Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sued Arrington, Kratville, Welke, Elite Holdings, and MJM, alleging that they fraudulently induced more than 130 individuals to invest $4.7 million in commodity pools, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1. The district court granted summary judgment against Kratville. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his request for more time to review purportedly new evidence; consideration affidavits from investors who signed releases and from investors who allegedly lacked credibility; refusal to consider the affidavit of an expert opining on the authenticity of emails; summary judgment on the CFTC's claim that Kratville committed fraud and related violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations in soliciting persons to invest and maintain funds in commodity investment pools; and a determination that the litigation strategy of Kratville's attorney was not excusable neglect warranting relief under FRCP 60(b)(1). Kratville's misrepresentations and omissions related to potential profit and risk, the identities of brokers, and ownership of a proprietary trading system were material. He hid from investors that pool funds were being sent out of the country and that the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance had ordered Elite Pools to be closed and participants’ funds to be returned. View "Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Kratville" on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Smith created an online photo-sharing account. Several law enforcement agencies independently observed Smith trading naked pictures of his 10-year-old stepdaughter, M; offering pornographic pictures of M. for purported pornographic pictures of an undercover agent's daughter; and proposing sexual relations with the purported 13-year-old daughter of an undercover agent and recording the encounter. Officers executed a warrant. Told of the reason for the search, Smith admitted viewing child pornography. Officers found more than 800 photos and 144 video files on Smith's laptop depicting child pornography. Smith admitted that he had sexual encounters with his minor stepdaughter, R, since she was five years old; had touched the genitals of M.; and used pen cameras to take pictures and videos of his stepdaughters in the shower. Officers found the pen cameras, which had 11 video files and more than 600 photos of the girls and a friend. Smith pleaded guilty to production, attempted production, receipt, and transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, 18 U.S.C. 2252A. The court calculated Smith's Guideline sentence to be life imprisonment. Smith’s plea agreement stipulated a downward variance of four levels. The court acknowledged the stipulation, stating that the range would be 292 to 365 months, but that "there are some things,… just so vile and horrendous that the dismay, the disdain, …it's the same as witnessing it yourself." Addressing Smith's difficult childhood, the court stated that "[i]t's very difficult, … to find anything that excuses such conduct." The Eighth Circuit affirmed Smith’s 720-month sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Trooper Taylor observed a car on I-80 with very dark-tinted windows, traveling at a high speed. He initiated a traffic stop. The driver, Gomez, provided a valid driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. After testing and discovering the window tint level violated Iowa law, Taylor began to issue warnings for the tint and speeding violations at 9:01. When questioned, the men did not accurately identify each other, the owner of the car, or the purpose of their trip. They appeared "extremely nervous." Taylor ran checks on all three men. Dispatch responded that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for passenger Anguiano and that he was "armed and dangerous." At 9:29, another trooper arrived. Anguiano was arrested. At 9:41, Taylor issued written warnings and returned Gomez’s documents, stating that the traffic stop was done, but asked for consent to search the vehicle. Gomez gave written consent. At 9:50 the troopers began to search. They found a bag containing a stolen rifle and ammunition; a meth pipe; and open beer; removing the panel in the center console, they found two pounds of methamphetamine. The men were charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, rejecting arguments that the stop was unreasonably prolonged and the search went beyond the scope of consent. View "United States v. Anguiano" on Justia Law

Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades. Sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which, if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. By 1997, Robinson knew that sandblasting could cause silicosis. In 1998, he saw Dr. Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In 2002, he went to Ragland for bronchitis. In 2007, Robinson went to an emergency room for chest pain. The report listed three possibilities: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis, or a pneumonoconiosis disease (e.g., silicosis) caused by inhaling dusts. Medical notes reflect an “impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw a respiratory specialist, to “follow up his silicosis.” Ridgeway’s notes, shared with Ragland, list an “impression” of silicosis. In 2011 Ridgeway biopsied Robinson’s lung. According to Robinson, Ridgeway then first told him he had silicosis. In 2012, Robinson sued entities that “sold, designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the suit was time-barred. Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for product-liability actions applied, subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuries suffered.” Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his lungs. View "Robinson v. Mine Safety Appliances Co." on Justia Law

