Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Manuel’s home burned down while he and his family were vacationing in Las Vegas. Manuel had insured his home through MDOW with a policy providing $150,000 for the house, $75,000 for personal property, and $45,000 for added costs. Manuel filed a claim for the fire, but MDOW denied it. MDOW told Manuel that it believed he or someone acting on his behalf had intentionally set the fire and that Manuel’s claim form contained fraudulent information. Manuel sued. A jury found that MDOW proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Manuel “either burned his home or caused it to be burned.” The jury did not decide whether Manuel had intentionally misrepresented information during the fire investigation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing even under an “implied bias” test of juror impartiality, there was insufficient potential bias alleged to warrant a new trial. The court rejected an argument that the court erred by allowing the testimony of MDOW’s expert witness, who disagreed with parts of the National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations. View "Manuel v. MDOW Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Messerli law firm obtained a default judgment for its client, Capital One against Scheffler, a former debt collector. Having learned of Scheffler’s reputation as “the most litigious debtor” in Minnesota, Messerli instructed its employees not to contact Scheffler. Scheffler claims he nonetheless sent a cease-and-desist letter to Messerli, which says it received no letter. Messerli attempted to enforce the judgment by serving Scheffler with a garnishment summons. Scheffler returned an exemption Form, claiming that all of the money the bank had frozen was protected, but giving no reason why it was protected. He asserted that the source of the money was “[his] butt,” that he was entitled to death benefits, and “I told you that you were wasting your time.” Scheffler’s attorney sent a letter asking Messerli to honor the claimed cease-and-desist request and asserting that Scheffler was “judgment proof.” Scheffler, acting pro se, sued Messerli under the Fair Debt Collection Practices and Fair Credit Reporting Acts and state laws. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Even if there were a cease letter, Messerli’s communications did not violate it. A creditor may communicate with a debtor after receiving a cease letter “to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies,” 15 U.S.C. 1692c(c)(2), which is what the garnishment letter was. Messerli was also permitted to request Scheffler’s credit report, 15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(3). View "Scheffler v. Messerli & Kramer P.A." on Justia Law

Lopez was a passenger in a car driven in St. Louis by Pyron. The lane in which they were driving ended at an intersection. Pyron merged into the lane where Cleveland's postal truck was traveling; the vehicles collided. The collision pushed Pyron's car a short distance into the intersection, but its air bags did not deploy. She pulled over and later drove her car home. Photographs show only minor damage to her car. Lopez filed a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671–2680. Officer McKern testified that based on her investigation she believed Cleveland's account of the collision and that in her experience similar accidents occurred frequently at the intersection. At the close of trial Lopez argued that under Missouri law there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of a vehicle colliding into the rear of another and that no evidence had been presented to rebut this presumption. The district court rejected the argument, finding that Lopez was not credible, that Pyron's own testimony showed she was at fault, and that Officer McKern was believable. Cleveland had died of unrelated causes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the government. View "Lopez v. United States" on Justia Law

Rodd, an investment advisor who produced and was regularly featured on a Minnesota local radio show, “Safe Money Radio,” was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, for swindling 23 investors out of $1.8 million. Rodd used the radio show to market low-risk investment products to gain customers’ trust and maintain a client base for soliciting participants in a fraudulent investment scheme. Rodd solicited money by promising liquidity, safety, and a 60% six-month return. Rodd instead used the money for personal and business expenses, hiding behind false assurances of security and payouts to his early investors. Finding an advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months, the district court sentenced Rodd to 87 months in prison, applying a two-level enhancement for abusing a position of trust, U.S.S.G. 3B1.3, The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the finding that Rodd occupied a position of trust. As a self-employed investment advisor, Rodd was subject to no oversight except by his investors. The discretion and control he possessed over client funds adequately supported the finding. The court did not err in failing to apply a two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Rodd took his case to trial and denied his guilt to the end. View "United States v. Rodd" on Justia Law

Stonebridge, an engraver of promotional pocket knives, sued its former distributor Cutting-Edge and its members; competitor knife engraver TaylorMade and its sole member and manager Taylor, a former Stonebridge employee; and Massey, a TaylorMade employee and former Stonebridge employee, arising from Massey’s copying Stonebridge’s computer files and using those files to solicit business from Stonebridge customers. Stonebridge brought claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968; the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code 4-88-101; and Arkansas common law. The district court partially found for Stonebridge on its fraud and conversion claims, dismissed the remaining eight claims, and denied the parties’ motions for attorney fees. The Eighth Circuit upheld: the finding that defendants converted the copies of certain files created by Stonebridge; an award of damages for unjust enrichment; a finding Stonebridge did not establish the existence of a business expectancy under Arkansas law; a finding Cutting-Edge fraudulently induced Stonebridge to send sample knives while intending to employ TaylorMade as its engraver on the orders placed as a result of seeing the samples; and dismissal of the RICO and ADTPA claims. View "Stonebridge Collection, Inc. v. Carmichael" on Justia Law

