Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bertucci pleaded guilty to shooting and killing a bald eagle and a hawk, 16 U.S.C. 668(a), 703, and 707. Bertucci had a criminal history score of two; his offense level was 10, with a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A)(ii) and 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) based on "loss" amounts for the birds that exceeded $10,000 but did not exceed $30,000 and a two-level enhancement under 2Q2.1(b)(1)(B) for a "pattern of similar violations" because Bertucci was convicted in 2009 for possession of bald eagle feathers. There were several paragraphs concerning previous assaults that Bertucci had allegedly committed. Bertucci argued that the court had adopted a $2,000 valuation for bald eagles in the 2009 prosecutions of him and his brother and that the allegations of assault were baseless. The court denied Bertucci's objections and sentenced him to eight months' imprisonment with a special condition of supervised release that required Bertucci to "successfully complete, and pay for any diagnostic evaluations and treatment or counseling programs for anger management." The court imposed a "financial obligation" on Bertucci: $5000.00 for the eagle and $1500.00 for the hawk. The Eighth Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the court failed to establish the basis for requiring counseling; that the financial obligation constituted restitution; and that the valuation was not justified. View "United States v. Bertucci" on Justia Law

North Dakota prohibited abortion “[a]fter the point in pregnancy when the unborn child may reasonably be expected to have reached viability,” except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, N.D. Code 14-02.1-04(3), and defined “viable” as “the ability of an unborn child to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.” In 2013, North Dakota passed House Bill 1456, extendng the general prohibition on abortion by requiring a physician performing an abortion to “determin[e], in accordance with standard medical practice, if the unborn child the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable heartbeat” except “when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance.” Another provision prohibited a physician from performing an abortion if the unborn child had a “heartbeat [that] has been detected according to the requirements of section 1.” There were exceptions for the life or health of the pregnant woman. A physician who violated the provision committed a felony, but the pregnant woman was not subject to liability. Plaintiff, the sole North Dakota abortion provider, challenged the law. The district court granted an injunction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating the continued application of the Supreme Court’s viability standard discounts the legislative branch’s recognized interest in protecting unborn children. View "MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem" on Justia Law

Officers stopped Abbott's vehicle because its license plate had three active arrest warrants associated with it. They arrested Abbott after they confirmed that he had an active arrest warrant. Abbott orally consented to the search of his vehicle. Officers recovered a pistol underneath the driver's seat; a canine officer located 11.5 grams of marijuana in the center console. Later that day, Abbott consented to a custodial interview during which he admitted that he had bought the pistol for protection and placed it under the seat. Abbott pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(10, without a plea agreement. The court found that Abbott had the necessary three predicate "serious drug offense[s]" and applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(A). Abbott argued that two of his prior offenses should count as one offense for ACCA purposes because they were a part of the same criminal episode. On June 8, 2004, Abbott sold .4 grams of cocaine base to an undercover detective; the next day, Abbott sold .28 grams of cocaine base to the same detective. The court stated: "They're different sales on different days" and sentenced Abbott to the statutory minimum of 180 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Harris sold cocaine to an undercover officer at his residence. Police obtained a warrant and discovered cocaine and firearms. Harris pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Harris had one conviction for felony assault and two for felony sale of a controlled substance on different occasions. The court determined that Harris was an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 180 months, with a novel special condition of supervised release that “there be no unprotected sex activities without probation office approval.” In a later written order, the court stated that Harris “shall use contraceptives before engaging in sexual activity that may otherwise cause pregnancy unless such use would violate his religious scruples or is expressly rejected by his sexual partner.” The Eighth Circuit modified the judgment to eliminate the condition. The condition is not reasonably related to the purposes that motivated it or to the statutory factors. The court upheld the ACCA designation, rejecting an argument that the court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by finding that his prior offenses were committed on different occasions without requiring that the fact be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or be admitted. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Deputy Russeth stopped Wall for a traffic violation. Exiting her vehicle, Wall smelled of alcohol, exhibited poor balance, failed field sobriety tests, and in a preliminary breath test, produced a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of .109—beyond the .08 legal threshold. Russeth arrested Wall. At headquarters, Russeth sought Wall’s consent to conduct a urine or blood test to determine BAC. In compliance with Minn. Stat. 169A.51, Russeth read aloud the “implied consent advisory,” informing Wall that “[r]efusal to take a test [wa]s a crime,” and before making a decision about testing, she had the right to consult an attorney. Affirming her understanding of her rights and disclaiming her right to an attorney, Wall agreed to urinalysis. After 45 minutes, Wall had not produced a urine sample. Russeth transported Wall to a medical center where Wall agreed to blood analysis. A registered nurse took a blood sample. Wall pled guilty to a petty misdemeanor traffic violation; her DWI charge was dismissed. Wall sued, alleging the county had a policy or custom of conducting warrantless, nonconsensual blood-alcohol tests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Following the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court agreed that Wall’s consent made the blood draw constitutional. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Wall’s dilemma, alone, does not satisfy her burden of nullifying her otherwise uninhibited consent. View "Wall v. Stanek" on Justia Law

