Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Adams took her 16-year-old daughter, “M,” to Harris’s house. Harris, a paraplegic, has received morphine pills from the VA for 25 years. Harris regularly sold some of his pills. Adams was a customer. Adams told Harris that M wanted to “show her tits” in exchange for pills. Adams told M that Harris was dying, and that it would make him happy if M “flashed” him. M showed her breasts to Harris, who instructed M to sit on his bed and remove her clothes. M complied. Harris fondled and performed oral sex on her. Harris took nude pictures of M. Harris claims that Adams retrieved the camera and encouraged him to take the pictures. Harris gave Adams two morphine pills. Adams and M left the house. Later Harris asked an acquaintance for help in developing the film. The acquaintance went to the police. M wrote her boyfriend a note, stating that Adams “was willing to use my body to feed her addiction.” The boyfriend’s mother gave the note to police. Police obtained a search warrant for Harris’s home and found the camera, and nude photographs. Adams was charged with permitting her minor child to engage in the production of child pornography. Harris was charged with production and possession of child pornography. Both were charged with sex trafficking of a minor. Harris pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate. Adams moved to dismiss, arguing that the photographs did not portray sexually explicit conduct. Apparently without viewing the photograph, the court denied Adams’s motion. The jury found Adams guilty of sex trafficking and not guilty of production of child pornography. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, and that any error in denying the motion to dismiss was harmless. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Des Moines Officers Chiodo, Fong, and Wilshusen were patrolling in a marked squad car. A week earlier, a shooting had occurred nearby; the area had been the site of murders and narcotics and gang-related activity. Around 1:00 a.m., the officers saw people loitering near a commercial building. The businesses were closed. One business owner had filed a letter, requesting police assistance in enforcing a sign prohibiting trespassing. The officers decided to approach, ask for identification, and advise them that they were trespassing. As they drove into the parking lot, they recognized Brown, a suspect in three murders and several narcotics investigations and the subject of a bulletin warning officers to use caution because he is believed to be armed and dangerous. Sighting the squad car, the group walked around the building. The officers observed one of the men, later identified as Trogdon, place something on the ground. The officers followed, then exited the squad car. Chiodo approached Trogdon, ordered him to stop, and asked if he had any identification. Trogdon responded that he did not. Chiodo informed Trogdon that he was going to perform a pat-down and grabbed Trogdon’s arm. Trogdon attempted to flee. With assistance, Chiodo took Trogdon to the ground and handcuffed him. Trogdon announced that he had a firearm. Officers located a handgun in his waistband. The district court denied his motion to suppress. Trogdon entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm as a felon. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and frisk. View "United States v. Trogdon" on Justia Law

In 2011, the IRS required tax preparers who were neither attorneys nor CPAs to pass a certification exam and obtain an identification number. H&R, a nation-wide tax service, passed anticipated costs to its customers by charging a “Compliance Fee.” H&R explained at its offices and on its website that the fee would cover only the costs to comply with the new laws. In 2011, the fee was $2; in 2012, the fee was $4. Perras sued on behalf of himself and a putative class. Perras alleged that the amount collected exceeded actual compliance costs. Perras sued under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. The district court compelled arbitration of the 2011 claims. Later, the court declined to certify the class, agreeing that the proposed class met the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) of “numerosity, commonality, typicality, and fair and adequate representation,” but Rule 23(b)(3), requires that “the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court of Missouri would likely conclude that the MMPA does not cover the out-of-state transactions. The law applicable to each class member would be the consumer-protection statute of that member’s state; questions of law common to the class members do not predominate over individual questions. View "Perras v. H&R Block" on Justia Law

Kienstra, a Missouri resident, received treatment for uterine fibroid tumors at the Mayo Clinic in 2008. Her health plan concluded that her treatment fell outside the plan's coverage as experimental and requiring prior approval. Internal appeals failed. The plan is a self-funded multiple employer plan, maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, and subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1002(1). The plan specified that any civil action for wrongful denial of medical benefits under ERISA must be filed within two years of the final date of denial. Kienstra filed suit almost two and a half years after she learned her claim had been denied. She unsuccessfully argued that the contractual limitations period was invalid because the plan's rules of construction stated that its terms should be read to comply with Missouri law, that a 10-year Missouri statute of limitations governed, and that a separate statute barred contracting parties from shortening that limitations period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. There is no conflict between the plan's contractual limitations period and Missouri law; state law does not "apply of its own force to a suit based on federal law—especially a suit under ERISA, with its comprehensive preemption provision." View "Munro-Kienstra v. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Code provides preferential treatment to domestic support obligations. Young filed for bankruptcy shortly after he and his wife, Stephens, divorced. The divorce decree required Young to pay alimony. Young did not pay. Stephens filed contempt proceedings in state court and Young was jailed. Young responded by filing an adversary proceeding against Stephens in the bankruptcy court, alleging a violation of the stay. In the bankruptcy, including the adversary proceeding, attorney Cruz represented Young. She repeatedly mischaracterized past-due post-petition alimony obligations as past-due prepetition obligations and falsely asserted Young was current on his alimony payments, representing that Young would "continue" to make alimony payments. In reliance on these representations, the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan. After discovering Cruz's false statements, the court entered a show-cause order and concluded that Cruz had no basis in law or fact for her assertions. Citing Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, the court imposed, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Eighth Circuit affirmed, sanctions; suspending Cruz from practice in the Arkansas bankruptcy courts for six months, fining her $1,000, and directing her to attend CLE. Rule 9011 required Cruz to "make a reasonable inquiry into whether . . . a factual and legal basis" supported her assertions. View "In re: Cruz" on Justia Law

