Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Higgins and the Union filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Missouri law against the District, alleging violations of the United States and Missouri Constitutions and state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and declined to exercise jurisdiction as to the state law claims. The court concluded that the Union does not have standing in this case to pursue its claims on behalf of its members. In regard to Higgins, the court concluded that Higgins failed to state an equal protection claim where the District explicitly reserved the right to award the contract at issue in its best interest, and to select a bidder other than the lowest. The court also concluded that Higgins failed to state a claim for deprivation of due process where, under Missouri law, an unsuccessful bidder obtains no property right in the award of a construction contract, and Higgins failed to state a violation of the First Amendment where it does not provide any plausible account of how the District interfered with Higgins's ability to associate with the Union or with its employees who are members of the Union. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Higgins Electric, Inc. v. O'Fallon Fire Protection Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq., and supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. The court concluded that the errors identified by plaintiff show the ALJ failed to consider Mental Impairment Listing 12.07 Somatoform Disorders (including Conversion Disorder) when assessing her residual functional capacity; the ALJ failed to evaluate fully the vocational expert's testimony; the testimony of plaintiff's sister-in-law reflects on the severity of plaintiff's impairments and the ALJ's failure to address this testimony was not harmless nor an arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique; and the ALJ erred by disregarding the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician and improperly accorded great weight to statements in the physician's treatment notes indicating that plaintiff demonstrated improvement without acknowledging that plaintiff's symptoms waxed and waned throughout the substantial period of treatment. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions. View "Nowling v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Defendants Christopher and Jordan were found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 113, and 1153. The court concluded that the admission of the certificates of the degree of Indian blood did not violate Christopher’s and Jordan’s Sixth Amendment rights because they were admissible as non-testimonial business records. In this case, the enrollment clerk here did not complete forensic testing on evidence seized during a police investigation, but instead performed the ministerial duty of preparing certificates based on information that was kept in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, in addition to the certificates, the government elicited testimony from the deputy superintendent for trust services that Christopher and Jordan were enrolled in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the lesser-included-offense instruction; there was no error in the district court’s questioning of the emergency room doctor; and the evidence was sufficient to convict Jordan of assault with a dangerous weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rainbow" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon and the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), sentencing petitioner to 327 months in prison. Petitioner moved to vacate his sentence in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Descamps v. United States, but the district court denied relief. The court agreed with other circuits that the decision in Descamps was dictated by the general principles set forth in existing precedent and did not establish a new rule. Therefore, petitioner's motion does not rely on a right that was “newly recognized” by the Supreme Court in Descamps, and the district court correctly dismissed petitioner's motion as untimely based on the limitations period of 18 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). The court affirmed the judgment. View "Headbird v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Haiti, petitioned for review of the IJ and BIA's denial of her application for relief and finding that she had not established that she would suffer torture if returned to Haiti. The court concluded that the BIA applied the correct legal standard in determining whether petitioner had established that she would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Haiti, and concluded that she had not. Accordingly, the court concluded that the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's application for relief and affirmed the judgment. View "Mervil v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Board issued a complaint alleging that ConAgra violated the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. 151-169, by censuring an employee for soliciting union membership and by posting a sign prohibiting discussion of unions during working time. General Counsel for the Board moved for a default judgment against ConAgra under a settlement agreement to an earlier dispute. The ALJ ruled in favor of the Union on both allegations. The court adopted the Board's findings of fact that accord with the employee's testimony. The court held that in answering the factual question of whether a statement amounts to solicitation of union support, neither the presentation of a card for signature at the time nor the duration of the conversation are determinative. The court concluded that the Board's novel construction of the Act in this case is unreasonable, contrary to the policies of the Act, and therefore an incorrect application of the law. The court concluded that there is not substantial evidence supporting the finding that the employee did not engage in solicitation where the Board cites no evidence that the employee was merely providing information divorced from an effort to obtain signed authorization cards. Therefore, the court reversed the Board's conclusion that ConAgra violated the Act when it censured the employee for violating its no-solicitation policy. The court concluded that the Board's conclusion that ConAgra violated the Act by posting an overbroad no-solicitation rule is supported by substantial evidence. Because the court declined to enforce the Board's order as to the warning, it refrained from enforcing the default judgment and remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the posted-letter violation constitutes grounds for granting the General Counsel's motion. View "ConAgra Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against the City, code inspector Peterson, and chief code inspector Denker, and various other defendants, alleging federal and state constitutional violations, and that defendants conspired to deter her from seeking judicial relief from their conduct and to deprive her of equal protection of the law and equal privileges and immunities under the law. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment against Peterson failed to state a claim of municipal liability under section 1983; plaintiff failed to state a claim with respect to the alleged actions of Denker and the unidentified Jane and John Does - either in connection with her sexual harassment claim against Petersen or as an independent claim that these defendants violated her federally protected rights; and plaintiff failed to state a claim independent of Petersen’s alleged sexual harassment. Because plaintiff’s complaint contained no facts showing that Denker or any unnamed City employee violated her constitutional rights, the court did not reach whether Denker, as chief code inspector, was a policymaking official or whether his role in the alleged conduct permits an inference that the City adopted a policy targeting plaintiff. Further, plaintiff failed to allege a conspiracy under section 1985 because the City could not conspire with itself through its agents acting within the scope of their employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelly v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former special agent with the FBI, filed suit against the DOJ under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), alleging that the Deputy Attorney General’s decision affirming the OARM's finding that she had not been constructively discharged and denying her back pay was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Plaintiff had previously filed a suit in district court alleging that OPR had not conducted its investigation as required by the applicable regulations and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the APA. The court concluded that both of plaintiff's suits relied on the same basis of subject matter jurisdiction and so the issues are the same for collateral estoppel purposes. Factual differences between the two underlying causes of action are immaterial, because those differences do not affect the common question, namely, whether Congress intended the CSRA to proscribe unique and exclusive remedial procedures for FBI employees alleging retaliation. Even if the court were to construe application of different sections of the APA as raising potentially different issues, collateral estoppel would still bar the action because both actions involve application of the same legal standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Turner v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for domestic assault in Indian country by an habitual offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant’s motion in limine and in allowing the government to use his prior simple-assault conviction as a predicate offense under section 117(a); it was reasonable for the jury to credit the victim’s corroborated testimony and find defendant guilty of domestic assault; and defendant's sentence is substantively reasonable where the district court sentenced him at the bottom of the Guidelines range after considering various factors such as his health, history of criminal assault, seriousness of domestic violence, failure to accept responsibility, and his lack of remorse. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harlan" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the search of a vehicle after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found a firearm during a protective search of the vehicle. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to draw his weapon, order defendant out of the vehicle, detain defendant in handcuffs, and sweep the passenger seat of the vehicle for weapons. Therefore, the investigative stop and protective sweep of the vehicle was not more intrusive than necessary, and it did not amount to a de facto arrest. The court also concluded that any error in applying a four-level increase to defendant's offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense would be harmless because the alternative upward variance was substantively reasonable based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's sentence is substantively reasonable where the district court adequately considered the section 3553(a) factors and did not rely on any portion of the PSIR to which defendant objected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sanford" on Justia Law