Wieland is a member of the Missouri House of Representatives and obtains healthcare coverage for his family through the Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan (MCHCP), a plan made available to him by his employer, the state. Until August 1, 2013, MCHCP offered an opportunity to opt out of contraceptive coverage under state law. The state and MCHCP discontinued offering that opportunity when the state opt-out was found to be preempted by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg, and its implementing regulation. The Wielands sued the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor, challenging the ACA, as requiring them to obtain, and provide to their daughters, healthcare coverage for contraceptives, sterilization, and abortifacients in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that it is more than merely speculative that the Wielands’ injury would be redressed if they were granted the injunctive relief they seek. If the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby overruled the case under which the opt-out was eliminated, the state law opt-out provision would likely again be available. View "Wieland v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Williams was arrested at a motel, following a sting operation to locate a missing minor female, who police believed was being prostituted online. In Williams' motel room, police found the missing girl, a second girl, condoms, and the cellular phone that an undercover officer called earlier to arrange a paid "date" with the girls. After Williams was in handcuffs, detective Slaughter read his Miranda rights. Detective Slaughter testified that Williams stated he understood the admonitions and agreed to waive his right not to speak. Williams asked Slaughter whether he could remove belongings from his rental car. Slaughter asked whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle. Williams responded that he had a registered firearm and gave verbal consent to search. Williams watched the search, and did not withdraw consent. Police found a firearm, condoms, and electronic devices. Later, during a recorded interview, Slaughter summarized his contact with Williams and stated that Williams had been read his Miranda rights. Williams acknowledged and agreed with Slaughter's statements. Williams voluntarily consented and officers began searching the electronic devices. Almost six hours later, officers asked Williams for written consent. Williams refused and requested a lawyer. The officers stopped questioning Williams and secured warrants for the devices. The Eighth Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress and rejected a claim of vindictive prosecution. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Schoenborn, age 25 Howard, age 21, and Stillday, age 19, sat in a car, drinking Schoenborn’s vodka. When Stately arrived, Stillday needed help walking. Later Stillday “blacked out” and urinated on herself. The four went to Howard’s house and carried Stillday to a loveseat in the living room. Schoenborn vomited and went to sleep on the couch. Howard and Stately went to bedrooms. Later, Howard heard noises and investigated. She saw Schoenborn on top of Stillday “grinding on her body.” Stillday’s leg was out of her pants; her shirt and bra were pushed up. She remained unconscious. Howard yelled. Schoenborn yelled “She let me,” and ran out. A police sergeant arrived at 2:00 a.m., and found Stillday still undressed. He could not wake her. Stillday was transported to a hospital, unconscious. Stillday had no recollection of events after passing out in Howard’s car. She testified that she never gave Schoenborn any indication that she wanted to have sexual relations. Schoenborn first claimed that he had been home all night, but later changed his story. Convicted of sexual abuse of an incapacitated person (18 U.S.C. 1151, 1153(a), and 2242(2)B0, he was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the “vulnerable victim” enhancement used in calculating his guidelines range. View "United States v. Schoenborn" on Justia Law

Nanic, a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, is a practicing Muslim, but he rejects the “Bosniak” label used by governments in the region to describe Muslims in Bosnia. Nanic advocates a unified Bosnia and identifies himself as Bosnian. Nanic entered the U.S. as a nonimmigrant visitor, authorized to stay until June 8, 2007. On June 13, Nanic applied for asylum and withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42)(A). An IJ denied relief. The B IA affirmed, finding that Nanic did not demonstrate that he suffered past persecution in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia, nor did he establish a well-founded fear of persecution if returned. The BIA also rejected Nanic’s contention that the IJ deprived Nanic of due process by receiving testimony of an expert witness about country conditions and considering a document prepared by an asylum officer who interviewed Nanic. The Eighth Circuit upheld the decision as supported by substantial evidence. Nanic’s testimony about warnings from unidentified friends was too vague to compel a finding that he had a well-founded fear that is objectively reasonable, especially when members of his family continue to live in Bosnia-Herzegovina without harm, and Nanic himself returned to the country several times since 2000 without experiencing persecution. View "Nanic v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Stephens visited the Oaklawn Club for gambling. After winning, playing slot machines, Stephens cashed out and left the casino. He returned later that evening and purchased another ticket for use in the slot machines. He was approached by uniformed security personnel and Jessup, a uniformed Hot Springs police officer. They accused Stephens of stealing the cashed-out ticket and detained Stephens while employees reviewed surveillance footage. Stephens alleges that Jessup threatened to “take him to jail immediately” if he did not return the money. Jessup recited Miranda warnings, escorted Stephens to his vehicle, and retrieved the money. An Arkansas state court granted Oaklawn summary judgment. Neither Jessup nor Amtote was a party to that action. Stephens then filed a federal suit against Jessup and Amtote, alleging the same causes of action against these new defendants. The court dismissed, citing issue preclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Stephens did not perfect an appeal with respect to Amtote. The court expressed no view on the merits of the Jessup claims, stating that the record is not clear that Stephens is trying to relitigate an issue that was previously decided or that Jessup and Oaklawn represent the same legal right. View "Stephens v. Jessup" on Justia Law