Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, a West Virginia federal judge ordered Patriot to install environmental remediation facilities at two of its mines. From October 2010 until May 2012, for accounting purposes, Patriot recorded the installation costs as capital expenditures. After corresponding with the Securities and Exchange Commission about this accounting treatment, Patriot restated its financial documents in 2012 to recognize the installation costs as expenses. The restatement caused Patriot’s asset retirement obligation expense and net loss to increase by $49.7 million for 2010 and $23.6 million for 2011. Patriot’s share priced dropped. The company filed for bankruptcy. A securities fraud class action was filed on behalf of all persons who acquired Patriot securities between October 2010, and July 2012, alleging violations of sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a and SEC Rule 10b–5, against Patriot’s former Chief Executive Officer and former Chief Financial Officer. Plaintiffs argued Defendants fraudulently capitalized the environmental facilities’ installation costs to avoid the impact expensing the costs would have on Patriot’s bottom line. The district court dismissed for failing to meet the heightened requirement for pleading scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the more compelling inference is that Defendants did not act with fraudulent intent. View "Podraza v. Whiting" on Justia Law

Ransom was driving home to Kansas City. His van began backfiring. He pulled over. Someone called 911 and reported that shots had been fired from or near a white van, though the caller did not report seeing flashes. Officers Phillips and Conaway arrived and pulled behind Ransom’s van, which had on its hazard lights. The van backfired; its driver’s-side door opened. Phillips yelled, “Get back in.” Ransom apparently did not hear and stepped out. The officers fired eight shots. Ransom did not notice that they had fired at him. The officers reported “shots fired.” Ransom stated “My van is backfiring.” Phillips stated, ““No, it’s not. Our window’s shot out” and ordered Ransom to walk toward the squad car. Ransom complied. The Officers requested back-up, thinking another person might be shooting from a ditch. Ransom was taken to police headquarters. When his interview ended, he accepted a ride. Officers pulled behind the van, began to exit, and heard a loud backfire that they thought was a gunshot. The officers believed that they were being “ambushed.” When Ransom did not follow a command to get back in his car, Phillips believed that Ransom was attempting suicide by cop and feared for his safety and for bystanders. The officers thought they heard more shots and fired at Ransom. An investigation determined Ransom’s van was backfiring; there was no suspect nearby. Ransom was again questioned. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court concluded that there were disputed issues and denied the officers’ motion for qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit directed judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the officers’ conduct reasonable. View "Ransom v. Grisafe" on Justia Law

Greater Omaha employs several hundred workers in its beef processing plant. In 2008, the entire non-union fabrication workforce stopped working until the owner listened to their concerns. None were fired. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security notified Greater Omaha that the employment eligibility of 179 employees could not be verified. Some employees were arrested and others quit. Remaining employees complained that the speed of the meat lines forced them to assume heavier workloads because there were so many new workers; 10-12 employees, including Zamora, left their workstations to protest working conditions. They returned to work when Plant Manager Correa agreed to meet. Correa told them that the compensation package was competitive, agreed to speak with management about other concerns, and reminded employees of the safety rule that they not leave the production lines without permission. Employees remained disgruntled. Degante planned a work stoppage and asked Salgado to tell other employees; when she told others, they were already aware of the plan. Zamora and Degante were fired. The National Labor Relations Board charged Greater Omaha with wrongfully terminating employees for engaging in protected concerted activity, interrogating employees regarding protected concerted activities, and creating the impression it was conducting surveillance of protected concerted activities. An ALJ concluded that the employees were wrongfully terminated (29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1)), but found that Greater Omaha had not made coercive statements or created the impression that protected activities were under surveillance. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the wrongful termination rulings, declined to uphold the interrogation and surveillance rulings, and enforced the Board’s Order, as modified. View "Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Officer Williams allegedly searched and seized Banks without probable cause, took $1,100 from him without including it in department records, and filed false reports, leading to a criminal prosecution against Banks for unlawful use of a weapon, a charge on which he was acquitted. Plaintiffs sued, in state court, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. An amended complaint against Williams, in his individual and official capacities, alleged that Williams’s actions were part of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct about which the St. Louis Police Board was deliberately indifferent. Williams and the Board were served. Williams and an attorney for the Board were notified of the potential default and a scheduled hearing. Only plaintiffs appeared. A$900,000 default judgment entered against Williams "in his personal and official capacities, jointly and severally." Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enforce the judgment against city officials in state court. The federal district court declined to enter a declaratory judgment, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Refusal to honor the default judgment against Williams in his official capacity, not the state court denial of mandamus, was the source of the injury from which plaintiffs seek relief. Plaintiffs did not ask a federal court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. Younger abstention is also inappropriate. View "Banks v. Slay" on Justia Law

