Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of conspiring to distribute, possessing with the intent to distribute, and distributing methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 96 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court's application of a two-level increase, pursuant to USSG 3C1.1, for obstruction of justice was justified where defendant lived abroad and resettled across the country, delaying the resolution of his case by almost a decade. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant a two-level decrease in his sentence for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to USSG 3E1.1(a), where defendant put the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential elements of guilt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Evelyn Garrison and ten opt-in plaintiffs filed suit against ConAgra under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), Ark. Code Ann. 11-4-201, et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Plaintiffs alleged that they were misclassified as exempt employees and denied overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment to ConAgra. The court concluded that ConAgra is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the federal and state law claims and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. In this case, the undisputed facts show that plaintiffs were working in an executive capacity and are exempt from the FLSA overtime pay requirements, as well as the AMWA overtime pay requirements. The court also concluded that a prevailing FLSA defendant is not precluded from recovering costs as a result of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and the silence in 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of ConAgra’s motion for costs and remanded to the district court to consider whether ConAgra’s costs should be awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d) and whether costs should be assessed against Plaintiff Garrison and ten opt-in plaintiffs jointly and severally. View "Garrison v. ConAgra Foods" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder of his parents in Indian country and the district court imposed two consecutive life sentences. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter where a rational jury could not have acquitted defendant of first- and second-degree murder and convicted him of involuntary manslaughter. The court concluded that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable, findings of premeditated murder were not clearly erroneous, defendant's sentence is within the guidelines range, and the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion in imposing an admittedly harsh within-guidelines sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Lasley, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to four counts of wire fraud. The court concluded that, because the district court did not apply one of the two total offense levels specifically contemplated by the plea agreement, defendant's appeal waiver does not preclude this appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in determining that defendant's post-plea conduct was inconsistent with a finding that he had accepted responsibility for his offenses. The court concluded, however, that it must reverse and remand so that the district court may determine in the first instance whether M.U. was a victim under the Guidelines and, if necessary, proceed to resentencing. The court further concluded that the district court did not plainly err when determining the amount of restitution owed to A.B. and R.W. Finally, the court declined to consider defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Binkholder" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, alleging that his former employer, AAKC, violated the FCA by submitting claims for Medicare reimbursement of anesthesia services at the “Medical Direction” rate. Relator alleged that, because AAKC anesthesiologists were not present in the operating room during patients’ “emergence” from anesthesia, and therefore AAKC did not comply with the Medicare conditions of payment for submitting such claims. The district court granted AAKC summary judgment. The court granted the United States leave to appear as amicus curiae supporting neither party. The court concluded that, because the agency had not clarified an obvious ambiguity in its Step Three regulation for decades, AAKC’s failure to obtain a legal opinion or prior CMS approval cannot support a finding of recklessness. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider a new theory first articulated in relator's summary judgment papers. Finally, the court rejected relator's claim that AAKC violated 42 C.F.R. 415.110(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Donegan v. Anesthesia Assoc." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to order disclosure of the co-conspirator's presentence reports, and the court held that defendant is not entitled to relief under Brady v. Maryland; because defendant failed to show justifiable dissatisfaction, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for new counsel; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it proceeded with the venire panel after one venireperson said that she was familiar with defendant's family and their distribution of methamphetamine; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that defendant was involved in the assault of a co-conspirator where the evidence was relevant and the district court gave mitigating instructions; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's money laundering conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Pendleton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence and imposition of a life sentence. The court concluded that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress where defendant was not seized and moved freely about the yard during the conversation in which he disclaimed any interest in the house and vehicle. Defendant's challenge to his life sentence also fails where he sustained two prior felony drug convictions, and was convicted in this case for conspiring to traffic at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. There is no dispute that defendant was subject to a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The court has ruled on numerous occasions that the imposition of a mandatory life sentence under that statute does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Camberos-Villapuda" on Justia Law

The Trusts filed suits in federal and state court over the course of two-and-a-half decades, claiming rights as the beneficiaries, successors, or assigns of the owners of coal mining royalty interests in Kentucky. In this case, the Trusts sued their former attorneys, alleging legal malpractice based on the adverse outcome of one of these cases. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected the Trusts' assertion that the attorneys committed malpractice by failing to raise preclusion arguments based on the outcome of a prior case. The court agreed with the district court that the proffered argument would not have changed the outcome in Willits II. The court concluded that the Trusts have not stated a malpractice claim based on failure to press this preclusion theory in Willits II. The court also rejected the Trusts' assertion that the attorneys committed malpractice by failing to raise certain constitutional arguments at an earlier phase. The court agreed with the district court that the constitutional arguments lack merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "The PPW Royalty Trust v. Barton" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to sell drug paraphernalia, conspiracy to distribute Schedule I controlled substances, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and being a felon in possession of ammunition, as well as the associated forfeiture. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that probable cause supported the search warrants, and in denying defendant's motion to suppress. In this case, the undercover buys, in combination with the financial information, provided probable cause to believe that evidence of one or more crimes would be found at defendant's shops and at his home. The court concluded that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the convictions on Counts 1-3 charged in the indictment, but was insufficient for the jury to find that defendant had knowingly possessed ammunition that had been transported in interstate commerce (Count 4). Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in entering the preliminary order of forfeiture against defendant's property. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Ways, Jr." on Justia Law

EIP filed suit against PI, alleging claims related to the PAKSTER mark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 119, 1120, and 1125(a). PI filed counterclaims for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act. The district court then issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant to this appeal, the district court cancelled PI’s two federal trademark registrations and found that EIP was the prevailing party. PI now appeals the grant of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to cancel the federal registrations of PI’s trademarks, and vacated the cancellation. Having obtained no damages, injunction, or cancellation from its section 38 claim, there is no basis for concluding that EIP was the prevailing party on that claim, which EIP agrees is a precondition to receiving attorney’s fees. As a result, the court need not reach PI’s argument that attorney’s fees are not available under section 38 of the Lanham Act. The court also concluded that, because EIP was not the “prevailing party” with respect to PI’s trademark infringement and unfair competition counterclaims, it is not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 35 of the Lanham Act. Finally, the court remanded the case for further consideration of the issue of whether EIP should obtain attorney's fees because it successfully obtained a declaration that it owned the PAKSTER trademark. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "East Iowa Plastics, Inc. v. PI, Inc." on Justia Law