Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

St. Francis hired Shirrell, who is Jewish, as a nurse in 1995. Shirrell resigned in 2000. In 2001, St. Francis re-hired Shirrell. In early 2012, Miller, who is not Jewish, commented to a co-worker that she was going to try to “Jew down” a seller to a lower price. Shirrell informed her supervisor, who talked to Miller, posted a copy of the harassment policy, and sent an email reminding nurses to be careful with their words and actions. Six weeks later, Shirrell informed her supervisor that her work environment had become hostile, alleging that co-workers gave her the cold shoulder and that Miller accused Shirrell of trying to get Miller in trouble. St. Francis later promoted Miller, who brought two patient complaints concerning Shirrell to the attention of her supervisor. By late May 2012, Shirrell had accumulated five unscheduled absences within a 12-month period. Subsequent incidents were described as reluctance, disinterest, or neglect in carrying out responsibilities. Based on Shirrell’s accumulate disciplinary points, her employment was terminated. She filed suit, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant; St. Francis terminated Shirrell pursuant to policy for accumulation of disciplinary points. View "Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In 1998, as required by his divorce decree, Jon purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy from Minnesota Life. Although the decree required Jon to maintain a life insurance policy payable to his children until his child support obligations ended, Jon designated his sister, Joetta, as beneficiary. His child support obligations ended in 2008. Jon died in 2013. On or near his body was found a handwritten note purportedly signed by Jon and expressing his intent that his daughter, Nikole, receive the proceeds of the life insurance policy. Joetta sought an order directing the insurer to pay the proceeds to her. Minnesota Life moved to interplead the funds and to join in the action. Nikole filed a counterclaim, seeking an order directing Minnesota Life to pay the proceeds to her. The district court granted Joetta summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Jon did not take adequate steps to change the beneficiary from Joetta to Nikole under the policy’s change-of-beneficiary requirements and Nikole presented no evidence that Joetta agreed to give the proceeds to Nikole, or that Jon asked Joetta to do so View "Hearing v. Holloway" on Justia Law

On August 20, 2013, Lee, an Arkansas citizen, sued VTI and 10 John Does, alleging that while preparing for a welding project on August 21, 2010, he attached a newly purchased oxygen tank to his existing pressure regulator, manufactured by VTI. Lee “tried without success to adjust the regulator pressure” when “[s]uddenly, and without warning, the metal crimped end of the oxygen hose came loose from the metal handpiece, striking him in the right eye” and causing blindness in that eye. On December 18, 2013, Lee dismissed VTI and moved for leave to amend his complaint to substitute Airgas LLC and Airgas-Mid South (the alleged supplier of the tank) for two Doe defendants. The district court denied the motion, noting Lee failed to allege Airgas-Mid South’s principal place of business, the citizenship of Airgas LLC’s members, and the citizenship of any John Doe defendants. The order imposed a deadline by which Lee was to correct these errors. The district court permitted amendment as to Airgas Mid-South but ultimately dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Lee’s claims against Airgas Mid-South were time-barred and the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the claims against the John Does. View "Lee v. Airgas - Mid South, Inc." on Justia Law

Brown pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),under a plea agreement, stating that the sentence to be imposed, “pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11(c)(1)(C), shall be the greater of the minimum sentence under the U.S.S.G. range as determined by the District Court, or 100 months.” The court accepted the plea and sentenced Brown to 100 months in prison. In 2011, Brown moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), which authorizes a court to reduce “a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The government agreed that Brown was entitled to a reduction. The court reduced Brown’s sentence to 70 months. In 2014, Brown moved for a further reduction based on 2014 Guidelines amendments. The court found that Brown was not eligible for a reduction, because he had not been sentenced based on a Guidelines range, but based on a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Brown argued that his plea agreement shows that a Guidelines range was used to establish his sentence, and that the government should be bound by its 2011 position. The Eighth Circuit reversed: where a plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are construed against the government. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Robb filed a Chapter 7 petition. Harder, the trustee, discovered a defect in the deed of trust securing the debt on Robb’s home. Robb converted her case to Chapter 13. Harder filed proof of claim ($450), describing an unsecured priority claim for “time spent by trustee in examining documents regarding avoidance of lien, preparing objection to homestead exemption, and filing objection to conversion to Chapter 13 case, and tracking debtors’ [sic] conversion to chapter 13.” Robb objected, arguing that trustee compensation is subject to 11 U.S.C. 326 and, because Harder did not disburse any moneys before conversion, she was not entitled to payment. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, holding that section 326(a) is not the only method of trustee compensation and that allowing the claim when no money was distributed encourages trustees to be diligent in looking for assets and discourages debtors from concealing assets. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed for lack standing. Robb did not plead any facts establishing that the order diminished her property, increased her burdens, or impaired her rights. If she had shown that all creditors would be paid in full and the length of the plan could have been shortened, it is possible that she would have been an aggrieved party. View "Robb v. Harder" on Justia Law