Officer Tourville stopped a speeding car. The driver’s license identified the driver as Smith. Tourville noticed a “slight odor of marijuana” coming from inside the car. Tourville checked Smith’s license, requested back-up, and asked permission to search. Smith would not consent. A K-9 unit arrived 17 minutes after the initial stop and 11 minutes after the request to search. As the dog approached, Smith sped away and led a high-speed chase for several minutes. When his car spun out, Smith jumped a fence, ran across the highway, and escaped. Search of the vehicle pursuant to a warrant revealed two kilograms of cocaine; $6,000; a hand gun with ammunition; prescription bottles for Smith; credit, insurance, and membership cards in Smith’s name; cell phones, one with a number assigned to Smith; and a partially consumed bottle of soda. The DNA profile from the soda bottle matched DNA collected from Smith, who was then on supervised release following conviction for distribution of controlled substances. Later, Smith was arrested in Chicago and was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Smith unsuccessfully moved to suppress, arguing that the faint smell of marijuana was insufficient to extend his detention. The Eighth Circuit upheld denial of the motion, admission of evidence of Smith’s prior conviction, and the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Brown pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Brown to 57 months imprisonment, recommending “the defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons’ 500-Hour Comprehensive Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program.” The district court also sentenced Brown to three years of supervised release with several special conditions of supervision, including: The defendant must not use alcohol nor enter bars, taverns, or other establishments whose primary source of income is derived from the sale of alcohol. Brown admitted to marijuana use twice in his life—both times while on parole in 2014—and alcohol use once in his life, in December 2013. Brown’s criminal history involved no charges relating to drugs or alcohol. Brown’s PSR indicated he never participated in substance-abuse treatment, but also reported Brown stated he “may benefit” from such a course of treatment. The court overruled Brown’s objection to the alcohol special condition. The Eighth Circuit vacated the condition. The district court did not “‘make sufficient findings on the record so as to ensure that the special condition satisfies the statutory requirements.” View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Lariat and Tenant entered into a 10-year lease for operation of a restaurant. Debtor personally guaranteed Tenant's performance. Tenant was evicted in 2010 and obtained a judgment of $2,224,237.00, plus interest and attorney fees. In 2011, Lariat filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition against Debtor, which was dismissed by agreement. The same creditors filed suit against Debtor's wife. After the involuntary petition was dismissed, they added Debtor as a codefendant. The court held Debtor and his wife liable for fraudulent transfers ($795,098.00) and awarded interest and costs. In 2013, Debtor sued Lariat; the court dismissed, based on collateral estoppel. Appeal is pending. In 2014 Tenant filed a chapter 11 petition and an adversary proceeding against Lariat. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding. On the Trustee's motion, Tenant’s chapter 11 case was dismissed. Debtor filed his own chapter 11 petition. Lariat filed a proof of claim for $1,734,539.00. Debtor objected on grounds that the amount sought based on Debtor's personal guaranty under the lease exceeded the amount allowable under 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6) and the amount sought based on fraudulent transfers was duplicative of, and subject to the same limitation as, sought based on thatl guaranty. Lariat filed an amended proof of claim for $1,610,787.00. The court capped Lariat's claim at $445,272.93. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel remanded for recalculation of damages under the lease and of fees and expenses, but agreed that damages for fraudulent transfers were duplicative. View "Lariat Co., Inc. v. Wigley" on Justia Law

Snyder was on parole after serving sentences for possession of a controlled substance and automobile theft. The Missouri Board of Probation and Parole determined that Snyder had absconded and issued a warrant for his arrest. Julian, an employee of the Board’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit, received a telephone call informing him that Snyder was at an apartment in Cape Girardeau. Julian drove to the address and positioned his car in a well-lighted parking lot in front of the apartment. Julian saw Snyder, got out of his car, and informed Snyder that he was a parole officer with a warrant for Snyder’s arrest. Snyder placed his hands on the back of Julian’s car. Julian approached, stood to Snyder’s left, and placed his left hand on Snyder’s left shoulder. Snyder then turned to his right and began to run. After Snyder took two steps, Julian fired one shot, killing him. In a suit by Snyder’s estate, the jury rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but awarded $1 million for wrongful death. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence to defeat Julian’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and that the damages award did not require a new trial. View "Estate of Snyder v. Julian" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs obtained second mortgage loans on their homes through Bann-Cor. After Bann-Cor executed their loan agreements, it sold or assigned the loans and the accompanying mortgage liens to the defendants. The borrowers alleged that the defendants, either directly or indirectly, charged, contracted for, or received fees that were impermissible under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act. About 15 years ago, the borrowers first filed suit in Missouri state court against Bann-Cor. The borrowers periodically sought leave to amend the complaint and add additional defendants. After two removals to federal court and two remands, the borrowers filed their sixth amended complaint in 2010, which for the first time added Wells Fargo as a party. Wells Fargo removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, and the district court denied the borrowers’ motion to remand. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the subsequent dismissal on grounds that the borrowers lacked standing to pursue their claims against defendants who did not personally service their loans and that a three-year statute of limitations barred the action against remaining defendants. View "Wong v. Bann-Cor Mortgage" on Justia Law

An estimated 1,600 Missouri homeowners obtained second mortgage loans from FirstPlus, a now-defunct California company. After issuing the loans, FirstPlus sold and assigned the loans and second mortgages to the defendants. In a putative class action, the borrowers alleged that FirstPlus and the defendants violated the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA) by collecting impermissible fees which were rolled into and financed as part of the borrowers’ principal loan amount. The district court dismissed, concluding the claims were barred by a three-year statute of limitations and the action is not saved under class action tolling principles. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2000, a different set of named borrowers had started a Missouri state court action based on the same MSMLA claims against FirstPlus. The state court granted summary judgment to the defendants in that action, concluding that there was no cause of action under MSMLA. The court rejected borrowers’ argument that they were members of that putative class and that their claims in this action should be tolled from the filing of that action in 2000 until its dismissal in 2004. View "Thomas v. US Bank NA ND" on Justia Law