Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

FedEx contracts with operators to take packages from its terminals to homes and businesses. FedEx assigns each territory to an operator. Former operators claim that FedEx defrauded them as to their employment status, denying them benefits, such as overtime pay and workers’ compensation. Operators were paid based on the numbers of packages and stops serviced and were not required to drive personally; they could hire others, subject to FedEx’s qualifications. Operators received a proprietary interest in their territories, which they could sell, subject to approval. FedEx could not fire the operators at will during their contract terms, but could fire them for cause, and could choose not to renew their contracts for any reason. Operators provided their own vehicles. FedEx managers could ride along on four delivery runs per year. Contracts stated that an operator made deliveries “strictly as an independent contractor, and not as an employee,” but FedEx required that operators’ vehicles bear FedEx’s logo and be painted “FedEx White.” Operators had to provide proof of inspection and maintenance. Drivers had to wear a FedEx uniform and meet FedEx personal appearances standards. Drivers were subject to background, credit, and drug checks. They had to use FedEx package scanners. The district court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment, finding no genuine dispute that they were FedEx employees, even though under Missouri law employment status is an issue of fact. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that a reasonable jury could disagree. View "Gray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Ash and Jewsome filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated persons, alleging that their employer failed to pay required overtime compensation. The district court dismissed without a hearing for failure to allege that defendants were their employer for purposes of the FLSA, and failure to allege a substantive FLSA cause of action. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate and request to file an amended complaint. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleged only that: “During all relevant times, [defendants] were part of an integrated enterprise and, as such, were plaintiffs’ employer. During all relevant times, and upon information and belief, all of these defendants shared interrelated operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management and common ownership and/or financial control.” The allegation is simply a restatement of the legal test used to determine whether certain entities constitute a joint employer for the purpose of civil rights litigation and does not include any facts describing the “economic reality” of their employment, such as their alleged employers’ right to control the nature and quality of their work. View "Ash v. Anderson Merch., LLC" on Justia Law

Etenyi, a citizen of Kenya, came to the U.S. on a student visa in 2006. After he graduated in 2011, he remained and married a U.S. citizen. Etenyi’s wife sought an immediate-relative visa on Etenyi’s behalf. Etenyi concurrently applied to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). DHS denied Etenyi’s application on grounds that he had falsely claimed that he was a U.S. citizen on a Form I-9 when he applied for a job in 2009. At a removal hearing, Etenyi admitted that he did not comply with the student visa, but denied that he had falsely claimed citizenship. Etenyi contended that the form had been pre-populated with his personal information and that he did not notice the checked box asserting, under penalty of perjury, that he was a citizen. The IJ considered the signed Form I-9, Etenyi’s testimony, Etenyi’s social security card that stated DHS authorization was required before Etenyi could work, and evidence of Etenyi’s efforts to ensure that his social security card was accurate, and concluded that Etenyi’s testimony was not credible. The BIA affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported a finding that Etenyi falsely claimed citizenship on a Form I-9, View "Etenyi v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Federated, a Minnesota corporation, insured Missouri property owned by Hubbard and leased to the McKees. A fire damaged the property. Both Hubbard and the McKees, who said they exercised an option to purchase the property, made claims. Federated claimed it owed $40,980.95 and that Hubbard and the McKees disputed the distribution. Asserting that Federated owed more, Hubbard counterclaimed for vexatious refusal to pay. The district court authorized Federated to deposit $40,980.95 and dismissed Hubbard’s counterclaim. The parties mediated. In an e-mail to Federated’s counsel and the McKees’ counsel, Hubbard’s counsel wrote that the McKee claim was resolved by payment of $10,879.39. The email stated: As the sum owed to the McKee defendants is less than $11,000.00, there is no possible way that the McKee defendants should have to proceed further as Federated has asserted it owes no less than $40,980.95. Seven months later, Hubbard sued Federated and the McKees in state court. Federated removed the case; Hubbard moved to remand. Concluding that Hubbard fraudulently joined the McKees, the court dismissed them, denied remand, and applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to Hubbard’s claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that in the original case, the district court has distributed the interpleaded funds and dismissed with prejudice. View "Hubbard v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Siouxland, a group practice of obstetrician-gynecologists, terminated Hagen, its President and an equity owner, invoking the for-cause termination provision in Hagen’s 1993, Employment Agreement, after an incident during which Hagen yelled at Dr. Eastman (another Siouxland doctor) and hospital staff, accusing them of neglecting a patient, resulting in a stillbirth. Hagen also reported the incident to hospital administration and told the Siouxland partners that he was considering reporting to the Iowa state medical board. Hagen advised the patient to sue for malpractice. Hagen filed suit, alleging wrongful retaliatory discharge in violation of Iowa public policy. The other doctors testified about Hagen’s history of workplace conflicts and outbursts and about concern that his suspension by the hospital would hurt the reputation of the practice. A jury awarded Hagen $1,051,814 in compensatory damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Hagen failed to prove he was an at-will employee who may assert a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The exclusive remedy of a medical professional practicing under Hagen’s Employment Agreement would be a breach of contract claim, which would permit inquiry into the professional conduct the district court found separately protected by the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, PC" on Justia Law

