Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Long, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, operated the “OC Store,” a novelty store, on the reservation. The store had few exterior windows. BIA Officer Spargur encountered juveniles, carrying fireworks. One juvenile stated that he just bought them at the OC Store. Spargur went to the Store, was unsure whether it was closed, but concluded the store was open because of lights, music, unlocked doors, and the juveniles’ report that they had “just” purchased fireworks. Spargur entered through two unlocked doors, stopped at a third door, and “knock[ed] and announce[d] police.” Receiving no response, Spargur opened the main door, and, seeing Long’s son, entered the store. Another of Long’s sons acknowledged the juveniles had been in the store. Spargur noticed a small package on one of the concession tables that, based on his experience and training, he “recognized . . . as a package normally holding synthetic marijuana.” Once Long emerged, Spargur reminded him not to sell fireworks after Independence Day, left the store, and prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. A judge, 60 miles away, approved the warrant by telephone. Spargur and others searched the store, seizing 80 grams of synthetic marijuana. Long conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Heartland employed Thomas as an account liaison from May 2010 until she was terminated in June 2011, at age 53. Thomas claims that Hagen, an administrator for Heartland, had commented “that older people didn’t work as fast or were as productive as younger people,” and about having ‘fresh blood, younger employees.” Hagen referred to Thomas as “the old short blond girl,” and, after Thomas’s discharge,told a Heartland client that “he likes to keep himself surrounded with young people.” A Heartland human resources manager testified that Hagen was “an indirect supervisor” of the account liaison personnel. Duncan, Heartland’s regional manager, had audited three weeks of Thomas’s mileage claims and determined that Thomas had falsified her reimbursement claims. Thomas maintains she responded that she kept records that would explain discrepancies between the claimed mileage and the weekly call plans, but that Hagen dismissed her response by stating that termination “was a decision they had made.” In her suit, alleging violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age was a contributing factor in Thomas’s discharge by Heartland and Hagen. View "Thomas v. Heartland Employment Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

The indictment alleged that "within the Omaha Indian Reservation in Indian Country, [Webster], an Indian male, did knowingly engage in a sexual act with A.C., a child who had not attained the age of 12 years.” The jurisdictional statute, 18 U.S.C. 1152, provides: Except as otherwise expressly provided … the general laws of the United States … shall extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian ... who has been punished by the local law of the tribe. The indictment did not allege A.C. was a non-Indian or that Webster had not faced tribal punishment. At trial, Webster stipulated that he is an Indian and A.C. is a non-Indian. The court excluded references to a tribal complaint filed against Webster, which had been dismissed. Webster was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and upholding the decision not to admit the tribal complaint. Even if the victim’s status is an element of section 1152, the indictment’s failure to allege A.C.’s status did not render it “so defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense.” View "United States v. Webster" on Justia Law

Graco manufactures fast-set spray foam equipment (FSE) and sells it to distributors, who resell to consumers like Insulate. In 2005 and 2008 Graco purchased competing FSE manufacturers, ultimately raising its market share “to above 90%.” In 2007, Graco sent a letter to its distributors citing the “best efforts” clause in its distributor agreements, stating: It is our opinion that taking on an additional competitive product line may significantly reduce the “best efforts” of a Graco distributor.” In 2009, Foampak, a Graco distributor, considered carrying Gama products but chose not to after Graco threatened to end its distributorship. Graco sued Gama, alleging theft of trade secrets; Gama counterclaimed that Graco had unilaterally monopolized the FSE market (Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2). In 2013, the FTC accused Graco of unlawfully acquiring its competitors (Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18). Graco and the FTC entered a consent agreement which confirmed Graco would not engage in any practice “that has the purpose or effect of achieving Exclusivity with any Distributor.” The agreement did “not constitute an admission by [Graco] that the law ha[d] been violated.” Insulate filed suit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal on the pleadings. Insulate did not adequately plead concerted action in the existence of written anticompetitive contracts or implied exclusivity agreements. View "Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