Undercover police pulled into a driveway while Stoner was loading his car with stolen goods during a residential burglary. Stoner leapt into his car, shoved it in reverse, and accelerated backward, ramming the unmarked police car as an officer tried to get out. He hit the car so hard his car partly jumped onto the hood of the police car. Accelerating forward, he hit the garage door and the house. Stoner resisted arrest, but was subdued. In a later search of Stoner’s bedroom, detectives discovered 20 9mm rounds and nine .45 caliber rounds of ammunition. Stoner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The Presentence Investigation Report calculated his total offense level as 17, his criminal history as category IV, making the guideline range of 37-46 months. The maximum sentence was 120 months. The district court sentenced Stoner to 108 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The district court did not ignore the guidelines or Stoner’s acceptance of responsibility, but decided that in this case the guidelines did not accurately reflect Stoner’s history and conduct. View "United States v. Stoner" on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado struck and substantially damaged Midwest’s building and its contents. After the tornado, the medical practice was to relocate, which required substantial work. Until construction was complete, Midwest operated out of a temporary location, but was unable to operate at its normal capacity. Moving the repaired MRI machine to the new building required a crane; it was necessary to reinforce floors; replace exterior brick; and install pipe, specialized heating and air conditioning equipment, and copper shielding. The new location opened about a year after the tornado. Cincinnati Insurance paid Midwest the policy limit of $2,414,161.26 for the building; the policy limit of $388,000 for business personal property; and $828,081.75 for business income interruption and extra expenses. . Midwest requested “Extra Expense” reimbursement for the costs to repair and relocate the MRI machine and to replace the other specialty equipment necessary for normal operations. Cincinnati denied payment, contending the expenditures were covered under the Building or Business Personal Property provisions, for which it had paid the policy limits. The district court found the claimed expenses were recoverable under the Extra Expense provision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the language of the Policy does not specifically exclude coverage under the Extra Expense provision if the expenses happen to fall under another coverage in the Policy. View "Midwest Reg'l Allergy Ctr., P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Fraser, a citizen of Canada, married a U.S. citizen. In 2006, his wife filed an I-130 Petition to adjust Fraser’s status based on their marriage; Fraser filed an I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. The petition and application were granted in 2007. Weeks later, the Department of Homeland Security determined that Fraser’s application had been approved in error. DHS believed that in 1991, Fraser had been convicted in Canada of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Fraser appeared before an Immigration Judge. The government provided a Trial Disposition from Canada dated March, 1991, plus an Information, dated April, 1990, which identified the offense charged as possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The Trial Disposition did not identify the offense to which Fraser pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced. The IJ concluded that the documentation presented, in combination, proved by clear and convincing evidence that Fraser had been convicted in Canada of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and that Fraser was inadmissible at the time of his adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). The BIA and Eighth Circuit dismissed Fraser’s appeals. View "Fraser v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2003, Fraser, a citizen of Canada, married a U.S. citizen. In 2006, his wife filed an I-130 Petition to adjust Fraser’s status based on their marriage; Fraser filed an I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. The petition and application were granted in 2007. Weeks later, the Department of Homeland Security determined that Fraser’s application had been approved in error. DHS believed that in 1991, Fraser had been convicted in Canada of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Fraser appeared before an Immigration Judge. The government provided a Trial Disposition from Canada dated March, 1991, plus an Information, dated April, 1990, which identified the offense charged as possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The Trial Disposition did not identify the offense to which Fraser pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced. The IJ concluded that the documentation presented, in combination, proved by clear and convincing evidence that Fraser had been convicted in Canada of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and that Fraser was inadmissible at the time of his adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). The BIA and Eighth Circuit dismissed Fraser’s appeals. View "Fraser v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Pierre and three co-defendants were charged, in the Minnesota district court, with conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 286, by submitting 1066 false tax returns and claiming undeserved tax refunds of about $6.9 million. They used social security numbers belonging to Florida prisoners on returns and, allegedly, incorporated fictitious businesses in Minnesota, opened bank accounts on behalf of those businesses, and collected tax refunds in those accounts. The indictment also charged Pierre with money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Before the Minnesota indictment was returned, Pierre and two co-defendants were indicted in Florida. Pierre’s Florida codefendants were not mentioned in the Minnesota indictment. The Florida indictment charged conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 286, conspiracy to use unauthorized access devices (section 1029(b)(2)), use of unauthorized access devices (section 1029(a)(2)), and aggravated identity theft (section 1028A(a)(1)). The indictment also charged Pierre with possession of 15 or more unauthorized access devices (i.e., debit cards and social security numbers), 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3). A jury convicted Pierre on all counts charged in Florida. Pierre unsuccessfully moved three times to dismiss his Minnesota indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the prior conviction did not encompass either the same conspiracy or the money laundering offense charged in Minnesota. View "United States v. Pierre" on Justia Law