Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taylor was charged with conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiring to launder money. The government offered to dismiss the drug conspiracy count and recommend a two-year sentence if Taylor pled guilty to money laundering. Taylor did not accept the plea. After trial, the court granted judgment of acquittal on the money laundering count. The jury found Taylor guilty on the drug count. Taylor received the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. His conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255’s limitation period in January 2012. Taylor filed a timely motion to vacate, arguing his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate his decision to accept the plea; failing to request a “cautionary tail” instruction; and failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. After a hearing, Taylor moved to amend to add a claim that his attorneys were ineffective for presenting a defense theory that essentially conceded guilt. The court allowed amendment and granted the motion to vacate on Taylor’s amended claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed with instructions to reimpose the sentence, finding that Taylor’s amended claim did not relate back to any original claim. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

Fry solicited funds from investors for promissory notes issued by Petters, stating that the notes would finance purchases of merchandise that would be resold at a profit. In fact, the notes were part of a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Petters, who was convicted separately. The transactions were fictitious, documentation was fabricated, and early investors were paid purported profits with money raised from the sale of notes to later investors. From 1999-2008, Fry and his recruits raised more than $500 million. Fry continued to misrepresent the investments and to solicit investments after the scheme began to unravel, causing $130 million in losses for 44 victims, while he collected tens of millions of dollars in fees. Fry made false statements to the SEC during its investigation. He was convicted of securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a), 77x ,18 U.S.C. 2; wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; and making false statements to the SEC, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). The district court sentenced Fry to 210 months’ imprisonment. Other participants in the Petters scheme pleaded guilty to various charges and were sentenced by the same judge. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Fry’s conviction and sentence, rejecting an argument that it should presume that the court sentenced him vindictively, in retaliation for his exercise of the right to a jury trial, because Fry’s sentence was longer than sentences imposed on defendants who pleaded guilty. View "United States v. Fry" on Justia Law

Debtors, limited liability companies, own pools of commercial and industrial real estate, subject to mortgages held by the Trust. The promissory notes for the loans provided that upon default, the interest rate on the remaining principal would be 5% in addition to the non-default rate of 5.04%. Debtors defaulted and later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. The Trust filed proof of claim for $1,516,739.80 in default interest. The assigned asset manager for the loans testified about expenses associated with default and said that the 5% rate was consistent with the rate for similar loans. According to the Debtors’ chief manager, the additional interest duplicated costs associated with default that Debtors were already paying, including attorneys’ fees, late fees, and costs of administration and enforcement. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, finding that Debtors failed to rebut the Minnesota law presumption that the default-interest provision was a valid liquidated-damages provision. The district court and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the bankruptcy court misapplied Minnesota law because it did not require the Trust to prove actual damages; that actual damages for breach of a promissory note are always ascertainable; and that many of the costs the default rate purportedly covers are otherwise covered. View "Bowles Sub Parcel A, LLC v. CW Capital Asset Mgmt. LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007-2012, Stewart was supervisor of a branch office for Rise, a welfare-services non-profit entity that obtained funding from a Minnesota welfare program, "Pathways." Stewart supervised counselors who directly assisted clients. Stewart's performance was measured in part by the relative workforce participation rate for her office's clients compared to clients of other Pathways organizations. During Stewart's tenure, other offices closed, a state government shut-down occurred, and workloads from different offices were consolidated, without a commensurate increase in staffing. When Stewart began working at Rise, the workforce participation rate was at a generally acceptable level. By the time she was terminated, her office’s performance had deteriorated. Stewart's predecessor and successor were, like Stewart, American-born African-American women. Stewart claimed that male, Somali-born subordinates created a hostile work environment through sexist, racist, and nationalist comments and through physical violence and intimidation, and that her supervisors ignored her complaints, denied her the authority to terminate the offending employees, allowed the hostile environment to persist, and eventually terminated her employment as an act of discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Rise. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remand as to the hostile work environment claim but otherwise affirmed. View "Stewart v. Rise, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed they were lured into making investments from which their money was “appropriated” and sued Nathan and Vertical Group. The district court entered an order of default against Vertical, but did not award damages at that time. Nathan filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The district court closed the matter during the bankruptcy. Nathan proposed a Chapter 11 plan. The plaintiffs objected and brought an adversary proceeding, restating their allegations and asserting that their claims were non-dischargeable. The bankruptcy court agreed, rejected Nathan’s plan, awarded actual and punitive damages, and determined that Nathan’s bankruptcy estate acquired his interest in the Kathleen Trust, into which Nathan and his wife had transferred assets before his bankruptcy, but did not identify a specific value of Nathan’s interest. The court converted Nathan’s bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The trustee tried to reach Trust assets. The court concluded that Nathan’s powers as a co-trustee were property of his bankruptcy estate, but Nathan lacked authority to act as trustee without Kathleen’s consent and only Kathleen could revoke the trust. Plaintiffs reopened the original action to determine damages and to collect the Vertical judgment from Trust assets. The district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, which recommended awarding actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees in the amount awarded in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. The district court adopted the findings and entered a default judgment against Vertical. The Eighth Circuit dismissed Nathan’s appeal for lack of standing and affirmed as to Kathleen. View "Cutcliff v. Reuter" on Justia Law

