Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged a disability due to gout, arthritis, back pain, diabetes, high blood pressure, and obesity. In this appeal, he challenged the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405. The ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a farm worker. The court concluded that the ALJ's determination that plaintiff's residual functioning capacity (RFC) to do medium work, with some limitations, is supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ sufficiently developed the record. In this case, the objective medical findings do not support the degree of limitation alleged by plaintiff. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Buford v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm and possession of a stolen firearm. The court concluded that, while there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of possession of an unregistered firearm, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for possession of a stolen firearm where proof of scienter was not adequate. The court also found that, using the common-sense evaluation required by United States v. Barr, the Street Sweeper 12 gauge shotgun is quasi-suspect and defendant had no legitimate expectation that it was not subject to regulation. Therefore, the jury need not have found that defendant knew of the characteristics that bring it under the registration requirements of the National Firearms Act, Pub. L. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the jury instruction as proposed by defendant. However, when the characteristics of a weapon render it quasi-suspect, the government still must prove that defendant possessed the weapon and observed its characteristics. Because the adequacy of Instruction 16 was at least subject to reasonable dispute, there was no obvious error in the instruction. Finally, even if the district court erred in admitting evidence that officers were investigating defendant with respect to other criminal activity, the error was not clear or obvious. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. White, Jr." on Justia Law

Cellular Sales petitions for review of the Board's determination that it violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 157, 158(a)(1). The court concluded that Cellular Sales did not violate section 8(a)(1) by requiring its employees to enter into an arbitration agreement that included a waiver of class or collective actions in all forums to resolve employment-related disputes. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and declined to enforce the Board’s order with respect to this issue. Because the class-action waiver did not violate section 8(a)(1), Cellular Sales’s attempt to enforce the class-action waiver likewise did not violate section 8(a)(1). Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and declined to enforce the Board’s order with respect to this issue. The court also declined to enforce the Board’s remedies related to this issue. Because Cellular Sales’s unlawful arbitration agreement remained in effect and governed a former employee both as a current and as a former employee during the section 10(b) limitations period, his unfair labor practice charge was not time-barred. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review, and denied in part and enforced in part the Board's order. View "Cellular Sales of Missouri LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and six others filed suit against Lindsey Management alleging misclassification as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219. The jury found in favor of Lindsey Management. On appeal, Lindsey Management challenges the district court's denial of its Bill of Costs in its entirety. Section 216(b) of the FLSA is silent regarding the court's authority when the defendant is a prevailing party under Rule 54(d). Because section 216(b) addresses only an award of costs to a prevailing plaintiff and neither section 216(b) nor any other provision of the FLSA precludes an award of costs to a prevailing defendant, the court concludes that Lindsey Management is not precluded from collecting its costs incurred. The fact that a prevailing party prosecutes its rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to an award of costs cannot be seen as chilling the flow of litigation. Therefore, the court reversed because Lindsey Management is entitled to a decision whether its Bill of Costs should be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1) without consideration of the FLSA’s silence on the issue of prevailing defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider whether costs should be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1). View "Lochridge v. Lindsey Mgmt. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of first degree murder, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Defendant claimed that his counsel’s last-minute change of trial strategy and failure to allow him to testify violated his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The state court concluded that, although counsel's performance was deficient, defendant was not prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington where defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The court concluded that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland to the facts of defendants case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "White v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a class action claiming the right to title and possession of twelve square miles of land in southern Minnesota. Appellants allege that they are lineal descendants of the Mdewakanton band of the Sioux tribe who were loyal to the United States during the 1862 uprising, and that the Secretary of the Interior set apart the twelve square miles for the loyal Mdewakanton and their descendants. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that appellants failed to state a claim under federal common law as set forth in the progeny of Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida; the district court properly granted defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863, Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 9, 12 Stat. 652, 654, does not provide a private remedy to the loyal Mdewakanton; the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions, and the claims regarding the appellate-cost bond are moot; and, because the district court made no findings regarding the propriety of the Municipal Appelllees' motion for costs, the motion was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of appellees' motion to dismiss; vacated the order imposing sanctions and requiring an appellate-cost bond; and remanded for limited consideration of Municipal Appellees’ motion for costs Under Rule 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. 1920. View "Wolfchild v. Redwood County" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, moved to reopen an in absentia removal order, arguing he never received the Notice of Hearing. Alternatively, he moved to reopen to apply for asylum. The IJ denied both motions and the BIA affirmed. The court concluded that petitioner's affidavit claiming that he never received the Notice of Hearing is insufficient to overcome the presumption of delivery. The court also concluded that there is no error in denying the motion to reopen where petitioner did not file his motion until two years after the IJ entered the order of removal. Therefore, the motion to reopen is time-barred, and petitioner failed to demonstrate a change in conditions between the 2011 hearing and his 2013 motion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Diaz v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence under Florida v. Jardines, and to strike a portion of the presentence report. In this case, the court concluded that the area immediately in front of defendant's door - where the dog sniff occurred - was also curtilage. The court concluded that the officer had no license to have the dog enter the curtilage and sniff the door. Therefore, the dog sniff violated Jardines, and the warrant application was not otherwise supported by probable cause. However, because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in this case, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence from the search of the apartment. Furthermore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the gun and drugs found on his person. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court should have stricken the statements in the presentence report identifying him as a gang member where the district court did not use the statements in making its decision and did not violate due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against appellant under 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), seeking revocation of appellant's citizenship and cancellation of his certificate of naturalization. The United States alleged that appellant procured his naturalization illegally, or alternatively, that appellant procured naturalization by material misrepresentation or concealment. The court granted the United States summary judgment. The court concluded that, because circumstantial evidence is compatible with the evidentiary standard applicable to denaturalization proceedings, the district court did not err by considering circumstantial evidence to find appellant had willfully concealed or misrepresented material facts; the district court did not err by considering appellant’s prior use of the names Rakeshkumar Patel and Rakesh Hirani outside the naturalization context; the undisputed facts established clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to revoke appellant’s citizenship and to cancel appellant’s certificate of naturalization on the basis of representation or concealment of a material fact; and the court declined to consider a collateral challenge to the 1995 deportation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hirani" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Warden, Deputy Warden, and Major, in their individual capacities, after he was terminated from the ADC. Defendants’ stated reasons for terminating plaintiff are based on their determinations that he violated ADC policy by making false statements and improperly allowing an inmate into the count room.The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for intentional race discrimination. In this case, plaintiff's attempt to show pretext through comparator evidence fails because defendants have provided evidence that a similarly situated Caucasian employee was subject to the same treatment as plaintiff. Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's claims that defendants shifted their explanations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Henry v. Burl" on Justia Law