Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of firearms by a prohibited person - a user of a controlled substance - in violation of 18 U.S.C 922(g)(3), and waived the right to appeal nonjurisdictional issues. On appeal, defendant argued that section 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional because the terms "unlawful user" of a controlled substance and "addicted to" a controlled substance are vague. The court affirmed defendant's conviction. Though it is plausible that these terms could be unconstitutionally vague under some circumstances, defendant does not argue, and has not shown, that either term is vague as applied to his particular conduct of possessing firearms while regularly using marijuana. Under the court's case law, defendant's facial challenge cannot succeed without such a showing. View "United States v. Bramer" on Justia Law

Kip Kaler, as trustee of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, brought suit against Louie Slominski to avoid a land lease that Slominski and the debtor had entered. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held that the bankruptcy court incorrectly calculated the setoff but affirmed its judgment in all other respects. Despite Slominski's failure to raise his double-recovery argument before the bankruptcy court, the BAP considered it. The court, however, will independently review the bankruptcy court's decision and is not bound by the BAP's decision. The court has discretion to consider a new argument in exceptional circumstances but the court is not convinced to do so on this record. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the trustee a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence where the newly discovered evidence - consisting primarily of unexecuted lease documents found on a computer not belonging to Slominski - did not undermine its conclusion that Slominski acted in good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the BAP. View "Kaler v. Slominski" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to sexual exploitation of children and to commission of a felony offense involving a minor while being required to register as a sex offender. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 480 months in prison. Given the district court's explicit statement that it would have sentenced defendant to 480 months in prison even if an error in the Guidelines calculation were found, the court concluded on this alternative ground that any error would be harmless. The court also concluded that defendant's within-guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. In this case, that the repugnant aggravating factors were properly considered, reversal is not justified in light of the district court’s careful consideration of such factors, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced defendant to 480 months or life imprisonment. View "United States v. Jauron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Principia, alleging claims arising from events that occurred during plaintiff's time as a student at Principia. The district court granted Principia's motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract because none of the policies and provisions that she identifies in her Third Amended Complaint create obligations that Principia owed to plaintiff; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim where the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint detail, at most, insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities to which liability for IIED clearly does not extend; and the district court properly dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim (NIED) where, under Missouri law, plaintiff failed to allege that her emotional distress or mental injury is medically diagnosable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gillis v. The Principia Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's revocation of his term of supervised release. Special Condition Number 6 made it a condition that defendant must not possess obscene material as deemed inappropriate by the probation officer and/or treatment staff. The court concluded that defendant's claim that Special Condition Number 6 is unconstitutionally vague is foreclosed by precedent, (see Miller v. California); the condition is not overbroad because a ban on possessing obscene materials is narrower than a ban on possessing pornography or sexually explicit material; the district court did not commit plain error by phrasing the condition so that enforcement is triggered by a probation officer or member of the treatment staff; and because defendant has been convicted of a child pornography offense, a condition of supervised release properly may limit his constitutional rights; the district court applied the correct standard when it sanctioned him for possessing “inappropriate” materials without determining that they were obscene; and the district court adequately explained its decision to vary upward from the advisory guidelines range and impose the 24 month sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Anthony Key" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court categorized defendant pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and sentenced defendant to the the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence in accordance with the ACCA. The court rejected defendant's contention that the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because defendant has lower intelligence. In this case, the sentence imposed does not fall within the purview of the Eighth Amendment where he does not face capital punishment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, he is neither a juvenile nor mentally disabled, he was found competent to stand trial, and his sentence reflects prior convictions for violent felonies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McCurry" on Justia Law

After defendant plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court determined that defendant had three prior violent felony convictions and sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Defendant appealed, contending that his juvenile adjudication for second degree assault, Minn. Stat. 609.222, subd. 1, does not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. The court concluded that the phrase "with a dangerous weapon" is an element of Minnesota's second degree assault statute, Minn. Stat. 609.222, subd. 1, and that the separate definition of "dangerous weapon" in 609.02, subd. 6, lists means for committing that element. The element "with a dangerous weapon" is not divisible. Minnesota's definition of "dangerous weapon" is broader than the ACCA's requirement. Therefore, defendant's juvenile adjudication was thus not an ACCA predicate offense, and he does not qualify as an armed career criminal because he had only two prior ACCA predicate convictions. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Headbird" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to five counts of production of child pornography, and five counts relating to the registered sex offender enhancement. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress child pornography evidence. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding the officers’ entry into the apartment was gained from the resident's implicit consent where he opened the door wider and stepped aside when the officers asked to come in. Therefore, the subsequent seizure of the backpack and discovery of its contents is not fruit of the poisonous tree. View "United States v. Faler" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to being a felon in possession and subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm seized during an investigative stop. Defendant also appealed his sentence and relied on the Supreme Court’s post-sentencing decision in Johnson v. United States, arguing that the residual clause in USSG 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore the district court erred in concluding that his prior felony conviction for violating Mo. Rev. Stat. 575.150 constituted a “crime of violence.” The court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying a concealed firearm and, together with other suspicious actions, the investigatory stop was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. In this case, during a Terry stop, the officer was concerned for his safety and, upon exiting the patrol car, asked if defendant was armed. Defendant replied that he was and nodded toward the bulge on his hip, giving the officer more than mere suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. In United States v. Taylor, the court joined other circuits and remanded sentencing appeals raising the issue whether the identically-worded residual clause in USSG 4B1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for the district court to address the issue. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to manufacturing explosives in violation of 18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1), 844(a)(1). The court concluded that the government need not prove defendant engaged in the business of manufacturing explosives for the purpose of livelihood or profit; although defendant asserts on appeal that he was manufacturing explosives for his own personal, non-business use, the district court specifically found that the government would not have to prove that defendant intended to sell or seek livelihood or profit from the explosive manufacturing activities; and the sheer quantity of completed and partially completed IEDs (and materials) shows that defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing explosives. Therefore, the district court reasonably determined that defendant likely committed the offense and did not err in accepting defendant's guilty plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Belmont" on Justia Law