Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., alleging that her former employer, Mosaic, interfered with her FMLA rights and terminated her employment in violation of public policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Mosaic. The court concluded that because plaintiff exhausted her FMLA benefits, she had not been denied any entitlement under the statute. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to make a submissible case of FMLA discrimination. In this case, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was able to return to work even if Mosaic had maintained what she viewed as a welcoming environment; plaintiff has not presented evidence of any tangible loss actually incurred and directly caused by her one-month suspension; plaintiff's alleged mistreatment are not actions that will deter reasonable employees from exercising their FMLA rights and are therefore not actionable under the statute; and where, as here, the employee presents insufficient evidence to show that she was discharged in violation of the FMLA, her termination does not undermine a clearly defined public policy, and Iowa law does not provide a separate cause of action based on the tort of wrongful discharge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hasenwinkel v. Mosaic" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's order denying her discharge for failure to list a number of assets and prepetition transfers in her bankruptcy schedules pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, concluding that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that debtor's omissions were made with reckless indifference to the truth and therefore were intentionally false and fraudulent. In this case, debtor, a bookkeeper for several businesses and nonprofits, failed to truthfully answer specific questions necessary to complete a picture of her assets and liabilities. View "Home Service Oil Co. v. Cecil" on Justia Law

An attorney petitioned for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition directing the district court to set aside an order that disqualified counsel from representing three witnesses in a grand jury proceeding and to schedule a hearing to address whether counsel has an unwaivable conflict of interest that necessitates his disqualification. Having reviewed the sealed motion to disqualify filed by the United States Attorney, which includes information derived from secret grand jury proceedings, the court is satisfied that counsel does have a conflict of interest in concurrently representing his three clients during proceedings before the grand jury. The court concluded that the district court's ruling was not a clear abuse of discretion and agreed with the district court that a hearing to consider possible waivers of counsel’s conflict of interest would require a deleterious breach of grand jury secrecy. Further, the court concluded that, assuming that a grand jury witness could waive his interest in conflict-free assistance of counsel, the district court did not engage in judicial usurpation of power by concluding that no such waiver was feasible or permissible under the circumstances presented here. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "In re: Grand Jury Process, John Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for copyright infringement and conversion. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for copyright infringement and denied plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Then the district court entered final judgment dismissing with prejudice the copyright infringement claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) where the district court did not properly weigh the Rule 54(b) factors. In this case, the district court cited no hardship or injustice which would result if plaintiff is not able to immediately appeal the order dismissing the copyright infringement claim, and none is apparent from the record. Even if the court were to accept as a valid Rule 54(b) factor the interest in avoiding further litigation, it is not apparent that accepting jurisdiction and reaching the merits of plaintiff's appeal would further this interest. There remains a chance that plaintiff will later appeal the measure of damages for conversion, which would create precisely the type of piecemeal appeal the court seeks to avoid. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jones v. West Plains Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NSP under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, for failure to pay overtime wages. On appeal, NSP challenged the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgement and grant of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether plaintiff was an exempt employee and not entitled to overtime pay. In this case, there are genuine issues related to whether plaintiff's primary duties were directly related to management and general business operations, and whether plaintiff exercised discretion and independent judgment in matters of significance. View "Grage v. Northern States Power Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed suit against BNSF and its contractor, Massman, alleging that the loss they suffered when their family farm was flooded was caused by BNSF's maintenance of a railway embankment running across their farm. The Board concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10501(b), preempted petitioners' state law claims but that they retained a federal claim based on BNSF's alleged violation of federal regulations. The court concluded that petitioner failed to properly challenge the Board's use of the unreasonable-burden-or-interference test for as-applied preemption. Therefore, the court declined to overturn the Board's use of the test. The court also concluded that petitioners' state law claims unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation and the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tubbs v. STB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as surviving spouse of Arlie Walls, filed suit against Petrohawk alleging claims related to an oil and gas lease. The court concluded that Petrohawk's failure to pay royalties in a timely manner did not substantially defeat the purpose of the contract and therefore does not constitute a material breach of contract; plaintiff waived the breaches with respect to all of the assignments except the Petrohawk-Exxon assignment; the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment from Petrohawk to Exxon; the language of the lease does not support plaintiff's argument that the lease holds Petrohawk liable for breaches of previous assignees, specifically Alta; and plaintiff is not entitled to statutory penalties because she failed to make factual allegations of Petrohawk's willfulness or bad faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Walls v. Petrohawk Properties, LP" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the revocation of his supervised release and imposition of a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a probation officer’s testimony and the Virginia arrest warrants and incident report, because producing the live testimony of the Virginia officers at the Missouri revocation hearing would have been unreasonably burdensome and impractical, and because the evidence offered in place of that testimony was sufficiently reliable. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the Virginia offense of malicious bodily injury to law-enforcement officers qualified as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) and a Grade A violation of supervised release. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Marshals seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics. Plaintiff alleged that the Marshals’ false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, and use of excessive force violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. On remand, the district court denied in part the Marshals' motion for summary judgment. The court held that the Marshals are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force claim because it was not clearly established in April 2009 that the use of a Tazer against a suspected armed and dangerous felon violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the Marshals are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for unreasonable seizure where the twenty-minute detention was not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment denying the Marshals' motion for summary judgment and remanded for an order granting qualified immunity to Deputies Franklin and Wallace. View "Wright v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA agreed with the IJ's finding that petitioner failed to sustain her burden to prove past or future persecution in light of the fact that she failed to provide credible testimony to support her claim. The court affirmed in light of the numerous contradictions and inconsistencies in petitioner's claim. The court concluded that it was proper use of demeanor to buttress an analysis that, as the BIA explained, satisfied the IJ’s obligation to provide specific and cogent reasons based on the record. Because petitioner failed to establish that she was a refugee under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42), the IJ and BIA denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The court concluded that there was no error. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review and the motion to remand. View "Rodriguez-Mercado v. Lynch" on Justia Law