The Debtors sought Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. On their schedules, they listed the IRS as an unsecured creditor holding a claim in the amount of $249,085. They received a discharge in October 2009. Following the close of their Chapter 7 case, several IRS employees issued IRS levies and filed Notices of Federal Tax Liens with respect to the Debtors’ federal tax debt. The Debtors filed an adversary proceeding, naming each IRS employee as a defendant, alleging that the IRS employees violated 26 U.S.C. 7433 by issuing levies and filing the Notices of Federal Tax Liens, and seeking actual and punitive damages. The Bankruptcy Court entered an order substituting the United States as the sole defendant, denying the Debtors’ request for default judgment, and dismissing the Debtors’ complaint. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Debtors did not file an administrative claim for damages with the IRS and, therefore, may not bring an action for damages under section 7433. If the Debtors wish to sue the government for violations of the bankruptcy discharge under 11 U.S.C. 524, they must first exhaust their administrative remedies. View "Broos v. United States" on Justia Law

H & Q and the Doll Companies owned membership units of Double D Excavating, LLC. The Doll Companies opened account 121224 in the name of "Double D Excavating" and deposited a check payable to the LLC and opened account 119992 in the name of David Doll. The Doll Companies deposited into Account 121224 multiple payments that LLC customers made to the LLC and then transferred funds from Account 121224 to Account 119992, commingled funds from Account 119992 with funds belonging to the Doll Companies, and used those funds to pay Doll Companies' expenses. H&Q claims that the Doll Companies failed to give notice or obtain consent for any of those activities and represented to H&Q that the LLC was struggling financially and needed additional financial assistance. The Doll Companies contributed a portion of the funds from Account 119992 back to the LLC and, according to H&Q, represented to H&Q that these were fresh capital contributions. H&Q also invested additional capital. After discovering the Doll Companies' alleged conduct, H&Q filed suit asserting state law claims and claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that the complaint did not sufficiently allege any racketeering activity. View "H & Q Props, Inc. v. Doll" on Justia Law

In 2009, a jury found Thompson guilty of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of first-degree murder while committing aggravated robbery. Thompson was 17 when he committed the crimes. Pursuant to Minnesota law, he received two consecutive mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Thompson’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court (Miller decision) held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Thompson sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed with prejudice, finding that Miller’s rule was not retroactively applicable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Miller did not announce a new substantive rule because it neither categorically barred a punishment nor placed a group of persons beyond the state’s power to punish. After Miller, as before, a court retains the power to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole. That the sentence now must be discretionary does not alter its substance. View "Thompson v. Roy" on Justia Law

AVR, an Israeli corporation, and Interton, a Minnesota corporation, produce hearing aid technology, and entered into an Agreement, giving Interton a 20 percent interest in AVR. During negotiations, they discussed integrating AVR's DFC technology into Interton's products, and Interton's purchase of AVR's W.C. components. The Agreement incorporated terms indicating that the Agreement would be governed by the laws of the State of Israel and that “Any dispute between the parties relating to (or arising out of) the provisions of this Agreement … will be referred exclusively to the decision of a single arbitrator … bound by Israeli substantive law.” AVR commenced arbitration in Israel. Interton participated, but believed that disputes concerning DFC and W.C. were separate and not subject to arbitration. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected Interton's objection to the scope of arbitration, citing the "relating to (or arising out of)" language. An Israeli arbitrator awarded AVR $2,675,000 on its DFC and W.C. claims, plus fees and expenses. After the award became final in Israel, in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201, AVR successfully petitioned the district court for recognition and enforcement in the US. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Convention does not allow Interton to relitigate the scope of arbitration in an American court. View "AVR Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Am. Hearing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Lee and Kehoe, members of a white supremacist group, killed a gun dealer, his wife, and their eight-year- old daughter during a 1996 robbery. Lee was sentenced to death. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Lee sought post-conviction relief, 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by not adequately objecting to Dr. Ryan’s testimony regarding the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, which indicated Lee was a “psychopath” and a future danger if sentenced to life imprisonment. Lee's petition referenced Dr. Ryan’s sworn declaration, repudiating his reliance on the checklist, but neither that declaration nor supporting exhibits were attached. The court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Lee moved for reconsideration (Rule 59(e)), attaching affidavits purporting to show that the checklist was scientifically invalid and including Ryan’s sworn declaration that he should not have relied on the checklist and that the basis for a challenge was available before Lee's trial. The judge denied the motion, stating that had counsel timely presented these affidavits, it “might have determined that an evidentiary hearing was required.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed both denials. Lee moved for relief from the section 2255 judgment (Rule 59(e)), citing 2012-2013 Supreme Court decisions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the successive section 2255 motion filed without appellate authorization. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law