Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

By quitclaim deed, 27 acres in Branson passed to Tori, Inc. Tori was dissolved, and, by quitclaim transactions, Rea acquired the land. Rea quitclaimed to Missouri Branson. Coverdell also claims ownership, based on a 1999 quitclaim from Tori. Coverdell's claim spurred state lawsuits, funded by Elfant, a businessman, who operates a Delaware LLC, Nekome, from his Florida home. In 2013, Missouri state courts rejected Coverdell's claim. In 2014, Nekome acquired Missouri Branson, days after receiving tax advice that merging Missouri Branson into an out-of-state corporation would avoid Missouri state taxes. Nekome became the sole member in a newly form company, Florida Branson. Missouri Branson merged into Florida Branson, transferring Missouri's claim of ownership to Florida. Days later, Florida Branson filed suit in federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction based on its Florida citizenship and the defendants’ Missouri citizenships, and alleging that the city, the electric company, and developers infringed on its rights by breaking ground on its land in 2004, to develop Branson Landing, a mixed-use retail, residential, and entertainment complex. Elfant admits that the only business that Florida Branson conducts consists of directing and funding the lawsuits." The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Florida Branson's corporate maneuvers were done to manufacture diversity in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1359 and that the purported tax purpose for merging was pretextual. View "Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson" on Justia Law

Witthar pleaded guilty to conspiracy against rights, obstruction of justice, and interference with fair housing rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, 1512(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 3631 waiving her right to appeal or collaterally attack a finding of guilt and her sentence on any ground except: ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum, or an illegal sentence. The prosecution advocated for a sentence at the bottom of her advisory guidelines range, dismissed four other counts, and agreed to not bring additional charges related to her crimes. The district court sentenced Witthar to 63 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of her advisory guidelines range. No appeal followed. Eleven months later, Witthar filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that her attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal. The government submitted an affidavit from Witthar’s attorney stating that Witthar had not asked him to file an appeal. The district court denied Witthar’s claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing, finding that Witthar’s “bare, conclusory allegations” did not entitle her to relief. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Because Witthar’s allegations, if true, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, there was a factual dispute on a critical issue View "Witthar v. United States" on Justia Law

When Bloodman withdrew as Haynes’s attorney in a criminal case, the judge ordered her to return discovery material “as soon as possible” and emailed the order, instructing her “to turn over to the United States Attorney’s Office any and all discovery material previously provided her by the Government.” After 20 days, she had not returned the material. The judge issued an order to return it within a week, or risk a show-cause order and sanctions. Bloodman, no longer on the electronic filing system, did not receive the email; the clerk mailed her a hard copy. She still had not returned the material 11 days later. The judge emailed her a show-cause order. Bloodman sent the material the next day via overnight mail, though delivery was delayed due to weather. At the show-cause hearing, Bloodman apologized. She claimed not to receive the second order, the only one to set an exact date and to have had medical issues. The judge did not find bad faith or hold her in contempt, but ordered her to pay $250 for the government’s “time and effort and energy.” The Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Haynes’s criminal case is still pending. View "United States v. Bloodman" on Justia Law

Knickel approached Macquarie Bank about a loan to develop North Dakota oil and gas leases, providing confidential information about leased acreage that he had assembled over 10 years. Macquarie entered agreements with Knickel’s companies, LexMac and Novus. His other company, Lexar was not a party. Macquarie acquired a mortgage lien and perfected security interest in the leases and in their extensions or renewals. Royalties and confidential information—reserves reports on the acreage, seismic data, and geologic maps—also served as collateral. The companies defaulted. Because of the lack of development or production, many leases were set to expire. Knickel claims he agreed to renew only leases that included automatic extensions. Macquarie claims that Knickel promised to renew all leases serving as collateral in the names of LexMac and Novus. Upon the expiration of the leases without automatic extensions, Knickel entered into new leases in the name of Lexar, for development with LexMac and Novus, since they owned the confidential information. A foreclosure judgment entered, declaring that LexMac and Novus’s interest in the leases would be sold to satisfy the debt: $5,296,252.29,. Marquarie filed notice of lis pendens on Lexar’s leases, leased adjoining acreage, used the confidential information to find a buyer, and sold the leases at a profit of about $7,000,000. Marquarie filed claims of deceit, fraud, and promissory estoppel, and alleged that the corporate veil of the companies should be pierced to hold Knickel personally liable. The defendants counterclaimed misappropriation of trade secrets and unlawful interference with business. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on all but one claim and judgment that Macquarie had misappropriated trade secrets. View "Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Knickel" on Justia Law

In 2009, Paramount contracted with the RSAs, cellular-service providers: Paramount would provide billing services and the RSAs would pay Paramount $1.05 per month for each customer billed. The contract had an initial three-year term, with continual renewal for two-year terms, unless a party gave six months’ notice. The RSAs could end the agreement before the end of a term, but would have to pay Paramount “all projected monthly fees based on the number of unexpired months remaining on” the term. The contract did not guarantee a minimum number of billings, nor did it require the RSAs to use Paramount exclusively. In 2011, the RSAs sent Paramount a letter explaining that they were switching billing companies and would want assistance. The RSAs would “send an official notice … when [they] want[ed] the system shut down.” For a year, Paramount continued to serve the RSAs while helping them transfer records. Before the transfer was finished, the initial, three-year term ended, and the contract renewed. In 2013, the RSAs stopped using Paramount, with a year remaining on the renewed term. The RSAs sought a declaratory judgment, Paramount counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Paramount, finding that the RSAs owe about $260,000 in liquidated damages. View "RSA 1 Ltd. P'ship v. Paramount Software Assocs." on Justia Law

