Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989 White was convicted of rape and murder. The prosecution used testimony and confessions from White’s five co-defendants, all of whom pled guilty to related charges. After DNA testing in 2008, all convictions were pardoned or overturned. They sued Gage County and the officers involved in their case. On earlier appeals from separate summary judgments, the Eighth Circuit determined: “evidence is sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ claims that their rights to fair criminal proceedings were violated as the result of a reckless investigation and Defendants’ manufacturing of false evidence”; evidence was sufficient to support a conspiracy claim; evidence was not sufficient to support a coercion claim; members of the sheriff’s office were not protected by qualified immunity; and the county attorney was protected by absolute immunity. After trial of the consolidated claims, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim and all claims against Gage County, but denied qualified immunity to the officers. The Eighth Circuit reversed as to the County and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs “produced proof of questionable procedures” and “hasty condemnation” by officers in charge of policy-making. There was ample evidence that the sheriff created policies, supervised other officers, specifically directed, endorsed, and encouraged their activities, and was a final policymaker for the County. View "Dean v. Cnty. of Gage" on Justia Law

The 2013 General Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code 6–18–1901 provided that "[a] school district annually may declare an exemption under this section if the school district is subject to the desegregation order or mandate of a federal court or agency remedying the effects of past racial segregation." Plaintiffs have minor children who reside within the Blytheville School District and applied to transfer their children to neighboring school districts. The Blytheville District subsequently adopted a resolution to exempt the District from the Act. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that the District violated their due process and equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for violations of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the District violated due process by abusing its power under state law and failing to provide pre-deprivation process, and violated equal protection by using race as the reason for its exemption and nullifying the 2013 Act within its borders on the pretense that it was subject to a desegregation order. The District at least had a rational basis for believing that it "is subject to the . . . mandate of a federal court or agency." View "Adkisson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5" on Justia Law

Shoyombo, a native of Nigeria, entered the U.S. illegally in 1993 and filed two fraudulent asylum applications. The second, in his own name, was denied and he was ordered deported in absentia in 1995. Shoyombo married a U.S. citizen. His second motion to reopen, filed while he applied for adjustment of status, was granted in 2002. After DHS discovered Shoyombo had filed another asylum application, the proceedings were reopened on the Immigration Court’s own motion. An IJ denied adjustment of status but granted voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed. He did not depart, but married a second U.S. citizen in 2010. His attorney filed a new I-130 Visa Petition, but failed to file a third motion to reopen removal proceedings and apply for adjustment of status. ICE arrested Shoyombo in 2012. He hired a new attorney. In 2013, a new I-130 application was approved. In 2014, Shoyombo filed a third motion to reopen his removal proceedings to request adjustment of status based on the I-130 approval, asserting that the delay was due to the previous attorney abandoning his case. The BIA denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit dismissed a petition for review: because the decision to reopen sua sponte is explicitly left to the BIA’s discretion, with “no meaningful standard” against which to judge the exercise of that discretion, courts lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a such motion. View "Shoyombo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1966, DeBough purchased a Minnesota residence and surrounding 80 acres for $25,000. In 2006, DeBough sold the property for $1.4 million under an installment contract, secured by the property. Because the property was his principal residence,DeBough excluded $500,000 of gain from income on his 2006 tax return, 26 U.S.C. 121. DeBough received $505,000 from the buyers and reported $56,920 as taxable installment sale income for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008. In 2009, the buyers defaulted. DeBough reacquired the property, incurring $3,723 in costs. DeBough kept the $505,000 previously received from the buyers as liquidated damages. On his 2009 tax return, DeBough treated this event as a reacquisition of property in full satisfaction of indebtedness under 26 U.S.C. 1038. In calculating his realized gain, DeBough again applied the $500,000 principal-residence exclusion. DeBough reported $97,153 as long-term capital gains related to the reacquisition for tax year 2009. The Commissioner sent DeBough a notice of deficiency, having determined DeBough had underreported $448,080 in long-term capital gain for tax year 2009 by applying the principal-residence exclusion in his calculation. The Tax Court and Eighth Circuit agreed that DeBough was not entitled to the principal-residence exclusion because he had not resold the property within one year. View "DeBough v. Shulman" on Justia Law

STABL processed dead cattle and offal in Lexington. As part of Nebraska’s EPA-approved National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program, the state issued STABL a pretreatment permit, effective in 2008, that contained effluent limitations for wastewater that STABL discharged to the city’s wastewater treatment plant. The city controlled the valve that allowed wastewater to flow from STABL’s facility to the treatment plant. STABL paid the city to perform testing and monitoring and used the city’s records as the basis for discharge monitoring reports required by the permit. STABL’s manager signed the DMRs, which reflect numerous instances when STABL exceeded its permit limitations. In 2010, STABL sold its facility. The purchase price was reduced by $1 million to account for the costs of a pretreatment system needed to bring STABL’s facility into compliance. The federal and the Nebraska governments brought an enforcement action against STABL for violations of the Clean Water Act , 33 U.S.C. 1342, and the Nebraska Environmental Protection Act. The court granted the government partial summary judgment and, following a bench trial of the remaining issues, imposed a civil penalty of $2,285,874. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that district court’s evidentiary rulings and grant of partial summary judgment were not in error or were harmless error. View "United States v. STABL" on Justia Law

