Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant where the officers, while patrolling a high-crime area, observed defendant and others act suspiciously when another patrol car drove past. In this case, the officers decided to conduct the “pedestrian check” or “car check” because they reasonably believed defendant could be involved in an automobile theft or could have been hiding something illegal in the Taurus. Reasonable suspicion arose when the officers made the U-turn and reasonably believed that the Taurus had fled the scene at a high rate of speed. Considered with the other circumstances observed by the officers leading up to that moment, the officers were justified under the Fourth Amendment in stopping the fleeing Taurus to investigate whether criminal activity was afoot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and subsequently appealed, arguing that the government violated the plea agreement. The court concluded that the language of the plea agreement permitted the government to argue against an acceptance of responsibility reduction. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for acceptance of responsibility where defendant sent threatening letters to cooperating codefendants and defendant denied relevant conduct by multiple objections to the PSR. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Torres-Rivas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a licensed California real estate broker, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Nebraska officials in their official capacities, seeking, among other things, prospective relief declaring that provisions of the Nebraska Real Estate License Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 81-885.01 to 81-885.55, violated her constitutional rights. The district court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove that the Nebraska License Act, on its face, was regulation of speaking or publishing as such,” rather than legitimate regulation of the real estate broker profession; at a minimum, plaintiff was a "broker" because she held herself out as one who was "listing" property for compensation; and plaintiff's contention that the License Act violates the First Amendment because it is vague and overbroad is without merit. The court further concluded that its conclusion that the License Act does not restrict speech contrary to the First Amendment forecloses her other facial attacks on the statute. In this case, the License Act is rationally related to the legitimate State interest in ensuring the competency and honesty of those who hold themselves out as providing professional brokerage services to the sellers and buyers of Nebraska real estate. Finally, plaintiff's claim under the privileges or immunities clause is foreclosed by the Slaughter-House Cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American man who has diabetes, filed suit against his employer, the City, alleging that it had discriminated against him based on his race and had retaliated against him for filing charges of unlawful discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the City did not change plaintiff's conditions following its pretermination investigation, and that plaintiff has not argued that taking medical leave is tantamount to being constructively discharged, nor could he succeed on such an argument on this evidentiary record. Therefore, plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of race discrimination because he has not shown that he suffered an adverse employment action. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination when the City rated his overall performance as unsuccessful because he failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that two Caucasian employees were similarly situated to him. Finally, plaintiff failed to file a separate charge of discrimination with the EEOC regarding his fitness exam and thus this claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Rahsaan Taylor seeks federal habeas relief from his state court conviction for capital felony murder, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Taylor alleged that counsel failed to present sufficient evidence at trial that Taylor was incapable of running at the time police witnesses testified that Taylor ran from them. The court agreed with the district court that the state court reasonably determined that Taylor was not prejudiced. Taking into account the numerous police officers’ identifications of Taylor as the runner, the final location of the stolen car, and the deficits in an orthopedic surgeon's testimony, the court found that reasonable jurists could agree that counsel’s failure to call Taylor's mother and the surgeon as witnesses did not have a reasonable probability of changing the outcome. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of Taylor's petition for habeas relief. View "Taylor v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Following a jury verdict in favor of Lincoln, in this case involving a contract dispute between the parties, Firetrace appealed the denial of its motion for a new trial or remittitur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. The court concluded that Firetrace made its intent clear by filing its Amended Statement of Issues and Amended Designation of the Record on Appeal and that Lincoln will not be prejudiced. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Firetrace’s motion for a new trial because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Firetrace’s limited repair or replace remedy failed of its essential purpose; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Firetrace’s motion for a new trial because it found there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Firetrace was on notice that Lincoln’s terms and conditions existed and that Lincoln intended those terms and conditions to be binding on Firetrace; the court rejected Firetrace's claim that it was entitled to a new trial based on several errors regarding jury instructions; and the district court did not err by declining to grant Firetrace's motion for a remittitur or new trial on damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States, aiding and abetting copyright infringement, and aiding and abetting the trafficking of counterfeit goods. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his role as the owner of a flea market where vendors sold counterfeit goods. The court rejected defendant's argument that the statutes under which he was charged and convicted are unconstitutional as applied to him because he did not have fair notice that his behavior was criminal; it was unclear what he should have done to avoid liability; and law enforcement enforced the statutes arbitrarily. In this case, defendant was not merely a passive landlord who is merely renting his property. Rather, defendant was actively involved at his market, continually reminded his vendors that he was in charge, and even involved himself in regulating the prices of counterfeit goods. Even if defendant had been a less active landlord, a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that intentionally selling counterfeit products at a flea market, or willfully infringing copyrighted works at the market for financial gain, could result in criminal liability, and that intentionally aiding and abetting such conduct could result in the same. Furthermore, the evidence shows that defendant received actual notice that his conduct as the operator of the flea market was unlawful. The evidence showed that defendant both understood that his tenants were acting contrary to the law and actively helped to facilitate the unlawful conduct to his and his tenants’ financial benefit. In this case, defendant presents no reason to believe the statutes at issue did not clearly apply to him, and he fails to consider that although his arrest did not occur sooner, he was given numerous warnings over the years that his conduct violated the law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Frison, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of fifteen or more counterfeit and unauthorized access devices. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress information discovered by law enforcement after officers seized credit, debit, and gift cards from defendant's vehicle and scanned the cards' magnetic strips. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that scanning the magnetic strips on the cards was not a physical intrusion into a protected area prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; defendant failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information in the magnetic strip; even if defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, the interest is not one society is prepared to endorse; and therefore, there was no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because all of the information in the magnetic strip should have been identical to the information in plain view on the front of the card, and where the cards were lawfully possessed by law enforcement officers and established to be counterfeit, the court cannot conclude that defendant had a privacy interest warranting further investigation into potential Fourth Amendment protections. View "United States v. DE L'Isle" on Justia Law

After Big River, a Nucor competitor, received a permit from ADEQ to construct a new steel recycling and manufacturing facility in Osceola, Arkansas, Nucor filed a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7475, seeking injunctive relief to stop Big River from constructing or continuing to construct the steel mill. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even though Nucor’s allegations that Big River violated the Arkansas State Implementation Plan (SIP) present a challenge to an “emission standard or limitation” as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. 7604(f)(4), Nucor has not alleged the repeated or ongoing violations necessary to support a citizen suit under section 7604(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under section 7604(a)(1). The court also concluded that the district court did not err by finding it lacked jurisdiction under section 7604(a)(3) to entertain Nucor’s allegations that Big River did not meet the requirements to obtain the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit needed to begin construction; the district court did not err by finding that the CAA does not authorize a preconstruction citizen suit against a party that already has obtained a permit; and the district court did not err in barring Nucor’s Title I claims based on the availability of Title V review. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nucor Steel - AR v. Big River Steel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 151-month sentence for two counts of bank robbery. With no evidence presented to support the district court’s finding that defendant made a threat of death during the December 10 bank robbery, the court concluded that the application of the two-level threat of death enhancement was erroneous. However, defendant's sentence was not imposed as a result of the misapplication and therefore the error was harmless. In this case, the district court offered a thorough explanation for imposing the sentence that it did and in doing so, the district court never once mentioned the December 10 demand note, a gun, or a threat of death. The court also concluded that the sentence was reasonable where the district court thoroughly explained its reasoning in imposing an above-Guidelines sentence, and stated that the 151-month sentence was necessary to serve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law