Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

PR sued Windmill in Missouri state court, but did not serve Windmill with the complaint. More than two years later, Windmill moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution. After PR responded to the motion but before the state court ruled on it, Windmill filed a notice of removal. In federal court, PR moved to remand, arguing that Windmill had waived its right to remove when it filed the state court motion to dismiss. The district court granted PR’s motion. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The 28 U.S.C. 1446 right to remove a case filed in state court to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction can be waived by actions the defendant takes in state court. A defendant waives the right “by taking some substantial offensive or defensive action in the state court action indicating a willingness to litigate in that tribunal before filing a notice of removal with the federal court.” The right to removal is not lost by participating in state court proceedings short of seeking adjudication on the merits. Windmill’s motion was based on PR’s failure to complete service; it neither addressed nor sought adjudication on the merits and did not clearly and unequivocally demonstrate willingness to litigate in state court. View "PR Grp., LLC v. Windmill Int'l, Ltd." on Justia Law

Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. CP Medical’s collection agent timely filed a proof of claim. The Chapter 13 plan, proposing monthly payments of $124.00 over 36 months and pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors, was confirmed. Debtors fell behind on payments and converted to a Chapter 7. After confirmation, but during the Chapter 13 case, Debtors filed an adversary proceeding against CP, seeking damages For violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The complaint indicated that CP's proof of claim was for medical services provided in February 2011, that the bankruptcy and proof of claim filings were beyond Arkansas’ two-year statute of limitations for medical debt collection, and that by filing a claim on a debt that is time-barred, CP engaged in a “false, deceptive, misleading, unfair and unconscionable” debt collection practice. The bankruptcy court granted CP summary judgment, holding that no FDCPA violation occurs when a debt collector attempts to collect a potentially time-barred debt that is otherwise valid unless there is actual litigation or the threat of litigation. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate panel affirmed. CP's proof of claim was a simple attempt to share in any distribution made to listed creditors in bankruptcy, not actual or threatened litigation. View "Gatewood v. CP Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

Alpine repairs automotive glass and, under Minnesota law, receives from insured vehicle owners the right to seek payment from insurance companies for repairs performed. Alpine and several insurers had disputes regarding the amounts paid for 482 separate claims. Minnesota law mandates arbitration of these disputes. The district court determined many claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations included in some of the insurance policies; 248 claims either were not governed by the two-year statute of limitations or were timely. The court consolidated these claims for one arbitration and ordered arbitration. Alpine appealed the consolidation order. The Eighth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the consolidation order was not an appealable final judgment. The parties pursued arbitration of one claim in which Alpine sought reimbursement for an alleged underpayment of $398.77. Arbitration resulted in a ruling in favor of the insurance company. ​The district court confirmed the award. The Eighth Circuit again dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction View "Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After the Fire District suspended Anzaldua, a paramedic and firefighter, for failing to respond to a directive issued by Chief Farwell, Anzaldua emailed a newspaper reporter expressing concerns about the District and about Farwell. The email “shocked” and “angered” his co-workers. Battalion chiefs noted it “fostered division between Anzaldua and his co-workers," and between firefighters and Farwell. The District terminated Anzaldua, who sued, alleging that the District and the individuals involved in his termination violated his First Amendment rights by retaliation and that Farwell and Anzaldua’s ex-girlfriend violated federal and state computer privacy laws by accessing his email account and obtaining his emails. The district court allowed some First Amendment claims to proceed but dismissed all other claims and denied leave to amend the computer privacy law claims. The court granted defendants summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims and denial of leave to amend federal computer privacy law claims, but reversed denial of leave to amend state computer privacy law claims. View "Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire" on Justia Law

Litschewski was convicted of three child sex crimes. Separate judgments of conviction were entered for each offense. Litschewski was sentenced to serve three consecutive terms of imprisonment. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the sentences because state law required multiple sentences to be ordered chronologically according to the time of each offense. On remand the trial court rearranged the sentences, crediting all the time that Litschewski had served on count one toward his sentences for the later offenses and not increasing the total term of imprisonment. Litschewski asserted that he had served his entire 7.5 year sentence on count one before the rearrangement, so that the order technically required him to serve his sentence on count one a second time. The state supreme court affirmed. Litschewski filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his rearranged sentences imposed multiple punishments for the same offense, violating the double jeopardy clause. The district court vacated one sentence. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The "Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner." Supreme Court precedent provides a "reasonable basis" for fair-minded jurists to disagree on the correctness of the state court's chronological rearrangement. View "Litschewski v. Dooley" on Justia Law