Franklin claimed that Young, an assistant caseworker at the facility where Franklin was incarcerated, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from sexual assault by another inmate by being deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that he would be sexually assaulted by inmate Mosley. The district court denied Young’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that factual disputes prevented the court from determining whether Young violated Franklin’s rights. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal. A district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity may not be appealed “insofar as [it] determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Essentially, Young argued that the district court erred in finding a genuine dispute of material fact over whether he violated Franklin’s Eighth Amendment rights. By challenging the district court's finding on sufficiency of the evidence, Young was asking the court to engage in “the time-consuming task of reviewing a factual controversy about intent.” View "Franklin v. Young" on Justia Law

Heartland provides laboratory services to long-term healthcare facilities. Watson, an African-American woman, was a route phlebotomist, traveling to several facilities, drawing blood from patients, and returning to the lab to process the samples. As a new employee, Watson was subject to a 90-day probationary period. Watson's route included Plaza Manor, where she was assigned to draw blood from Ramsey. While Watson was attempting to draw Ramsey's blood, he touched Watson’s inside thigh and moved his hand upward. Watson told Ramsey to stop and brushed his hand away. When Ramsey touched her "crotch area," Watson knelt down to draw Ramsey's blood. Ramsey put his hand on her side. After she stopped attempting to draw blood, Ramsey "grabbed the back of [Watson's] neck to try to kiss [her]." Watson left and reported the incident to Heartland, which ensured that she never provided services for Ramsey again, but denied her request for a route change. Watson continued to visit Plaza Manor. Ramsey verbally assaulted Watson, making racial and sexually derogatory remarks. After the seventh incident, Watson missed three days of work. Under Heartland's policy, an employee is considered to have voluntarily abandoned her job after two consecutive days of absence without properly notifying Heartland. Heartland left multiple voicemail messages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting her claims of hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act. View "Watson v. Heartland Health Labs, Inc." on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Williams left the vehicle and ran from police. Officers saw Williams drop a handgun, later identified as a loaded Glock 9. Williams pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Williams asked the court to vary downward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range and sentence him to probation, noting a his stable employment history, his provision of financial support for his family, his involvement with his community and church, the age of his prior convictions, and the fact that he lived and worked in a high-crime area. The court denied Williams’s request, observing that Williams fled from police and that the gun was fully loaded, and sentenced him to 37 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the guideline range. Williams argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court improperly considered that Williams was prosecuted in federal court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The district court’s commentary about the prosecutorial discretion of the U.S. Attorney in gun cases does not establish an unreasonable sentence. The court correctly observed that once the U.S. Attorney elects to prosecute a case in federal court, the court is required to consider federal sentencing guidelines, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4), View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fonseca pleaded guilty to stealing 36 firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(u) and 924(i)(1). Fonseca was previously convicted in Kansas of knowing possession and disposal of eight of those firearms; he was serving that 70-month sentence at the time he was sentenced for this offense. The presentence investigation report determined an advisory guidelines range of 63-78 months in prison and recommended that the court reduce the sentence for time served on the undischarged Kansas sentence if the Bureau of Prisons would not do so, U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b)(1). Consistent with the plea agreement, the government urged a guidelines range sentence of 70 months, reduced by the Kansas time served (50 months). Fonseca urged a greater sentence credit to be served concurrent with the undischarged remainder of his Kansas sentence. Emphasizing Fonseca’s lengthy criminal history and other sentencing factors, the district court varied upward from the advisory range to 88 months, applied a 50-month credit for Kansas time served, and sentenced Fonseca to 38 months in prison, concurrent with the remainder of the Kansas sentence, plus a criminal restitution penalty of $18,666.62. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for further restitution proceedings. View "United States v. Fonseca" on Justia Law

Priesendorf, distraught and drunk, asked Purscell for a ride to a cemetery. On the return trip, Priesendorf's behavior became erratic. She put her foot on the accelerator, on top of Purscell's foot. Purscell got her to stop. Later, Priesendorf unbuckled her seat belt, scooted over, and repeated the behavior. Purscell was unable to remove his foot. Approaching a stop sign, he put his other foot on the brake, with no effect. Purscell saw the Carrs' vehicle. Priesendorf continued to press the accelerator. Purscell swerved, but the vehicles collided and overturned. The Carrs' vehicle caught fire. Priesendorf was dead at the scene. Later, Purscell learned the gravesite Priesendorf had visited belonged to a person who had been killed in an accident while Priesendorf was driving drunk. Priesendorf had attempted suicide following her friend's death; none of her other friends would give her a ride because of her erratic behavior. Infinity insured Purscell's vehicle with policy limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident for bodily injury. Infinity immediately put the full amount on reserve, with $25,000 designated to Priesendorf's fatality and $25,000 designated to the Carrs. Infinity immediately received a settlement offer from the Carrs, seeking policy limits. Tim's medical expenses were over $97,000 and ongoing. Amy had separate claimes. Infinity stated that it needed to investigate coverage. Infinity informed Purscell of his right to seek independent counsel. The Carrs withdrew their settlement offer. Infinity eventually filed an interpleader, depositing policy limits in court. A jury awarded Tim Carr $830,000 and Carr $75,000; Priesendorf's wrongful death claim settled for $7,764.50, leaving Purscell with a substantial judgment against him. Purscell sued Infinity, alleging bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court first and Eighth Circuit rejected the claims. View "Purscell v. Tico Ins. Co." on Justia Law