Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lemons applied for social security disability benefits after being diagnosed with a pain disorder caused by inflammation of a membrane that surrounds the nerves of the spinal cord. An ALJ awarded benefits and Lemons began receiving $802 per month. The ALJ, advised that Lemons’s condition was expected to improve, recommended follow-up review. The Administration failed to conduct the review and never contacted Lemons until it received an anonymous letter, including photographs of Lemons engaged in various activities. Investigators conducted surveillance. The Administration initiated review. Lemons responded that she could not pick up anything over 20 pounds nor sit more than 30 minutes without causing increased pain. The Administration discontinued benefits. Lemons appealed and chose to continue benefits during the process. Investigators met with Lemons’s treating physician, and showed her surveillance videos; the doctor revised her assessment and concluded that Lemons could perform some work. A cessation of benefits decision recorded a finding of “Fraud or Similar Fault.” Lemons was convicted of making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001, and theft of government funds, 18 U.S.C. 641. The district court calculated a guidelines range of 27-33 months’ imprisonment, based on an intended loss totaling $284,018.64, varied downward, and sentenced Lemons to 12 months and one day. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Lemons" on Justia Law

Graham sold insurance for American Family from 1988 until 2011. In 1996, they entered into an Agent Agreement. In 2010, following a customer complaint, American Family concluded that Graham had increased coverage and added endorsements without customer permission, increasing premiums; improperly applied multi-vehicle discounts to accounts with only one car; and changed vehicle-rating symbols used to assign risk and determine appropriate premiums for automobile insurance. American Famly terminated the Agreement. Weeks later, Graham formed an independent agency and sent letters to approximately 1,500 of his former American Family customers telling them he no longer represented American Family and had signed an agreement not to solicit or induce former customers for one year, but was not prohibited from serving needs not covered by American Family. Graham stated he now represented over 50 companies and could offer clients “more choices, expanded coverage, and excellent rates” that might be “better suited for your needs.” If a former customer contacted Graham, the customer was asked to sign a “non-inducement form.” American Family sued. Graham counterclaimed for wrongful termination. American Family asserted that Graham’s conduct qualified as “dishonest,” obviating the need for notice under the Agreement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed enforcement of a stipulated damages clause in the Agreement, in favor of American Family. View "Am. Family Mut, Ins. Co. v. Graham" on Justia Law

In 1979, James pleaded guilty to having sexual intercourse with a four-year-old girl. James was declared to be a sexual psychopath and placed in a hospital sexual psychopathy program. James admitted that he sexually abused his children and nephews, that he sexually abused a six-year-old girl when he was 17 years old, and that he sexually abused a 13-year-old girl while in his twenties. Hospital staff believed that James's dependence on alcohol exacerbated his deviance. In 1985, James left the program short of completion. The court revoked his suspended sentence and sentenced James to prison. James was paroled in 1988 and began a sexual relationship with a mentally handicapped woman. They had a child. James was convicted twice in 1995 for failing to register as a sex offender. James and his family moved to Arkansas in 2013. James last registered as a sex offender in 2012, in California. James pleaded guilty to failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250, as is required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901, and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the term and certain conditions, but vacated a condition prohibiting access to the internet, or any device capable of accessing the internet. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Meyers signed a revolving credit note and agreement and later signed term notes and loan agreements with U.S. Bank, to finance their swine production business. In 2006, the Meyers transferred all their business assets to a revocable trust, naming themselves as grantors and trustees. The revolving credit loan went into default in 2008. U.S. Bank agreed not to exercise its default rights. The lending relationship continued until the Meyers withheld proceeds from the sale of collateral (hogs). U.S. Bank filed suit; the Meyers sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2010. In 2011 the Meyers, individually, sued U.S. Bank, alleging breach of contract, fraud, violations of the Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and unjust enrichment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal. The Trust then commenced another suit, alleging that U.S. Bank tortiously interfered with the Trust’s contractual relations with a feed supplier. The district court granted summary judgment and imposed a $5,000 sanction against the Trust and its attorneys. The Trust appealed. U.S. Bank sought additional sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, arguing that appeal was frivolous. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the rulings, held that appeal was not frivolous but was frivolously argued, and granted double costs as a Rule 38 sanction. View "David M. Meyer & Nancy R. Meyer Trust v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1)(A) provides that, following arrest, the arresting officer “must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge.” Under the judicial McNabb-Mallory rule “confessions made during periods of detention that violate [Rule 5(a)’s] prompt presentment requirement” are “generally render[ed] inadmissible,” but 18 U.S.C. 3501(c), enacted in 1968, limits that rule, providing that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing [the defendant] before a magistrate judge” if the confession was voluntary and was made “within six hours immediately following” arrest or detention. If the confession occurred before presentment and beyond six hours, the court must decide whether delaying that long was unreasonable or unnecessary. “[D]elay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of ‘unnecessary delay.’” Casillas, charged with conspiracy to distribute and nine counts of distributing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846, argued that his confession should be suppressed because it was made more than six hours after his arrest and that presentment to a magistrate 36 hours after his arrest was “unreasonable and untimely.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and the 188-month sentence, finding that the confession occurred within six hours of arrest. View "United States v. Casillas" on Justia Law

