Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence of 180 months, the mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), after pleading guilty to illegally possessing a firearm. Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that, by the plain language of the Iowa Code, defendant's terrorism conviction was a violent felony requiring the use of force, threat, or intimidation, and was, therefore, a violent felony under ACCA, which applies when a defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Defendant's conviction of going armed with intent under Iowa Code section 708.8 was also a predicate violent felony where under ACCA’s residual clause. There was no Sixth Amendment violation under Alleyne v. United States; the challenged enhancement was based solely on defendant's prior conviction and fell under the recidivism exception to the jury presentation requirement.. On remand for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, (2015), the Eighth Circuit again affirmed the sentence, but subsequently granted rehearing and vacated.. In light of Johnson, Langston’s going-armed-with-intent conviction is not a qualifying violent felony, nor is Langston’s theft conviction. View "United States v. Langston" on Justia Law

In 2002 Brown began working for Diversified. She was promoted and received excellent reviews. In 2009 Brown became an account executive. Brown struggled in the position, repeatedly making serious record-keeping errors. Brown took 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, after receiving a breast cancer diagnosis. Diversified provided Brown with additional training after she returned, and her 2011 reviews noted improvement, but still identified needed improvement. Diversified was purchased by a new owner, who told Brown’s new manager to rank employees and discharge the lowest performers. After determining that Brown was underperforming, management decided to move Brown to a different position. Diversified accommodated Brown’s high risk pregnancy and did not immediately change her job, but then lost a major account. Diversified accommodated Brown’s request to work from home for several weeks. Brown was fired five days after complaining about her reassignment .The district court granted Diversified summary judgment on all FMLA and state law claims. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part: where an employer has known its stated reason for taking adverse action against an employee for an extended period of time, but only acts after the employee engages in protected activity, the employer's earlier inaction supports an inference of pretext. View "Brown v. Diversified Distrib. Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The court concluded that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged by a dog sniff where seven or eight minutes had passed from the time the officer issued a written warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. Following remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit again affirmed. When Rodriguez’s vehicle was stopped in March 2012, the law of the Circuit provided that a brief delay to employ a drug dog did not constitute an unconstitutional seizure, as long as the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Hollingsworth was detained for booking at the police station in St. Ann, Missouri, after an arrest for stealing wine coolers from a convenience store at a gas station. When she refused a directive from police and corrections officers to change from her street clothes into an orange jumpsuit, a police officer stunned her with a Taser device to encourage compliance. Hollingsworth later sued the police officer, two corrections officers, and the City of St. Ann, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force in stunning her with the Taser, and that corrections officers violated her constitutional rights by failing to intervene. She asserted that the city was liable because its policy regarding the use of Tasers was unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and that the city’s Taser policy did not cause any potential violation of Hollingsworth’s rights. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating that although the actions of one or more officers might have been unreasonable, their conduct did not violate clearly established law at the time of the incident. View "Hollingsworth v. City of St. Ann" on Justia Law

In 2009, Liu, a physician in a residency program, elected basic life insurance coverage from LINA through his employer’s ERISA plan and elected supplemental coverage in an amount four times his salary. Asked whether, within the last five years he had been diagnosed with “Cancer, Tumor, Leukemia, Hodgkin’s Disease, Polyps or Mole,” he answered “no.” One month after submitting his application, Liu received a cancer diagnosis. On March 1, 2010, the insurance became effective. On April 23, 2010, Liu died. LINA paid the basic benefit of $46,858.49, but reviewed Liu’s medical records, which revealed that Liu had been experiencing symptoms without a diagnosis before submitting his November 12 application. LINA then issued a denial, stating: While the form was completed accurately at the time ... a diagnosis of cancer prior to the coverage approval date was not disclosed … [the] Form states ... any changes in your health prior to the insurance effective date must be reported. His wife responded that Liu was told he would not have to provide evidence of good health, but did not identify the person who made the alleged representation. The court rejected the wife’s suit on summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Liu breached an application requirement by failing to notify LINA of a cancer diagnosis he received before a policy issued. View "Huang v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am." on Justia Law