In a case alleging that Abbott's baby formula contained a harmful bacteria that caused permanent brain damage to J.M.K., the jury found in favor of Abbott. The district court then ordered defense counsel Ghezzi to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under FRCP 30(d)(2) for obstructing each deposition in which she had participated. Defense counsel was subsequently ordered to produce a discovery training video dealing with the impropriety of form objections, witness coaching, and excessive interruptions and to distribute the video to most of the attorneys in her national law firm, Jones Day. The Eighth Circuit reversed. While the court had authority to impose Rule 30 sanctions, generally sanctions should be imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred and no advance notice was given of the unusual nature of the sanction being considered. The court noted that once information about an unusual sanction appears in public, the damage to the subject's career, reputation, and future professional opportunities can be difficult if not impossible to repair. View "Sec. Nat'l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day" on Justia Law

Agent O’Neil interviewed V.R.B., who told him that in 2008, when she was about eight years old, she awakened when someone lay down in her bed and touched her vaginal area through her clothes. V.R.B. pretended to remain asleep, but got up after the person left and saw her mother's friend Thunderhawk in her living room. Agents went to Thunderhawk’s home and talked to him in their car, stating that he could end the interview at any time, he was not under arrest, and he would not be arrested at the end of the interview regardless of what he said. He admitted to the incident involving V.R.B., saying he had been drinking heavily. In a taped statement, O’Neil reviewed the interview and gave Thunderhawk an opportunity to correct mistakes. O’Neil later drove Thunderhawk to a polygraph test, stating that the test was voluntary, he could stop at any time, and O’Neil would drive him home. Thunderhawk signed written Miranda warnings and was again advised that the polygraph was voluntary and he could stop at any time. Thunderhawk again admitted to the incident. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Thunderhawk’s conviction for abusive sexual contact of a child under 12 years of age, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(5), and sentence of 41 months in prison, upholding denial of a motion to suppress his allegedly involuntary confessions; instructions to the jurors to draw reasonable inferences from their experience and common sense; and denial of motions for mistrial based on improper closing arguments. View "United States v. Thunderhawk" on Justia Law

In a suit alleging violation of the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, the district court certified a class consisting of current and former hourly employees of Tyson’s Madison facility, who “are or were paid under a ‘gang time’ compensation system in the Kill, Cut or Conversion Departments.” Gang time refers to time on the production line; Tyson uses a different system (K-Code) to compensate for pre- and post-shift activities, such as donning and doffing. The amount of K-Code time compensated depends on the employee’s position. Tyson had changed the K-Code entitlements. The court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on most liability issues, and awarded nearly $19 million to the class after a bench trial on damages and Tyson’s defense of good faith. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding no evidence that Tyson had agreed to pay the disputed compensation as required for liability under the Nebraska Collection Act and that the FLSA claims should have been dismissed for failure to file a timely consent to the collective action as required by 29 U.S.C. 216(b). View "Acosta v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Hesseltine is “within the Borderline range of mental functioning.” She graduated from high school in 2003, reading at a sixth grade level. Hesseltine underwent several childhood surgeries to treat a leg impairment caused by Perthes disease, which cuts off blood flow to the hip. From 2004 to 2005, Hesseltine worked irregularly as a cook’s helper. From 2005 to 2007, Hesseltine worked part-time at a laundry business with the help of a job coach. In 2009, Hesseltine worked briefly as a casino housekeeper. In 2006, Hesseltine was diagnosed with polycystic ovarian syndrome, she manages her syndrome with medication. In 2007, a doctor observed limitation in flexion of her left hip and knee, “probably due to obesity.” Hesseltine lives with her husband and performs some household tasks, but reported that she could not walk more than a block without needing to rest and could lift a gallon of milk at a maximum. Hesseltine applied for disability insurance benefits. An ALJ denied the application, finding that her combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. 404, and that there were jobs in the economy that Hesseltine could perform. The Eighth Circuit remanded; the ALJ failed to sufficiently address whether her impairments medically equal Listing 12.05C. View "Hesseltine v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Waynesville Office Weir sought a warrant to search the Conants’ house, stating that a reliable confidential informant had given information that Methamphetamine was being distributed from and stored at the house. Weir explained that the CI faced criminal charges and hoped to receive favorable consideration for cooperation, but there was no agreement. The prosecutor signed the application and did not tell Weir to include any additional information. The judge granted a warrant. The Conants moved to suppress evidence from the search and requested a Franks hearing. At a hearing, Weir testified that: the CI got the information from a second person while they used drugs together, and was subject to criminal charges at the time. A magistrate found no Franks violation because the officer did not act intentionally or recklessly to mislead the judge, and recommended denial of the suppression motion based on a good-faith analysis. The district court denied the motions to suppress. The Conants conditionally pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that a Franks hearing was, in effect, conducted when the officers involved were questioned at the evidentiary hearing, and the district court treated the evidentiary hearing as a Franks hearing.” View "United States v. Conant" on Justia Law