupying a vehicle he owns that is not included on the policies' declaration page. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Walker v. Progressive Direct Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C 924(e). The court concluded that the officer's observation - that the crack in the car's windshield obstructed the driver's view - provided a reasonable basis for the officer's belief that defendant was violating Minn. Stat. 169.71(a)(1) and thus justifying a traffic stop; the smell of unburned marijuana provided a basis to further detain defendant that was independent of the cracked windshield and it also provided probable cause to search the car; and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The court also concluded that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)(A), nor defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right; the district court did not err in granting the government's motion in limine seeking to preclude defendant from introducing at trial evidence regarding an internal affairs investigation of the officer; and the district court did not err in rejecting defendant's proposed jury instructions. The court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing because the court could not conclude that defendant's second-degree burglary conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Trinity Health, and former supervisors violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. Cent. Code 14-02.4-03(1). The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, concluding that she failed to show she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position, and that Trinity did not have a duty to reassign plaintiff to an alternate position. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff produced evidence that she could have performed the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation. In this case, plaintiff's written notification that she would be unable to complete the basic life support certification without medical clearance, and her statement that she required four months of physical therapy before completing the certification, could readily have been understood to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation of her condition. Consequently, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff made a request for an accommodation sufficient to trigger Trinity’s duty to engage in the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kowitz v. Trinity Health" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his request for administrative closure of his immigration proceedings. DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2012, asserting that he was removable as an alien who was present in the country without being admitted or paroled. The IJ denied the request for administrative closure, emphasizing that petitioner's infant son would not turn 21 within a reasonable time to sponsor a visa petition on his behalf, and the lack of a pending visa application made the anticipated duration of closure indefinite. The court joined the other circuits that have held that circuit courts have jurisdiction to review denials of motions for administrative closure, assuming, of course, that other judicial prerequisites (like finality) are satisfied. After determining that it has jurisdiction, the court concluded that the IJ committed no clear error of judgment in weighing the In re Avetisyan considerations and did not abuse its discretion by being unmoved by petitioner's arguments in favor of administrative closure. Because it is unclear to the court whether the BIA heard and thought about petitioner's alternative request to exercise its independent authority to grant administrative closure, the court remanded the matter to the BIA to consider whether petitioner's requests warrants a favorable exercise of the BIA's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and remanded in part. View "Gonzalez-Vega v. Lynch" on Justia Law