Based on an elaborate scheme by Barber, Van Doren, and Barber's attorney, Knight to defraud Barber's creditors by concealing income, assets, and funds, involving Barber's business ventures, the three were charged with bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, wire fraud, and similar crimes. Van Doren pled guilty to money laundering by engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Particular monetary transfers between Barber and Van Doren formed the basis for the plea and the loss calculations at sentencing. Van Doren later moved to withdraw his plea, stating that his claim was not that the court committed any procedural error during its acceptance of his plea, but rather, in his own words, "based solely on his factual innocence." The district court denied Van Doren's motion, holding that his claim of innocence was insufficient to overcome his sworn testimony acknowledging guilt and that there was a sufficient factual basis supporting the charge. The court sentenced Van Doren to 15 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s refusal to vacate the money judgment for $22,000; and applying Van Doren's $25,000 cash bond toward payment of a fine, special assessment, and satisfaction of the money judgment. View "United States v. Van Doren" on Justia Law

Following a police pursuit, Murray shot Jermell through the windshield and side window of Jermell’s vehicle. Jermell died from the gunshot wounds. Jermell’s mother sued Murray, another officer (Caudell), Chief of Police Gunderman, and the City of Morrilton, alleging excessive force, supervisory liability, and municipal liability under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and claims under Arkansas law. Murray, Caudell, Gunderman, and the city moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Caudell’s motion, denied the city’s motion, granted Defendants’ motion as it pertained to Thompson’s duplicative official-capacity claims against Murray and Gunderman, and denied Murray’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Murray and Gunderman filed an interlocutory appeal. The Eighth Circuit dismissed Murray’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed Gunderman’s claim for want of a reviewable order because the district court did not address or rule on Thompson’s claims against Gunderman in his individual capacity. View "Thompson v. Murray" on Justia Law

B.S., a 16-year-old with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, had an individualized education program (IEP). A dispute arose and the parents requested a due process hearing. The parties settled several issues, so the only claim remaining was whether B.S. was entitled to compensatory education services for alleged past denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). On the first day of the hearing, B.S.’s counsel spent five hours examining the special education administrator. The district objected, noting the allotted nine hours of time. The ALJ subsequently reminded B.S.'s counsel that the time limit set at the pretrial conference would be enforced, and offered an opportunity to reorder the evidence. B.S. objected to enforcement of the time limits and continued with the lengthy examination of the case manager. B.S's time expired and B.S. was not allowed to question witnesses further or cross-examine district witnesses. B.S. made an informal offer of proof of additional evidence that B.S. had intended to present. After an unfavorable decision, B.S. appealed, also alleging that state defendants established an unpromulgated "best practices" rule restricting the length of testimony in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court dismissed the state defendants, finding that B.S. was challenging only one ALJ's discretionary decision, so the state was not a proper party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that B.S. did not suffer a legally cognizable injury for which the state could be liable and had not been denied a FAPE. View "B.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

The Zarecors invested $800,000 in the RMK Funds. Morgan Keegan was the lead underwriter for the Funds and was heavily involved in their operations. The Zarecors allege that Morgan Keegan omitted facts regarding policies and structure of the Funds; misrepresented the quality of the Funds to Zarecor; and “was intimately involved with” misrepresentations and omissions made in SEC filings, prospectuses, and other marketing materials. When the Funds collapsed in 2007, the Zarecors lost $718,577. Unrelated plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a class that purchased mutual funds, including the RMK Funds, claiming that Morgan Keegan was liable as a “controlling person” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78t(a), and violations of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. 77k. The Zarecors were part of the putative class, but opted out. The class action was resolved by settlement. In 2009, the Zarecors filed a statement of claim in arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleging that Morgan Keegan had violated federal, New Jersey and Arkansas securities laws. The FINRA arbitration panel awarded them $541,000 in 2010, but a court vacated the award, holding that the dispute was not subject to arbitration under FINRA. The court dismissed their subsequent suit as untimely. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims under Arkansas law and federal law, but concluded that the claim under New Jersey law was timely. View "Zarecor v. Morgan Keegan & Co." on Justia Law

Knight is a licensed attorney, and the charges against him stem from his representation of a Barber in a bankruptcy proceeding, in 2008-2010. Knight was convicted of conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 157; aiding and abetting bankruptcy fraud; aiding and abetting the making of a false statement in relation to a bankruptcy case; and five counts of aiding and abetting money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957 and 2. The district court granted Knight a new trial on the conspiracy, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering counts, granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement count, and conditionally granted him a new trial on the false statement count in the event of reversal on appeal. The Eighth Circuit reversed the acquittal on the false statement charge, but affirmed the decision to grant Knight a new trial on all counts of conviction, noting evidence that Knight and Barber used the IOLTA to keep Barber's creditors from learning that he had money available and evidence concerning a sham entity that was used to divert money to Barber's own pocket. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law