Lion Oil, a small Arkansas refinery, petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency for an exemption from the 2013 Renewable Fuel Standard program, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), under which refineries must blend their share of renewable fuel or buy credits from those who exceed blending requirements. Congress exempted “small” refineries—75,000 barrels of crude oil or less per day—from RFS obligations until 2011. The exemption can be extended. Lion cited disruption to a key supply pipeline and argued that RFS compliance would cause disproportionate economic hardship. Before EPA considered the petition, the Department of Energy determined that Lion Oil did not score high enough on the viability index to show disproportionate economic hardship. EPA “independently” analyzed the pipeline disruption and Lion Oil’s blending capacity, projected RFS-compliance costs, and financial position. EPA denied the petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, first holding that it could consider the matter because EPA had not “published” a determination of nationwide scope or effect. The denial was not arbitrary or inadequately explained. View "Lion Oil Co. v. Envt'l Protction Agency" on Justia Law

In 1997, Kosmes pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the U.S. territory of Guam. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. After his release, Kosmes was deported to Micronesia. In 2014, Homeland Security discovered Kosmes in Arkansas. He pled guilty to illegally reentering the U.S. after deportation, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Kosmes filed objections to the presentence investigation report (PSR), arguing that the Eighth Circuit "has left open the question of what mental state attaches to generic manslaughter for purposes of determining whether it should qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)." According to Kosmes, because his manslaughter conviction i required only a reckless mental state, rather than an intentional one, the PSR's 16-level enhancement was improper. After the district court noted the "precise issue" has not been resolved by the Eighth Circuit, it held that the manslaughter conviction with a reckless mental state qualified as a crime of violence, calculated an advisory guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, and imposed a sentence of 30 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Kosmes" on Justia Law

Investors who suffered losses when an Arizona golf course and residential development failed, allegedly due to the fraud and mismanagement of the developer, McClung, were unable to recover from the insolvent McClung and sued the development’s principal lender, Hillcrest Bank and its officers and directors. The Kansas Banking Commissioner closed Hillcrest Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver. The district court dismissed 14 of the 16 counts, dismissed the FDIC because Hillcrest Bank’s bankruptcy rendered claims against the Bank prudentially moot, and granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on the remaining count. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the Bank had insufficient assets for distribution to unsecured creditors and that, as to claims against the officers and directors, the investors made only conclusory assertions such as, “each defendant knew about McClung’s bad financial condition, his scam attempts to get more financing, knew that the development had not been completed, and knew that the Bank had engaged in improper banking practices . . . to conceal its own bad financial condition and avoid being shut down by the FDIC.” View "Quintero Cmty. Ass'n Inc. v. Fed Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Fischer worked for Minneapolis Public Schools as a Janitor Engineer, 2008-2010, and performed satisfactorily. After being laid off for fiscal reasons, he was told that he was eligible for reinstatement, conditioned on his possession of a boilers license and his completion of a strength test created by Cost Reduction Technology that measured the “maximum force-producing capability of muscles.” Fisher did not pass the test. Fischer alleged that District employees told him that he was not reinstated because of his back, that he was “incapable of pulling, carrying, pushing, or lifting a heavy load,” and that his employment would “create[] a substantial risk of injury in the work place.” The District denied his request for a retest. Fischer sued, claiming violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act by refusing to reinstate him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the district. The District’s belief that Fischer was capable of performing the physical labor of a medium strength worker is not equivalent to a belief that Fischer suffered a physical impairment such as a physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or disease as defined by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). View "Fischer v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs" on Justia Law

In 1992, Gabaree began living with a woman who had two daughters; the two later had two children together. In 1996, three children told a social services employee that Gabaree was abusing them. A physician found marks that had been inflicted intentionally. The girls, ages five and six, made inconsistent statements concerning sexual abuse; no physical evidence was found. Gabaree was convicted of statutory sodomy, first-degree child molestation, and child abuse. A court granted post-conviction relief because Gabaree’s attorney had failed to impeach the girls. At a 2003 retrial, one girl testified that Gabaree had sex with her and that she saw Gabaree having sex with her sister, who testified that Gabaree had “touched her ‘private part’ with his hands.” The court admitted the statement of an unavailable witness that the girls had previously recanted their allegations. A doctor’s testimony about Gabaree’s “propensity” was not challenged. Gabaree again was convicted of all counts. The state court denied Gabaree’s post-conviction petition, concluding that counsel’s stated possible reasons for not objecting to the doctors’ testimony were not necessarily unreasonable. Gabaree sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted Gabaree’s petition with respect to his convictions for sodomy and child molestation and denied his petition with respect to child abuse. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. By not challenging the testimony of the doctor concerning sexual abuse, counsel failed to make the adversarial testing process work. View "Gabaree v. Steele" on Justia Law