Hansen, a farmer, served as a bank trust officer. In 2003, he invested, through Johnson (a stock broker), in the Hudson Fund, a hedge fund Johnson ran with Onsa and Puma. Hansen continued investing with the three. In 2007 Hansen and Johnson formed RAHFCO limited partnership. Hansen served as general partner, but delegated responsibility for executing trades to the Hudson Fund. Hansen misrepresented RAHFCO to investors, directly and through a private placement memo. Hansen prepared and sent investors earnings statements that falsely inflated RAHFCO’s performance. Hansen later testified that he relied on Onsa and Johnson to provide the numbers and never confirmed them. Hansen hired an accounting firm for an audit, but the firm quit after Hansen refused to authorize it to obtain a brokerage statement confirming RAHFCO’s investments. RAHFCO’s law firm withdrew. Johnson was charged in 2007 with securities fraud concerning another company. Onsa was sued civilly for fraudulent securities trading in 2009. Hansen never informed investors of any of these events nor did he attempt to find another auditor. In 2011, RAHFCO collapsed. Convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1349, Hansen was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and ordered to pay $17 million restitution to 75 victims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the use of a willful blindness instruction and an instruction on conspiracy. View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

The victim was diagnosed with a skull fracture and a subdural hematoma, a type of traumatic brain injury after being found unconscious at a drinking party at which William Clifford, King Martinez, and four others were present. Clifford was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3), (6), 1153, and 2. In addition to the victim’s testimony, the district court admitted an out-of-court statement by the victim's three-year-old son that "Will and King hurt mama." Clifford objected to this evidence based on the Confrontation Clause. A jury convicted Clifford of simple assault and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The record showed an informal, spontaneous conversation between a very young child and a private individual to determine how the victim had just been injured, not a statement intended as testimony. The statement was also properly admitted under the hearsay exception for an excited utterance. View "United States v. Clifford" on Justia Law

ATF agents learned that Jones and an accomplice were robbing Little Rock drug dealers. An undercover ATF convinced Jones that he was running cocaine and wanted to rob a stash house. The story was false. During recorded meetings, Jones and the agent planned to rob the house at gunpoint, kill the guards, and steal cocaine. Jones, carrying four loaded guns, met the agent at a hotel to finalize their plans. The next morning, they met to conduct the robbery. Jones followed the agent to pick up a car for use during the robbery. Other agents were waiting and saw Jones take objects from his waistband and throw them under the vehicle. Agents found three loaded guns on the ground and another inside Jones's vehicle, later identified as those seen at the hotel. Jones pleaded guilty to conspiracy to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(o). Jones requested a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(b)(2), because the object of the conspiracy could not have come to fruition, "unless . . . the conspirators were about to complete all [acts necessary to complete the substantive offense] but for … interruption by some … event beyond their control." Jones’s Guidelines range was 210–262 months; with the reduction, it would have been 151–188 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 210 months. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Eva Robinson and her son Matthew were walking their dog. Dover Deputy Payton observed "suspicious people walking." He stopped them. The dog ran away; Matthew chased it. After Matthew returned with the dog, Payton placed them inside his patrol car. Pope County Deputy Stevens and Arkansas State Trooper Condley arrived. Stevens asked Matthew to exit the patrol car. Matthew did not exit. Stevens tased Matthew. According to the Robinsons, Matthew, who is very large, was tased while struggling to get out. Condley asserts Matthew refused to exit after multiple requests. The parties disagree about whether warning was given. Condley removed Eva from the vehicle, and handcuffed her. Payton pulled Matthew from the car and stunned him, then took Matthew to the ground and stunned him again. Photos show at least 15 taser marks. Searching Matthew, the officers found cigarette lighters and an air chuck. Eva thought the officers were shooting a handgun. She urinated on herself and screamed. Wanting to cover Matthew, she broke free a. Condley grabbed her and slammed her onto the hood of the patrol car. Eva was charged with disorderly conduct, refusal to submit to arrest, and criminal mischief. Matthew was charged with refusal to submit to arrest. The Robinsons sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Condley's motion for qualified immunity on the claim that Condley failed to intervene during the other officers' use of excessive force. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Condley's duty to intervene in these circumstances was not clearly established, View "Robinson v.Condley" on Justia Law

Because of an unpaid drug debt, Velez attacked the victim in a prolonged beating with a metal pole causing numerous broken bones and other serious injuries. Velez pleaded guilty to two counts of "willful injury causing serious injury" under Iowa law. The plea agreement provided that the state would recommend consecutive sentences for the counts, both based upon the July 5, 2010, incident. The state court sentenced Velez to consecutive 10-year sentences. On appeal, Velez asserted there was an inadequate factual basis for his plea, that counsel was ineffective, and that the sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the plea colloquy only established a factual basis for the proposition that Velez had caused multiple serious injuries, not that there were at least two discrete incidents. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record as a whole contained a sufficient factual basis to support a finding of two separate assaults. The federal district court denied habeas relief, finding that the state court's adjudication of the federal issue was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence and that Velez's convictions were not based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eighth circuit affirmed. View "Velez v. Clarinda Corr. Facility" on Justia Law