During negotiations with Nichols to replace an expired collective bargaining agreement, the union called for a strike. Most employees participated; some crossed the picket line. Nichols hired replacement workers. Bandy, a 34-year employee, participated, but did not take a strategic or leadership role. The union ended the strike. Nichols began recalling strikers, including Bandy. Nichols requested, and, without objection, Bandy took a pledge that they would not “strike again over the same dispute,” subject to discipline. Nichols maintains the pledge merely confirmed returning employees would not engage in unlawful intermittent striking, which is not protected activity. Nichols also distributed its longstanding “zero tolerance” policy, which was incorporated into the CBA: “[h]arassing, disruptive, threatening, and/or violent situations or behavior by anyone, regardless of status, will not be tolerated and” offending employees would be “subject to discharge for the first offense.” Nichols posted notice. Two weeks after his return, Bandy drew his finger across his throat in a “cut throat” gesture toward Braafhart, who had crossed the picket line. Bandy was discharged. T An ALJ concluded Nichols did not violate National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), but the NLRB concluded that Bandy’s strike activity was a motivating factor and ordered Bandy reinstated with back-pay. The Eighth Circuit declined to enforce the order. View "Nichols Aluminum, LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Debtor, a Grand Island pathologist, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in 2011. Heritage holds an allowed, unsecured claim of $270,566.00. In 2012, the Debtor acquired her residence from the Elliotts and signed a $169,900 promissory note and granted a security interest in their favor. The case was converted to a Chapter 11 proceeding in 2012. The Elliotts filed a proof of claim asserting secured status. The Bankruptcy Court overruled Heritage’s objection to timeliness and allowed the claim. Heritage did not appeal, but continued to object to the Elliotts’ voting on the plan as an impaired class, arguing that they had a post-petition claim. The court found that the Elliotts had an allowed claim, that the plan altered the treatment of their claim, and, that the Elliotts were an impaired class entitled to the vote. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan. The Elliotts, the sole members of their class, voted in favor of the plan. No other impaired classes voted to accept the plan. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. Although an impaired class of claims accepted the Plan, the absolute priority rule of 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)' applies to prevent Chapter 11 debtors from retaining property acquired prior to the filing of the petition when not all creditors' claims will be paid in full. View "Heritage Bank v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Kevin and Lisa Nutt worked at Osceola Nursing Home. Funds were withheld from their paychecks as “pre-tax insurance.” After Kevin was injured, they learned that Osceola had not paid premiums. Their policy had lapsed; the Nutts owed $233,000 for medical services. The insurer told Lisa that it could reinstate the policy and pay the bills if Osceola made the delinquent premium payments. Osceola did not do so. Osceola then entered into a contract with Cooper, who specialized in turning around financially troubled nursing homes. Cooper’s company, Berryville, ultimately took title to the property. Before the closing, Cooper could assume management under a temporary lease. Cooper assigned this lease to OTLC, created for the project and owned by Hargis. Though OTLC was independent, Hargis regularly worked with Cooper in nursing-home ventures. OTLC operated the facility for Cooper and Berryville for three years. Nutt told Hargis about the outstanding bills. Days later, OTLC fired both Lisa and Kevin. They sued. The court entered default judgment against Osceola under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001; found that they could not provide adequate relief; and, on a theory of successor liability, held OTLC liable. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that if successor liability required only subsequent operation, it would discourage the free transfer of assets to their most valuable uses. OTLC was not a party to the unlawful practices of Osceola and operated without significant connection to the culpable parties. View "Nutt v. Osceola Therapy & Living Cntr., Inc." on Justia Law

Romero was arrested in Kansas City for multiple traffic offenses. Officers identified Romero as a citizen of Mexico who had not been admitted or paroled for entry into the U.S. The immigration judge found that Romero was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted in 1993 of violating California Penal Code 472, which criminalizes forgery and related conduct. The BIA agreed that section 472 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that carries a potential sentence of one year or more in prison, so that Romero was ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2). The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Romero’s argument that section 472 criminalizes both acts requiring a specific intent to defraud and acts without this mens rea. The court held that that conviction under section 472 always includes the element of a specific intent to defraud. View "Miranda-Romero v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Lohse lived with his girlfriend and her three-year-old daughter, K.S. Lohse’s girlfriend discovered images on an SD card, depicting K.S., clothed and sleeping in a natural position on a bed, and Lohse, naked and positioned so that his penis was on or near K.S.’s face. She contacted law enforcement. A search was executed at the house that day. Officers seized several devices that were found to contain child pornography. Lohse was charged, based on the images found on the SD card, under 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e) alleging that he “used and attempted to use a minor under the age of 18 to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct.” Lohse argued that the images did not depict “sexually explicit conduct,”, because the display of genitals was not lascivious. The district court denied the motion. He was ultimately charged with receipt of child pornography and four counts of possession of child pornography. Each possession count related to a different device. For the receipt offense, the government identified four videos that had been downloaded. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting challenges to denial of the motion to dismiss and to the verdict form. View "United States v. Lohse" on Justia Law