Jenkins had a 1997 shoplifting conviction. Store video showed Jenkins purchasing 9mm ammunition. Arrested as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2), Jenkins did not stipulate to the prior conviction. The government introduced a certified copy, showing an original charge of shoplifting over $1,500—a class III felony. The charge was later amended to a class IV felony—shoplifting over $500 but less than $1,500. The jury sent a question: “What is a class 3 felony and what is the punishment? What is a class 4 felony and what is the punishment?” The court instructed that, under Nebraska law, a felony is a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment. The ammunition was linked to four murders by Jenkins’s children. The presentence report relied on the cross-reference in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(c)(1)(B) to hold Jenkins responsible for the transfer of ammunition resulting in death. Applying the first-degree murder reference under 2A1.1, the Guidelines range was life. The court found Jenkins transferred the ammunition with knowledge or intent that it would be used in another offense and, applying the cross-reference, sentenced her to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of insufficient evidence, an erroneous supplemental jury instruction, and error in applying the cross-reference. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

First National sought a successor for Senior Vice President of Operations Downing. Cox, a woman, began at First National in 2008 as Vice President of Loan Operations, reporting to Downing. She had 21 years of experience, plus a graduate degree. Her 2009 and 2011 performance appraisals rated her “Meets Expectations.” Doyle, a man, began at First National in 2000 and became Vice President of Payment Operations, reporting to Downing. He had more than 10 years’ previous experience. He was rated “Meets Expectations” in 2011 and “Exceeds Expectations” in 2009. Anticipating retirement, Downing created a matrix, rating potential candidates. Doyle rated higher in: “Leadership,” “Peer Respect,” and “Managerial Acceptance.” President O’Neill made the decision. O’Neill did not interview the candidates, did not review their resumes or appraisals, but studied Downing’s matrix. One of 15 executive officers was female, one member of the 12-member Board of Directors, and one of 18 employees reporting directly to O’Neill. O’Neill promoted Doyle. Cox remained in the same position; O’Neill gave her a raise and increased responsibility. Cox sued for gender discrimination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Taken as a whole, Cox did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact that O’Neill’s reasons for promoting Doyle are “unworthy of credence.” Only the lack of female executives supported pretext. View "Cox v. First Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

The City of Osceola purchases wholesale energy from Entergy Arkansas under an agreement filed with and approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Osceola sued Entergy in Arkansas state court, seeking reimbursement for charges allegedly in violation of their agreement. Entergy removed the case to the federal district court which denied Osceola's motion to remand, granted summary judgment to the defendant energy providers, and dismissed the case. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that FERC has primary jurisdiction to determine the appropriate treatment of the bandwidth payments under the parties' agreement. View "City of Osceola v. Entergy Ark., Inc." on Justia Law

Sellers, a Deere employee for more than 30 years, sued Deere and his supervisor, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act; disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act), 42 U.S.C. 12101; retaliation under the ADEA, ICRA, and ADA; and harassment because of his age and disability. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Sellers did not suffer an adverse employment action when his title and duties changed during a company-wide personnel reorganization. Incidents identified by Sellers may have been “rude or unpleasant,” but they were not “severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.” View "Sellers v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation (tasked with regulating the transportation of hazardous materials) finalized extensive amendments to the regulations for the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, 7 49 C.F.R. 171-174 & 179). The regulations included substantial background information regarding the safety issues concerning the transportation of hazardous materials and prior train derailments leading to tragic harms. Chemical and fertilizer entities sought to enjoin the railway (CP) from imposing a requirement that any TIH materials transported on CP's railways be transported in normalized steel rail cars. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court held the Surface Transportation Board should address whether CP's requirement is reasonable in the first instance, denied the request for injunctive relief, and dismissed without prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding no likelihood of irreparable harm. The court rejected an argument that CP's requirement would amount to a national crisis for an adequate water supply or fertilizer for crops. Any minimum reduction in the ability to transport TIH materials by rail does not outweigh the real concerns which prompted CP to implement the requirement. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R." on Justia Law