Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kaplan operated an illegal sports-booking business in New York that moved to Costa Rica in the 1990s. In 2004, the company went public on the London Stock Exchange. Before going public, Kaplan placed $98 million in trusts off the coast of France. Kaplan neglected to pay federal income or capital gains tax for the trusts for 2004 and 2005. In 2006, Kaplan was indicted for operating an illegal online gambling business within the U.S. Kaplan accepted a plea agreement, which stated: [N]othing contained in this document is meant to limit the rights and authority of the United States … to take any civil, civil tax or administrative action against the defendant. The court asked: Do you understand … that there is a difference between a criminal tax proceeding and a civil tax proceeding … that [this] doesn't preclude the initiation of any civil tax proceeding or administrative action against you? Kaplan replied, "I understand." The court sentenced Kaplan to 51 months of imprisonment, and ordered forfeiture of $43,650,000. Later, the IRS issued Kaplan a notice of deficiency with penalties, totaling more than $36,000,000. The Eighth Circuit affirmed: since Kaplan failed to file a return, the period to assess taxes never began to run; the plea agreement was unambiguous; and the government's failure to object to the Presentence Report did not prevent the government from bringing a civil tax proceeding. View "Kaplan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Taylor was injured while attempting to secure a vehicle on a Cottrell car-hauling trailer. Dr. Odor operated on Taylor to complete a two-level cervical fusion. More than two years later, Taylor was again injured when he fell approximately 10 feet from a Cottrell trailer. He was taken to the emergency room and was discharged home with pain medication. The same month, Taylor reported to Dr. Odor with neck and back pain. After testing, Dr. Odor observed several disc protrusions and a disc desiccation. These injuries led to another complex spinal surgery with Dr. Odor, the cost of which exceeded $450,000. Two weeks before trial Cottrell claimed it had uncovered copies of agreements between Taylor's counsel and Dr. Odor which evidenced an impermissible contingent-fee agreement. The court found there was a contingency agreement and excluded Odor’s testimony as an expert witness, dismissed claims for Taylor's neck and back injuries, and stayed claims related to shoulder injuries. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the district court failed to articulate the precise interest Odor had in the outcome of the litigation and failed to explain why any such interest overcomes the general rule that Odor's bias and credibility should be resolved by the jury. View "Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc." on Justia Law

A Kansas City police officer stopped Harris for speeding. Before the stop, the officer saw him reaching below the driver’s seat and center console. Approaching the car, the officer smelled marijuana, but could not determine the source. The officer ordered Harris out of the car and soon found marijuana in Harris’s wallet. Harris was driving with a revoked license, so the officer arrested him. Because the car was parked on the left shoulder of a highway, the officer called for a tow truck. He inventoried the car, discovering a loaded 9mm semi-automatic handgun under the driver’s seat. Harris admitted he was a convicted felon, knew the gun was in the car, and had handled it before. Harris plead guilty to possessing a firearm, having been convicted of three previous violent felonies, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress. Harris’s car was towed pursuant to police policy. Police are not precluded from conducting inventory searches when they lawfully impound the vehicle of an individual that they also happen to suspect is involved in illegal activity, and, when police are conducting inventory searches according to standardized policies they may “keep their eyes open.” View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2012, Arkansas inmate Jones filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, challenging the Department of Correction’s (ADC’s) grooming policy. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on an Eighth Circuit decision, Holt. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Holt, and reversed, holding that ADC’s grooming policy substantially burdened the plaintiff inmate’s exercise of religion. The Eighth Circuit granted a motion to supplement the record on appeal with ADC’s new grooming policy, effective 2015. After holding that Jones’s appeal has not been plainly mooted by the new grooming policy, the court declined to reach the merits and remanded to the district court to consider Jones’s complaint in light of the new grooming policy and the Supreme Court’s decision. View "Jones v. Meinzer" on Justia Law

Davis was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was transported to the crowded Ferguson jail. Officers escorted Davis to a cell, which Davis refused to enter. Three officers responded as backup. White pushed Davis into the cell and a short, bloody fight ensued. Later, White was treated at a hospital and required surgery for a broken nose that had bled profusely. Davis was taken to the emergency room; scalp bleeding was noted but he refused treatment. After his release, Davis went to another hospital where he was diagnosed with a concussion and a scalp laceration. There was testimony that three officers each beat or kicked Davis after he was handcuffed and subdued on the cell floor. Davis was charged with “Property Damage” for transferring blood onto four uniforms and eventually pleaded guilty to careless driving, speeding, non-moving violations, and two counts of Destruction of City Property. Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force, municipal liability, substantive due process violations by filing false complaints, and assault and battery against the officers individually under Missouri law. White filed an assault and battery counterclaim. The district court rejected all claims. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the excessive force and assault and battery claims, vacated the dismissal of White’s counterclaim, and remanded. View "Davis v. White" on Justia Law

The Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) set up a sting targeting sex trafficking during the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally. DCI Agent Schnabel posted a Craigslist advertisement: “End of Rally …Travelin through ... and lookin. Fresh young thing. very discrete….” Larive responded by e-mail. Schnabel, posing as “Smith,” offered to sell Larive 30 minutes of sex with for $150, sent a photograph of a female state employee modified to appear underage, and informed Larive that the girl was 15 years old. After negotiation, Larive agreed to trade a cell phone for an hour of sex. They agreed to meet at a Hardee’s restaurant at 8:00 p.m.. DCI agents watched Larive before the meeting. Larive left his residence shortly after 8:00 p.m., drove slowly through the Hardee’s lot, and exited the lot. They agents initiated a traffic stop. After arresting Larive, they recovered a cell phone from his vehicle. Larive admitted that he had discussed trading the phone for sex with a 15-year-old girl, and that he was going to Hardee’s to meet the girl, but claimed that he was not going to go through with it until he talked to “Smith.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction for attempted commercial sex trafficking, rejecting Larive’s argument that he abandoned the attempt before taking a substantial step toward completion of the offense. View "United States v. Larive" on Justia Law

The Union represents Company employees, governed by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which required that there be tiered job classifications with specific work functions, that the parties arbitrate disputes, and that an arbitrator's disposition be "final." The Company’s Missouri call center was staffed with customer service representatives (CSRs) and service representatives (SRs). A CSR "[p]rimarily receives, screens, tests, analyzes, and dispatches trouble reports; explains and suggests various services and/or products … performs other generally related functions." SRs"[h]andle[] the business transactions in connection with customers' accounts, including telephone and correspondence contacts and collection and order work, etc." The Company chose 20 CSRs for special training to work with a new computer system. They were trained by an SR, used SR training materials, and were subsequently moved to a new work location where they worked alongside SRs and took calls out of the same queue. The CSRs claimed that this was different from the work that they had previously performed. The Union filed a grievance alleging violation of the CBA, which states that: A qualified employee . . . who is temporarily … assigned and does work in a position with a higher established maximum rate of pay” shall receive a higher rate of pay after a specified period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the arbitrator’s award in favor of the Union. View "SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc. v. Commc'n Workers of Am, Dist. 6" on Justia Law

Witnesses reported seeing Patrie burglarizing his stepmother’s house. Officers executed a search warrant on Patrie’s residence and seized several firearms, including one that matched a gun stolen from a 70-year-old retiree who was murdered in 2012 when a burglar broke into his home and shot as he lay in bed. After learning of the connection, officers executed a second search warrant on Patrie’s residence and found additional guns, including two sawed-off shotguns. Patrie pled guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and to possession of sawed-off shotguns, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The district court found that Patrie had committed first degree murder and thus that it would be appropriate to apply the cross-reference for murder and that Patrie was an armed career criminal, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Patrie did not challenge the determination that he killed the man with the sawed-off shotgun or its determination that the most analogous offense for this killing was first degree murder. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in applying the cross reference for murder and in determining he was an armed career criminal, and engaged in impermissible judicial fact-finding when determining that he was an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Patrie" on Justia Law

Witnesses reported seeing Patrie burglarizing his stepmother’s house. Officers executed a search warrant on Patrie’s residence and seized several firearms, including one that matched a gun stolen from a 70-year-old retiree who was murdered in 2012 when a burglar broke into his home and shot as he lay in bed. After learning of the connection, officers executed a second search warrant on Patrie’s residence and found additional guns, including two sawed-off shotguns. Patrie pled guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and to possession of sawed-off shotguns, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The district court found that Patrie had committed first degree murder and thus that it would be appropriate to apply the cross-reference for murder and that Patrie was an armed career criminal, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Patrie did not challenge the determination that he killed the man with the sawed-off shotgun or its determination that the most analogous offense for this killing was first degree murder. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in applying the cross reference for murder and in determining he was an armed career criminal, and engaged in impermissible judicial fact-finding when determining that he was an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Patrie" on Justia Law

After Fleetwood admitted, through counsel, to violating conditions of the supervised release he was serving for failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250, the district court revoked Fleetwood’s supervised release and sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment to be served—as Fleetwood requested—concurrently with his state sentence for assaulting two police officers. At Fleetwood’s revocation hearing, the district court addressed Fleetwood directly only to advise him of his right to appeal. Fleetwood never spoke. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Having essentially received the sentence he requested, Fleetwood has failed to present any evidence on appeal “prov[ing] a reasonable probability that he would have received a lighter sentence,” if the district court had asked him to make a personal statement before sentencing. Fleetwood failed “to set forth what he would have said to the district court prior to sentencing that might have mitigated his sentence.” View "United States v. Fleetwood" on Justia Law