Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya and a member of the Kikuyu ethnic group, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner failed to establish his eligibility for asylum. The court concluded that petitioner did not suffer persecution on account of his membership in two particular groups: witnesses to criminal activities of the Mungiki and Kikuyus who resist recruitment by the Mungiki. The court concluded that neither group forms a cognizable particular social group. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership upon return to Kenya. Because petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum, he necessarily fails to meet the higher burden of proof required for withholding of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ngugi v. Lynch" on Justia Law

This case arises out of the business relationship Joseph H. Whitney entered into with John R. Morrison. The court discussed the relationship and the various corporations in a prior opinion. See Whitney v. The Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1121–23 (8th Cir. 2012). In this appeal, Whitney argues that he was a shareholder of the several companies and that the district court erred in holding otherwise. He also argues that the district court erred in its statute-of-limitations analysis because he was not on inquiry notice prior to October 2007. The court concluded that Whitney was on inquiry notice when he knew he was not being treated as a shareholder. Therefore, a reasonable jury would be compelled to conclude that the July 20, 2007 email and the accompanying deposition testimony show such notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Whitney v. The Guys, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Because defendant redistributed drugs over a long period of time with knowledge of his suppliers, and enjoyed social benefits from those distributions, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that he knowingly and voluntarily joined a conspiracy to distribute, and that he shared a common purpose with his coconspirators. Finally, the court concluded that, by expressly agreeing to the district court’s proposed treatment of the buyer-seller defense, defendant waived any objection to the district court’s refusal to use his alternative jury instruction proposal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her application for supplemental security income. Plaintiff based her claims of disability on depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Plaintiff alleged that these conditions caused her difficulties with maintaining focus, energy, concentration, social interactions, and a regular schedule. The court concluded that the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff's credibility; the ALJ gave good reasons for the weight accorded to the medical evidence where the ALJ was entitled to discount the opinions of plaintiff's treating physician insofar as they relied on plaintiff's subjective complaints; and sufficient medical evidence supports the ALJ's determination of residual functional capacity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Julin v. Colvin" on Justia Law

CCDC filed suit against Affinity to enforce a memorandum of understanding that was signed after a mediation. The district court concluded that no contract existed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment for Affinity. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether board approval is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before the parties can enforce the memorandum of understanding. Whether board approval is a condition precedent thus cannot be resolved as a matter of law, and the case must be remanded for further proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Clarke Cnty. Dev. Corp. v. Affinity Gaming" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of firearms by a convicted felon and sentenced to 210 months in prison. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on defendant's perjury under USSG 3C1.1; the district court did not err in denying defendant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility where, absent extraordinary circumstances, obstruction of justice ordinarily indicates that the defendant, such as in this case, has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct; the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that defendant knowingly possess the firearms; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on inconsistent verdicts where a jury may acquit a defendant as to one or more charges for any number of reasons and yet come to the reasonable conclusion that defendant was guilty of other related charges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and analogues of controlled substances, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea where the record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant's knowledge that he knew the product that he was selling was illegal, that he knew it was a controlled substance, or that he knew the chemical composition of the product. Furthermore, given the nature of the product and the fact that defendant and his suppliers structured the transactions using money orders, which do not create records of the transactions, the district court could reasonably conclude that there was at least a “tacit understanding” between defendant and his suppliers to launder money. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Qattoum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, DSU, alleging a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted DSU's motion fro summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action by being exposed to floor-stripping and waxing products while employed as a custodian at DSI. In this case, plaintiff asserts facts that allegedly contradict DSU's argument, but many of those facts are not supported by the record, support claims plaintiff did not appeal, or reference incidents of alleged adverse action that are barred by the statue of limitations. Other facts, such as plaintiff's insistence that she had in fact previously applied for office jobs at DSU, while disputed, would not affect the outcome of the suit and as such, are not material. Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes of material fact preventing the district court from granting summary judgment in favor of DSU. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Dick v. Dickinson State Univ." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 75-month sentence after being convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After reviewing the record, the court could not tell whether the district court relied on the residual clause or the force clause to determine that defendant's prior offenses were crimes of violence. Although defendant could not prevail on this appeal if the district court sentenced him under the Guidelines's residual clause, he could if the district court sentenced him under the force clause. Since the record does not reveal which provision guided the district court's decision, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff requested payment for the one year remaining on his employment contract, but the FDIC advised that the payment was a prohibited “golden parachute,” under 12 U.S.C. 1828(k) and 12 C.F.R. 359.1, which the bank could not make without prior agency approval. Plaintiff, a former executive at Reliance Bank, filed suit against the bank and the FDIC, alleging a breach of contract under Missouri law and sought a declaration that federal law does not prohibit the payment. The district court upheld the FDIC determination and granted summary judgment to the bank. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the agency determination is not worthy of deference because it is inconsistent with FDIC positions taken elsewhere. Rather, the court concluded that Chevron and Auer deference is irrelevant because the agency treats the word "contingent" as unambiguous and relies on its dictionary meaning. The court concluded that one could reasonably characterize the payment obligation as contingent on either plaintiff’s termination or his continued employment. In this case, plaintiff alleged the bank came to owe the payment because of his termination, not because of services he rendered. Therefore, the agency determined the payment was contingent on termination, and the court found this finding was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court concluded that the bank’s obligation to pay plaintiff was rendered impossible when the FDIC determined the payment was a golden parachute. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Rohr v. Reliance Bank" on Justia Law