Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In 2008, Wages began working as a caretaker for StuartCo, a property management firm, responsible for vacuuming, cleaning, mopping, washing windows, dusting, and snow removal. Wages worked 30 hours per week. Her employee record was unblemished. In 2009, Wages learned she was pregnant. The doctor considered her pregnancy to be high risk. Wages experienced abdominal pain in October. Her doctor directed her not to vacuum or mop and provided her a note for her employer. StuartCo redistributed those duties to other employees and contacted the doctor to verify no other job duties were restricted. In November, Wages’s doctor prohibited snow removal. Wages missed three days of work, in November due to abdominal pain. Her doctor limited her to working no more than 20 hours per week. StuartCo terminated her employment, stating that it was “unable to accommodate the work restrictions provided by your physician.” Wages sued, alleging violations of her rights under the FMLA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wages on her FMLA entitlement claim and her FMLA retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded for a jury trial on damages. View "Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

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Brown pled guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 180 months’ imprisonment, finding that Brown had three predicate convictions, including possession of a short-barreled shotgun. In 2013 the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the shotgun conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA’s “residual clause,” which provides that crime is a violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

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Brown pled guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 180 months’ imprisonment, finding that Brown had three predicate convictions, including possession of a short-barreled shotgun. In 2013 the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the shotgun conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA’s “residual clause,” which provides that crime is a violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

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K.S. is biracial and has been diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, mood disorder, adjustment disorder, and Tourette's syndrome. K.S. was a freshman and sophomore at Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School 2010-12. K.S. is gifted academically, with a full scale IQ of 123. She excels in math and science; successfully took several advanced placement classes, and was involved in show choir, the school musical, and volleyball. K.S. received special education and services under an individualized education program (IEP) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district provided K.S. with one-on-one paraprofessional support throughout the school day. K.S. could return to a special classroom at any time and could use that classroom to take tests in a quiet environment. During winter break, K.S. was raped K.S. returned to class and to participation in the school's show choir in January 2012, but experienced unsettling social interactions with peers and other emotional disappointments during the semester; her IEP was amended to add paraprofessional support for K.S.'s extracurricular activities. K.S. did not make the cut for show choir. Her parents eventually removed K.S. to a private school and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit rejected their claims, finding that the district had provided a Free Appropriate Public Education. View "Sneitzer v. Iowa Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

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K.S. is biracial and has been diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, mood disorder, adjustment disorder, and Tourette's syndrome. K.S. was a freshman and sophomore at Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School 2010-12. K.S. is gifted academically, with a full scale IQ of 123. She excels in math and science; successfully took several advanced placement classes, and was involved in show choir, the school musical, and volleyball. K.S. received special education and services under an individualized education program (IEP) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. The district provided K.S. with one-on-one paraprofessional support throughout the school day. K.S. could return to a special classroom at any time and could use that classroom to take tests in a quiet environment. During winter break, K.S. was raped K.S. returned to class and to participation in the school's show choir in January 2012, but experienced unsettling social interactions with peers and other emotional disappointments during the semester; her IEP was amended to add paraprofessional support for K.S.'s extracurricular activities. K.S. did not make the cut for show choir. Her parents eventually removed K.S. to a private school and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Eighth Circuit rejected their claims, finding that the district had provided a Free Appropriate Public Education. View "Sneitzer v. Iowa Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

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St. Louis Metropolitan Police Officer Hendricks was driving when her patrol car’s license plate recognition system alerted, indicating that a man named Hicks was associated with a nearby car, was wanted for first-degree domestic assault, and could be armed and dangerous. The alert did not explain how or when Hicks was associated with the car. After pulling the car over, Hendricks asked the driver for his license, which identified him as Hicks. A second officer, Christensen, arrived, and asked the passenger, Williams, to step out and present identification. According to Christensen, Williams patted his waistband twice while getting out of the car, with his hands shaking uncontrollably as he retrieved his identification. Christensen handcuffed Williams, conducted a pat-down search, felt what he recognized to be a firearm, removed a handgun from Williams’s waistband, then found a bag containing “a dark rock-like substance” in Williams’s pocket--later identified as heroin. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Williams’ conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922, upholding denial of a motion to suppress and of motions in limine that sought to exclude his 2002 conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and a 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a concealable firearm and unlawful use of a firearm. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

