Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Morris was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams of methamphetamine and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of the criminal drug distribution. The presentence investigation report recommended a four-level increase because Morris was an organizer or leader of the criminal drug activity and a two-level increase because a pattern of criminal conduct was his livelihood, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a), 2D1.1(b)(15)(E). The district court overruled Morris’s objections and imposed a sentence of 360 months in prison, the bottom of his advisory guidelines range. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired shares of K-V Pharmaceutical stock during the period in which the company launched and marketed Makena, its new prescription drug, designed to reduce the risk of pre-term labor for at-risk pregnant women. It had acquired rights to the drug from the FDA, under the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 360. In a putative class action, the plaintiffs alleged that K-V and three of its officers made materially false or misleading statements or omissions related to the product launch. The district court dismissed, holding the challenged statements were protected by the safe-harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b), and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter under the PSLRA. The district court also denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the complaint as it related to allegations from confidential witnesses. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. K-V’s statements fell within the PSLRA’s safe-harbor provision as forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language and are not actionable as a basis for a securities fraud action. View "Anderson v. K-V Pharma. Co." on Justia Law

Boyd was convicted of aiding and abetting the distribution of methamphetamine. After one unsuccessful attempt at supervised release, Boyd was again placed on supervised release in January 2014. In May 2014, the government sought to revoke Boyd’s supervised release. Boyd objected to testimony from her new probation officer (Hudson) that was based on the file. Her previous probation officer had retired. Boyd argued “just because the probation officer is not working there does not mean she is not available.” The district court overruled the objections. Jonesboro Police testified about a traffic stop of Boyd’s vehicle based on a tip indicating Boyd was involved with stolen property. During the stop, Boyd admitted that there was stolen property in the vehicle and to knowing additional stolen property was at a local motel. After hearing that testimony, the court determined Boyd’s personal knowledge of the stolen property “would indicate that she was involved with it in some way,” found that Boyd had committed a Grade A violation of supervised release, and sentenced Boyd to 19 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that, even under the low preponderance of the evidence standard, there was insufficient evidence to find that Boyd participated in a burglary, View "United States v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Eighteen years after Nissan and Wayzata entered into an agreement which established Wayzata as an authorized Nissan dealer, Nissan informed Wayzata that it intended to establish a new dealership in Eden Prairie, eight miles from Wayzata. Nissan sought a declaratory judgment that the Eden Prairie dealership neither violated their dealer agreement nor infringed Wayzata's "relevant market area" under Minn. Stat. 80E.14. One month later, Wayzata sued Nissan in Minnesota state court, alleging the new dealership violated its dealer agreement and the statute, and moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss after concluding that the parties were not diverse under 28 U.S.C. 1332. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A district court may dismiss or stay a declaratory judgment action when it determines that the question in controversy would be better handled in state court. It would be duplicative and uneconomical for a federal court to decide a case substantially similar to one which has been pending for over a year in state court. View "Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Wayzata Nissan, LLC" on Justia Law

Wild is the sole member of Braveheart, LLC, which is one of two members of another limited liability company, Catalyst. In 2008, Catalyst borrowed $500,000 from Laurus. Wild signed a personal guaranty as security for Catalyst's loan. The guaranty did not expressly extend Wild's promise to Laurus's "successors and assigns," but it also did not expressly prohibit assignment of the guaranty. Years later, Laurus assigned the Catalyst promissory note to Avnet as part of a forbearance agreement on a debt Laurus owed to Avnet. An attorney for Avnet contacted Catalyst demanding payment of the $500,000 loan plus interest. When Catalyst did not make any payments, Avnet's attorney contacted Wild and demanded that he honor his personal guaranty. When Wild did not honor the guaranty, Avnet filed suit. Catalyst did not respond; a $770,065.80 default judgment entered against the company. Wild contended his guaranty was a "special guaranty" (directed solely to a specific creditor) rather than a "general guaranty" and that a special guaranty could not be assigned under Iowa law. After examining Iowa law, the district court determined the Iowa Supreme Court would allow enforcement of Wild's personal guaranty by Avnet. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Avnet, Inc. v. Wild" on Justia Law

Thomas was convicted of four counts of wire fraud based on a scheme she perpetrated to defraud mortgage lenders by submitting false income information on loan applications. The district court sentenced Thomas to 48 months imprisonment and ordered her to pay restitution. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding evidentiary rulings allowing the government to introduce evidence of a separate, subsequent scheme in which Thomas attempted to defraud mortgage lenders and evidence related to Thomas’s unfiled 2006 tax return; jury instructions regarding the “intent to harm” element of wire fraud; issuance of an Allen charge, advising deadlocked jurors to reconsider their positions; and polling of individual jurors. Allowing evidence and closing argument that Thomas should be convicted based on a failure to disclose debts did not amount to allowing the government to constructively amend the indictment. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Andrews, born in 1976, has a GED and work experience as a cashier, retail sales clerk, and a secretary/receptionist, all of which are classified as sedentary or light duty work. In 2010, Andrews applied for both DIB and SSI, claiming a disability onset of 2007, as a result of fibromyalgia/chronic pain syndrome, cervical disc disease, migraine headaches, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder and borderline personality disorder. The Commissioner denied her application. Andrews submitted extensive medical records to an ALJ. Her doctor’s opinion of Andrews' limitations, if deemed controlling, would have resulted in a finding of total disability. The ALJ placed little weight on his opinion, but placed great weight on the opinions of state agency medical consultants and credited the vocational expert's testimony in her final decision to deny Andrews' benefits. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed. The Eighth Circuit found that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. View "Andrews v.Colvin" on Justia Law

Burciaga began working at Ravago in 2007. Howe, a customer service manager, was her supervisor. Burciaga utilized Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, leave in 2008 and 2010-2011, for the births of her children. Burciaga received raises after each leave. After Burciaga returned to work in 2011, she had several performance-related issues. Howe warned that if the errors continued, she could be terminated. Burciaga requested FMLA paperwork in 2012, for intermittent leave to care for her son. Ravago’s human resources department approved her leave. According to Burciaga, Howe provided her time off for appointments when she requested it and was flexible with scheduling so she could attend appointments. Burciaga thereafter took FMLA leave for half a day on August 8, September 5, and September 6. After Burciaga returned from leave on September 6, she committed several shipping errors over the following three weeks. On the 28th, Burciaga’s employment was terminated. Howe indicated the termination was due to Burciaga’s shipping errors. Howe also could not provide Burciaga with the specific monetary amount her errors cost Ravago. Neither Howe nor Kramer referenced Burciaga’s absences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ravago on her FMLA claim. View "Burciaga v. Ravago Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own mineral interests in Chalybeat Springs and granted 21 oil and gas leases based on those interests. EnerQuest and BP America are the lessees. The property interests in Chalybeat, including the leases at issue, are subject to a Unit Agreement that establishes how the oil and gas extracted from certain formations will be divided and provides for a unit operator with the exclusive right to develop the oil and gas resources described in the Unit Agreement. In the late 1990s, PetroQuest became the operator of the Chalybeat Unit. Unhappy with the level of extraction, lessors filed suit against EnerQuest and BP, seeking partial cancellation of the oil and gas leases on the ground that EnerQuest and BP breached implied covenants in the leases to develop the oil and gas minerals. The district court granted the companies’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the lessors had not provided EnerQuest and BP with required notice and opportunity to cure a breach. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs’ earlier effort to dissolve the Chalybeat Unit constituted notice. View "Lewis v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law