Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with possession of a machinegun and unlawful possession of an assault rifle. The government appealed the district court's suppression of evidence gained after police entered defendant's residence without a warrant. The court concluded that suppression based on the officers’ warrantless entry was improper. In this case, the body-camera video shows that, based on defendant's behavior, the officers’ belief he consented to their entry was objectively reasonable. Although defendant did not affirmatively express consent to the officers’ entry, he also did not try to close the front door, or protest when the officers followed him into the house. Moreover, when an officer asked if he could step into the house to talk with defendant, defendant immediately opened the screen door wider with one hand, and walked inside with his back to the officers. Therefore, the court concluded that an objectively reasonable officer could interpret that series of actions as an invitation to enter. The court also concluded that the Leon good faith exception does not apply in this case where the officers' conduct - a protective sweep in the absence of an arrest or reasonable suspicion of dangerous individuals - was clearly illegal; and the court remanded to the district court to determine whether the independent source doctrine applies. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they violated various provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681-1681x, by obtaining copies of her credit report. The district court granted the city and the law firm's motion to dismiss. The district court ordered the city and firm to give their copies to the clerk of court for safekeeping and for the clerk to destroy the copies after thirty days unless directed otherwise. Plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the district court's order did not grant an injunction for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), so the court lacked jurisdiction to review the order at this stage. The court also denied mandamus relief with respect to the district court's order dismissing some of the defendants because an appeal from the district court’s eventual final judgment is the proper vehicle for plaintiff's challenges to the order. View "Auer v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, limits who may file a petition for a visa on behalf of an immediate family member who is a foreign national. In 2009, Joel Bremer, who had previously been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, petitioned for a spousal visa on behalf of his wife, a native and citizen of the Philippines. The USCIS, exercising discretion delegated to it by the Secretary, determined that Mr. Bremer failed to show that he posed no risk to his wife and denied his petition. The Bremers filed a class action suit contending that the manner in which the USCIS makes the no-risk determinations violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1), and the Constitution. The district court granted in part the Bremers' motion for class certification, dismissed the case, and concluded that the Bremers sought judicial review of determinations that were committed to the “sole and unreviewable discretion” of the Secretary. The court remanded to the district court for further consideration of Count II where the Bremers allege that the Adam Walsh Act no longer applies to Mr. Bremer's petition; the court agreed with the Bremers that whether Mr. Bremer’s petition has already been filed, and if so, whether Clause (viii) is inapplicable, are predicate legal questions over which the district court has jurisdiction; the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., bars judicial review of the Bremers' challenges to how the Secretary has exercised his discretion to make a no-risk determination under the Act; and the court rejected the Bremers' remaining claims. View "Bremer v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Air Methods, in state court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Air Methods removed to federal court and the district court, relying on this court's decision in Botz v. Omni Air International, dismissed the complaint. In Botz, the court construed the effect of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. 4173(b)(1), pre-emption clause on state whistleblower-protection laws. Although three circuits have disagreed with Botz in relevant part, the court concluded that plaintiff's claim cannot be distinguished from the second claim dismissed in Botz. Botz ruled that the plain language of section 41713(b)(1), bolstered by enactment of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (WPP), 49 U.S.C. 42121, pre-empted a whistleblower-retaliation claim based on reporting an alleged safety violation to an employer. Plaintiff argued that if Botz cannot be distinguished, then it should be overruled in relevant part. But one three-judge panel cannot overrule another. Plaintiff may raise this contention in a petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watson v. Air Methods Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 240 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not err by imposing a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 because defendant coached her daughter, the victim, and advised her daughter not to reveal defendant's involvement in the abuse; the district court did not err by denying defendant's request for an acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1 where defendant had numerous opportunities to admit her role in the abuse and accept responsibility, and lied repeatedly during those interviews; and, in imposing the statutory maximum sentence, the district court appropriately considered the relevant factors and that any error regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement or acceptance of responsibility reduction would be harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her Social Security benefits, arguing that the ALJ's determination that she is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Plaintiff claimed that she was unable to work due to osteoarthritis, lumbago, a congenital back defect, chronic stomach pain, and pulmonary restrictions. The court concluded that the Commissioner gave good reasons for discounting the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician and that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision that plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of benefits. View "Reece v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting the District's motion to approve the closure of Wilmot Elementary School and to modify the gifted and talented (GT) requirements for the District. In 1988, plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging race discrimination and other claims. The parties negotiated a settlement and, in 1991, the district court entered a Consent Order disposing of issues remaining in the complaint. In this case, the district court approved closure of Wilmot and modification of the GT program as the proper modification of the Consent Order due to the significant changed circumstances. The court concluded that such modification is suitably tailored where the modifications sought by the school district in light of the (1) demographic changes, (2) decrease in enrollment, (3) cost savings, and (4) educational considerations are in line with the initial Consent Order. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the District's motion to approve closure of Wilmot and to modify the GT requirements. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Mays v. Hamburg Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and was sentenced to 180 months in prison. Petitioner then filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, but the district court denied the motion. Petitioner filed his section 2255 motion five months after the one-year statute of limitations expired. The court concluded that equitable tolling is not applicable in this case where petitioner failed to establish that he diligently pursued the rights protected by section 2255 relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "English v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motions to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In this case, the district court did not determine whether defendant's untimely notice of appeal was the result of excusable neglect or good cause. The government argues that this appeal is untimely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). Defendant argues that the district court implicitly granted him a thirty day extension for excusable neglect or good cause under Rule 4(b)(4) when it docketed his late notice of appeal. The court remanded to the district court to address the issue. View "United States v. Starks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, hourly production employees, filed suit against their employer, EaglePicher, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, and the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 290.500-290.530. Plaintiffs seek payment for time spent on various tasks, including the donning and doffing of work clothing and protective gear, walking to and from production lines, and waiting in line to clock in and out for work. The district court granted summary judgment for EaglePicher. The court concluded that, the interim labor agreement here was an implied-in-fact contract between the employer and the union regulating employment conditions, wages, benefits, and grievances. It was made in good faith, without fraud or deceit. As such, it met the ordinary definitions of “bona fide” and “collective bargaining agreement.” The court also concluded that there is no genuine dispute that donning and doffing time was excluded from measured working time by “custom or practice” under the implied-in-fact agreement. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court correctly ruled that section 203(o) excluded that donning and doffing time from “hours worked” for which compensation was due, and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jackson v. Old EPT, LLC" on Justia Law