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St. Louis Metropolitan Police Officer Hendricks was driving when her patrol car’s license plate recognition system alerted, indicating that a man named Hicks was associated with a nearby car, was wanted for first-degree domestic assault, and could be armed and dangerous. The alert did not explain how or when Hicks was associated with the car. After pulling the car over, Hendricks asked the driver for his license, which identified him as Hicks. A second officer, Christensen, arrived, and asked the passenger, Williams, to step out and present identification. According to Christensen, Williams patted his waistband twice while getting out of the car, with his hands shaking uncontrollably as he retrieved his identification. Christensen handcuffed Williams, conducted a pat-down search, felt what he recognized to be a firearm, removed a handgun from Williams’s waistband, then found a bag containing “a dark rock-like substance” in Williams’s pocket--later identified as heroin. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Williams’ conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922, upholding denial of a motion to suppress and of motions in limine that sought to exclude his 2002 conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and a 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a concealable firearm and unlawful use of a firearm. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

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Defendant pled guilty to illegally possessing a firearm. The district court sentenced defendant to 180 months in prison, the mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Applying the categorical approach, the court concluded that, by the plain language of the Iowa Code, defendant's terrorism conviction was an ACCA predicate violent felony requiring the use of force, threat, or intimidation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed: Defendant's conviction of going armed with intent under Iowa Code section 708.8 was also a predicate violent felony, falling under the residual clause of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); there was no Sixth Amendment violation under Alleyne v. United States; because the challenged enhancement was based solely on defendant's prior felony drug conviction, it continues to fall under the recidivism exception to the jury presentation requirement; and the district court properly determined that defendant had four predicate offenses and was an armed career criminal for sentencing purposes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. The Eighth Circuit again affirmed the conviction, striking a finding that the going-armed-with-intent conviction was a predicate felony under the residual clause. View "United States v. Langston" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Officers Lesher and McCrillis were working off-duty, patrolling a Little Rock apartment complex. They noticed that Ellison’s apartment door was open. From outside, they could see 67-year-old Ellison sitting on his couch, leaning on his cane. After Lesher and McCrillis started a conversation, Ellison responded that he did not want help or attention. McCrillis thought Ellison was being mouthy and wanted to keep him from shutting the door. The women stepped inside. Ellison got up and approached. A physical altercation ensued. The officers repeatedly struck Ellison and knocked off his glasses. Ellison repeatedly told them to get out of his apartment. McCrillis requested back-up, which arrived after the physical altercation was over. Lesher was still inside the apartment. Officer Lucio reached inside to pull Lesher out. The officers instructed Ellison to lie down. He refused. Lesher told McCrillis that Ellison was getting his cane, and that she was going to shoot Ellison. She fired two shots into the apartment, killing Ellison. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Eighth Circuit held that neither officer was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of illegal entry; that Lesher was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of lethal excessive force; but both are entitled to qualified immunity on a claim concerning use of nonlethal force. View "Ellison v. Lesher" on Justia Law

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D.S. and her brother T.D., were nine and six years old, when their mother, found them dead in a bedroom at their father’s house, on the North Dakota Spirit Lake Reservation. D.S., found without underwear or pants, had sustained 40 stab wounds and had a battery inserted into her rectum. T.D. suffered 66 stab wounds. Officers recovered bloody knives from indoor and outdoor trash cans.. A partially open basement window permitted access to the residence. The father was later arrested for public intoxication. Law enforcement agents first focused on him as a suspect. Days later, during a polygraph examination, DuBois denied any involvement, but then confessed to the crime. Investigators later focused on Bagola, a cousin who had lived with the family. He moved into another house nearby before the murders. DNA found under D.S.’s fingernails matched Bagola’s. Bagola babysat the children in the days before the murders. Investigators interviewed Bagola, and he provided detailed written confessions to the murders and the sexual abuse of D.S. Bagola was charged with “murder . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . aggravated sexual abuse[,] sexual abuse, [or] child abuse,” 18 U.S.C. 1111(a), 1153. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions on felony murder and child abuse, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the court’s restriction of Bagola’s cross-examination of a witness View "United States v. Bagola" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law