Abhe, an industrial painting contractor, used stationary leased barges as platforms while painting Pell Bridge over Narragansett Bay. Abhe changed insurance carriers three months into the project. St. Paul Fire did not request that Abhe complete an application, but accepted the application provided to its previous insurer in 2010. The attached schedule of vessels was outdated and did not include vessels leased for the Pell Bridge project. Abhe sent St. Paul an updated schedule in 2011, listing those vessels, but did not provide a 2010 survey that showed that one barge had non-watertight bulkheads. St. Paul did not attempt to survey any of the equipment, as it was entitled to do under the policy. After the barge sunk in a storm, St. Paul denied Abhe’s claims and sought a declaration that the policy was void under the doctrine of uberrimae fidei, which requires that parties to an insurance contract accord each other the highest degree of good faith. Abhe counterclaimed, alleging negligence. The district court granted St. Paul summary judgment, finding the package policy void because Abhe failed to disclose the survey. The Eight Circuit remanded, stating that reliance is an element of the defense, and that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether it is satisfied. View "St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc." on Justia Law

To obtain a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration from a state motor vehicle department (DMV), individuals must disclose personal information. The 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, prohibits disclosure of personal information, “that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,” except for use by a government agency, in carrying out its functions; by a private person acting on behalf of a government agency in carrying out its functions; in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding; or for investigation in anticipation of litigation. DPPA establishes penalties for improper use. Drivers alleged that the Minnesota Department of Public Safety databases were accessible to law enforcement officers, government agents, and other individuals through an internet portal, and that the information was being accessed for improper purposes. Drivers requested audits detailing past accesses of their motor vehicle records. Audits showed that each Driver’s’ personal information had been accessed hundreds of times, primarily through police departments, sheriff’s offices, or other agencies. District courts dismissed Drivers’ suits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, noting that several claims were untimely, but reversed in part, finding that certain claims alleged patterns of access sufficient to establish improper purpose. View "McDonough v. Anoka Cnty." on Justia Law

Toy Box, an LLC organized to operate storage facility sales businesses, distributed an Offering Circular that stated that investors’ funds would be held in escrow and not released unless a minimum of $500,000 in capital was deposited in 2008. If Toy Box did not raise minimum capital by the deadline, the offering would terminate and Toy Box would return investors' funds . Doud executed a subscription agreement and invested $100,000. In June 2008, Toy Box amended its offering, lowering the minimum capital requirement to $350,000. Doud agreed to the amendment. By July 11, 2008, Toy Box had raised $200,000, including Doud’s investment; a manager authorized release of the escrow funds. Days later, Toy Box represented to investors that it had "achieved its threshold funding level and exited escrow with $425,000 in place." In 2011, Toy Box suffered substantial financial losses. Doud lost his investment and sued, alleging breach of the investment agreement and violation of the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)); SEC Rules 10b-5 and 10b-9; and the Iowa Uniform Securities Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that Toy Box had breached its agreement by releasing escrow funds before reaching the minimum threshold of funding; that its conduct violated both SEC Rules and the Uniform Securities Act; that Doud had established scienter; and rejecting a claim of good faith. View "Doud v. Toy Box Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Smiley, a resident of Monroe County, Arkansas, was severely injured when a vehicle driven by Medford, a resident of Woodruff County, struck Smiley’s vehicle. The accident occurred in Monroe County. Smiley was transported to the Med, a medical center in Memphis, Tennessee, where he received care before dying from his injuries. Under the Tennessee Hospital Lien Act, the Med filed a lien for the unpaid balance of over $355,000 in Tennessee and mailed copies to the attorneys for Smiley’s estate. After negotiating with Medford’s insurer, the administratrix for Smiley’s estate petitioned the probate court to authorize a settlement of $700,000. That court noted that no medical liens had been filed in Monroe County and that the Med’s lien was void and unenforceable in Arkansas as the Med did not follow the requirements of the Arkansas Medical, Nursing, Hospital, and Ambulance Service Lien Act. None of the settlement proceeds were paid to the Med, which filed suit in federal court, claiming impairment of its hospital lien. The court granted summary judgment, concluding that Arkansas law applied and would not permit the Med to recover. The Eighth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to identify the elements of a hospital lien impairment action. Viewed as a claim for damages for lien impairment, significant issues remain unaddressed. View "Shelby Cnty. Health Care Corp v. So. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Powell contends that his Christian beliefs compel him to publicly share his faith with others. Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds and positioned himself on a sidewalk outside the paid admission area, close to a heavily-traveled intersection near the fair’s main gate. Uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave the fairgrounds. The next day, Powell returned to the fairgrounds and stood in front of public restrooms outside the paid admission area. Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave. Powell brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part, prohibiting defendants from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow of traffic.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Powell’s motion based on his First Amendment claim and remanded the case for consideration of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. View "Powell v. Noble" on Justia Law