A 2006 indictment charged Weaver, England, Key, and others, with crack-cocaine conspiracy and possession crimes. England and Key pled guilty. Only Weaver proceeded to trial. He was convicted. After a motion for a new trial was denied, Weaver’s trial counsel, Primmer, moved to withdraw. The court granted the motion and appointed Dornan to represent Weaver for sentencing. Although neither England nor Key, Weaver’s cousin, testified at Weaver’s trial, both testified at his sentencing hearing that Weaver was not involved in the charged conspiracy and distribution conduct. The court sentenced Weaver to 300 months imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Weaver moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court heard argument concerning Dornan’s failure to file a motion for a new trial at or before sentencing based on his knowledge that England and Key were then willing to testify. The court concluded Dornan provided ineffective assistance, vacating Weaver’s conviction. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Considering the totality of the circumstances, sentencing counsel Dornan reasonably relied upon the general rule that belated exculpatory testimony by a codefendant who did not testify at trial is not newly discovered evidence. View "Weaver v. United States" on Justia Law

Zavadil organized AS and was its sole owner until he sold it to an employee stock ownership plan and received a $28,760,000 note, payable in annual installments. Zavadil served without compensation as CEO and on the board of directors. In 2004 and 2005, AS paid Zavadil’s personal expenses. Zavadil reimbursed the company monthly by personal check. AS recorded Zavadil’s personal expenses on a ledger after Zavadil used his company credit card or instructed an employee to issue a check. AS’s creditors required that all ledger accounts, including Zavadil’s, be paid off at the end of each month. In some months, however, Zavadil’s personal bank account had insufficient funds; Zavadil would write a personal check and AS brought the ledger balance to zero. At the beginning of the next month, AS advanced funds to Zavadil to cover the check, recorded the advance as an expense, and then cashed the personal check received the previous month. The IRS issued a notice of deficiency. The tax court ruled in favor of the Zavadils on charitable contributions made before July 2005, finding that Zavadil reimbursed AS and bore the economic burden; disallowed charitable deductions made later, because Zavadil did not demonstrate that he bore the economic burden; and disallowed unreimbursed expenses, finding Zavadil failed to introduce credible evidence regarding the nature and purpose of the payments. The tax court assessed deficiencies (about $260,000, with penalties) and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Zavadil v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

In 2006, Asoyia, an Iowa producer of soybean oil, purchased a general commercial agribusiness insurance policy and a commercial umbrella liability policy from Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance. In June 2007, a fire destroyed the Sunnyside Country Club, an Asoyia customer. Although Asoyia received a subrogation notice in June 2007, it did not notify Michigan Millers. No one associated with Asoyia participated in the fire investigation. In 2009 Sunnyside’s insurer, United, sued in state court, alleging Asoyia’s soybean oil caused the fire when a pile of laundered rags containing the oil spontaneously combusted. Asoyia then provided notice to Michigan Millers, which sought a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify because of Asoyia’s prejudicial failure to provide prompt notice of the loss. A jury determined the late notice did not prejudice Michigan Millers. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the court instructed the jury to consider, whether “the fire investigation by United Fire and the Waterloo Fire Department was sufficiently thorough and the evidence was sufficiently well-preserved to allow Michigan Millers to fully investigate the fire after it received notice and whether Michigan Millers lost the opportunity to try “to settle the claim” or “to conduct, direct, or participate in a meaningful fire investigation.” View "Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. v. Asoyia, Inc." on Justia Law

St. Francis hired Shirrell, who is Jewish, as a nurse in 1995. Shirrell resigned in 2000. In 2001, St. Francis re-hired Shirrell. In early 2012, Miller, who is not Jewish, commented to a co-worker that she was going to try to “Jew down” a seller to a lower price. Shirrell informed her supervisor, who talked to Miller, posted a copy of the harassment policy, and sent an email reminding nurses to be careful with their words and actions. Six weeks later, Shirrell informed her supervisor that her work environment had become hostile, alleging that co-workers gave her the cold shoulder and that Miller accused Shirrell of trying to get Miller in trouble. St. Francis later promoted Miller, who brought two patient complaints concerning Shirrell to the attention of her supervisor. By late May 2012, Shirrell had accumulated five unscheduled absences within a 12-month period. Subsequent incidents were described as reluctance, disinterest, or neglect in carrying out responsibilities. Based on Shirrell’s accumulate disciplinary points, her employment was terminated. She filed suit, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant; St. Francis terminated Shirrell pursuant to policy for accumulation of disciplinary points. View "Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In 1998, as required by his divorce decree, Jon purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy from Minnesota Life. Although the decree required Jon to maintain a life insurance policy payable to his children until his child support obligations ended, Jon designated his sister, Joetta, as beneficiary. His child support obligations ended in 2008. Jon died in 2013. On or near his body was found a handwritten note purportedly signed by Jon and expressing his intent that his daughter, Nikole, receive the proceeds of the life insurance policy. Joetta sought an order directing the insurer to pay the proceeds to her. Minnesota Life moved to interplead the funds and to join in the action. Nikole filed a counterclaim, seeking an order directing Minnesota Life to pay the proceeds to her. The district court granted Joetta summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Jon did not take adequate steps to change the beneficiary from Joetta to Nikole under the policy’s change-of-beneficiary requirements and Nikole presented no evidence that Joetta agreed to give the proceeds to Nikole, or that Jon asked Joetta to do so View "Hearing v. Holloway" on Justia Law