Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Loftness filed suit against Terry Twiestmeyer, Steven Hood, and TAI, seeking a declaratory judgment involving contracts associated with the development, manufacture, and sale of grain-bagging equipment. Defendants asserted counterclaims against Loftness for breach of two contracts: an Override Agreement and a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). On remand, the district court granted Loftness's motion for summary judgment on the claim for breach of the NDA. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding TAI’s claim that Loftness had breached the NDA by disclosing and using confidential information when it agreed to have Brandt Industries sell Loftness manufactured grain-bagging equipment. In this case, so long as Loftness continued to pay TAI, TAI reasonably may have considered Loftness’s use of TAI’s confidential information as part of the Brandt Industries relationship to be a non-competitive use. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Loftness Specialized Farm v. Twiestmeyer" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction after pleading guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) based on his failure to appear at a supervised release revocation hearing. Defendant argued that he had not been released under 18 U.S.C. Chapter 207, and thus could not have violated section 3146(a)(1) by failing to appear at his revocation hearing pursuant to the summons. The court concluded that a defendant who has merely been served with a summons, but who has not yet appeared in court pursuant to that summons, has not been “released under” Chapter 207. In this case, defendant had been served a summons, but had not yet appeared in court pursuant to that summons. Therefore, defendant had not been released under Chapter 207 when he failed to appear at his supervised release revocation hearing, and could not have violated section 3146(a)(1). Because defendant's conduct did not, as a matter of law, meet all of the elements of the crime to which he pled, the district court plainly erred in determining otherwise and the error affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Wroblewski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant John Daugherty was sufficiently involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff to qualify as a decision maker, given that the evidence showed that he participated in the investigation leading up to her termination, and that he was the one who ultimately told her she was terminated; there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Daugherty had earlier told plaintiff that she should step down because she was “a female” and “a single mom,” that it was “a man’s world,” and that she needed to “man up;" and because the court construed such comments, if made by a decisionmaker, as direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the court concluded, under a mixed-motive analysis, plaintiff may be entitled to some of the remedies she sought in her complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Morrow v. Zale Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 600-month sentence after being convicted of various charges related to his involvement in a gang, including murder. The court rejected defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge and concluded that defendant's 600-month sentence does not fall within Miller v. Alabama's categorical ban on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile. The Supreme Court in Miller did not hold that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender. The court joined its sister circuits in declining to apply Miller's categorical ban to discretionary life sentences. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence is not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and made an individualized sentencing decision taking into account, inter alia, his age, rehabilitative efforts, the seriousness of the offenses, and defendant's refusal to accept responsibility. Further, there is no abuse of discretion when sentencing disparities arise from legitimate distinctions between participants in the same crimes. In this case, the thirteen-year-old who participated in the firebombing murders with defendant was too young to be tried as an adult and he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Finally, defendant's claim that the district court committed procedural error when it failed to grant a downward departure due to his young age at the time of the crimes was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Petitioners, natives of Iraq, appealed the denial of their petitions for naturalization. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by determining that Petitioner Hamod had not lawfully been admitted to permanent residence status because he accepted employment from the Islamic Cultural Community Center (ICCC) "starting at least in early to mid-2000," before he was authorized to do so. Therefore, Hamod was not eligible for naturalization. Consequently, Petitioner Al-Saadoon's petition for naturalization was denied because her status is dependent upon Hamod's. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Al-Saadoon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for charges related to his involvement in a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and concluded that the information provided by the confidential reliable informant (CRI) was sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause, regardless of the manner in which he was identified; statements defendant made to investigators were properly admitted where defendant was not in custody at any point during the interview at issue; the district court did not clearly err in its credibility findings; and the court rejected defendant's claim that his statements were not voluntarily because the agents threatened defendant's wife and children. The court also concluded that the government proved a single conspiracy involving four properties; the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress pretrial and in-court identification of defendant; the district court did not err in determining defendant's relevant conduct, the actual loss amount, and that defendant had obstructed justice; and neither Apprendi v. New Jersey nor Alleyne v. United States are applicable in this case because the district court's findings did not increase the statutory maximum sentence or the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mshihiri" on Justia Law

Larkin moved to withdraw as counsel of Maid-Rite and two of the company's employees, after the franchisor failed to pay for its legal fees and to provide important information related to its defense. The district court denied Larkin's motion. The court concluded that, based on the record, it was presumptively appropriate for Larkin to seek withdrawal where defendants' failure to provide the firm with important information related to their defense also failed to fulfill an obligation to the firm. Further, defendants were warned several times and notified about the motion to withdraw. The court also concluded that defendants were not prejudiced by the withdrawal nor were third parties prejudiced by the withdrawal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Sanford v. Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren" on Justia Law

The ACLU filed suit against the director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Mo. Rev. Stat. 546.720 is unconstitutional as applied to department records the ACLU obtained under the Missouri Sunshine Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 610.010 et seq., and then posted on its website. Section 546.720 prohibits the disclosure of the identities of individuals who participate in executions. On appeal, the director challenged the district court's order denying immunity. The court concluded that the ACLU has alleged an injury in fact because it has shown an objectively reasonable fear of legal action that chills its speech. The court concluded, however, that the ACLU’s injury is not fairly traceable to the director because he does not possess any statutory authority to enforce section 546.720, and the ACLU's injury is fairly traceable only to the private civil litigants who may seek damages under the statute and thereby enforce the statute. Therefore, the court concluded that the ACLU lacks standing. The court also concluded that the director is also immune from suit because he lacks authority to enforce the challenged statute. In this case, the director’s authority to define the members of the execution team is not an enforcement action within the meaning of Ex Parte Young and its progeny. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Balogh v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

SEARK, operator of two hospice-care facilities, voluntarily entered into a provider agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to receive Medicare reimbursement pursuant to the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395c, 1395f(a)(7), 1395cc. The Act annually caps Medicare reimbursement. SEARK filed suit after the Secretary sent it seven demands for repayment, arguing that the cap violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The district court concluded that SEARK’s voluntary participation in the Medicare program precludes a takings claim. The court concluded that SEARK has not met its burden to prove the demands for repayment based on the statutory cap are a taking where the reimbursement cap allocates the government's capacity to subsidize healthcare; SEARK presented no evidence to suggest the cap makes it impossible to profitably engage in their business; and SEARK voluntarily chose to participate in the Medicare hospice program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Southeast Arkansas Hospice v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for possessing stolen firearms and ammunition and for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's objection to the admission of other-crimes evidence at trial because, even if some of the evidence was extrinsic, its admission did not violate FRE 404(b). In this case, the evidence was probative of a material issue other than character because it tended to prove defendant’s intent, lack of mistake or accident, and knowledge. Further, the evidence was similar in kind and not overly remote in time. Notice was also reasonable under the circumstances. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not procedurally err by imposing a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for use or possession of any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense. Defendant's sentence was also substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by varying downward from the advisory sentencing range. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law