Officer Bovy was stopped at a red light and saw Gaffney’s vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. As the light changed to green, the vehicle, without slowing, moved through the intersection. Bovy made a u-turn to follow it. Gaffney braked hard and made a right turn. Bovy turned on his lights. The vehicle stopped. Bovy said he estimated Gaffney was driving 50 to 55 mph in a 35 mph zone. While Gaffney was looking for an insurance card, dispatch told Bovy that Gaffney had a narcotics history. Bovy noticed Gaffney appeared nervous with beads of sweat, shaking, and heavy breathing. Gaffney stated that he had no drugs or weapons, but declined permission to search his vehicle. Bovy ordered him to exit the vehicle to prepare for a dog sniff (the dog was in his car). Conducting a pat-down search, Bovy detected a long round object with a bulb on the end--a meth pipe. Bovy had the vehicle towed. An inventory search disclosed four pounds of ice meth. At a suppression hearing, Bovy testified he received training in identifying speed 11 years earlier; his estimate of 50-55 mph was based on his general experience. Gaffney presented evidence that his vehicle traveled about 473 feet in nine seconds, an average speed of 35.8 miles per hour. The court denied the motion. The Eight Circuit affirmed. Based on the totality of the facts, corroborated by Gaffney’s admission and the investigator’s measurement, Bovy’s belief that Gaffney was speeding was objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Gaffney" on Justia Law

Danial received a 120-day "shock" sentence for possessing marijuana. At the Missouri Western Correction Center, Danial was placed in the prison's "hospital" ward, where he beat on the walls. Following a request from mental health personnel, Danial was moved to a padded cell. He remained in a manic state, under the highest level of observation, requiring in-person checks for an affirmative response four times an hour. One night, staff merely viewed Danial through a monitor. Around 11:26 p.m., Danial fell and hit his head against a wall, slid down, and remained sitting until he fell backward again, hitting his head on the door jamb. Danial stated that he injured his head and needed medical attention. Staff did not open the cell door. They obtained no responses from Danial during the rest of the shift. Around 9:00 a.m., staff tried to wake him, even splashing water on Danial's face through a door opening. Danial responded by moving his eyes "slightly" and groaning. Danial had been in the same position, unresponsive for hours, but staff still did not open the door. When staff finally entered Danial's cell, his temperature was below 90 degrees, his pulse was between 30 and 34 beats per minute, and his eyes were fixed and dilated. He died in a hospital three days later, as a result of subdural hematoma caused by the falls in his cell. His parents sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on deliberate indifference claims, asserting qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a jury could find two defendants liable for deliberate indifference, but that the conduct of a third officer constituted, at most, negligence. View "Letterman v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

After 31 robberies across Minnesota, Arafat was arrested and admitted to committing the last robbery. Charged with 13 counts of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d), Arafat successfully moved to proceed pro se with appointed stand-by counsel and to sever the counts into three groups to be tried separately. On the day that the first trial was to begin, Arafat stated that he wished to plead guilty to Count 1, although he had not entered into a plea agreement. Because Arafat had asserted in earlier filings that he felt coerced to plead guilty, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion to ensure that his plea was voluntary. Accepting the plea, the court scheduled trials for the remaining counts. Before the next scheduled trial, Arafat and the government reached a plea agreement. Arafat agreed to plead guilty to five counts and to admit responsibility for 25 additional armed bank robberies. The government agreed to dismiss the remaining seven counts and that a 168-month sentence was appropriate. After an extensive Rule 11 colloquy, the court did not explicitly state, “I accept your plea of guilty,” but scheduled a sentencing hearing. Moments before the hearing was to begin, Arafat moved to withdraw both pleas. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. View "United States v. Arafat" on Justia Law

Wright, a 50-year-old man, suffers from back and knee pain. Wright suffered a shoulder injury and complained of low back pain after being involved in a severe car accident in 2000. Wright suffered from another severe automobile accident in 1987. Wright has not reported earning any income in the years 2006–11. When he has earned income, it was seldom over $10,000 for the year. In his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits Wright testified that his average day consists principally of laying on his back trying to get comfortable and spending around 30 minutes cooking basic meals for himself. His physician noted that Wright had "type 2 diabetes, vitamin D deficiency, tobacco abuse, obesity, [and] bilateral knee arthritis." The district court upheld the Social Security Commissioner's denial of benefits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the administrative law judge erred by discrediting the opinions of two examining physicians, discrediting Wright's testimony, not considering Wright's mental condition as a severe impairment, and not considering the record as a whole. View "Wright v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 2003, the governors of Cedar Rapids Lodge obtained the rights to build an AmericInn franchise. The company used Lightowler as the project architect. Lightowler used a standard form agreement that specified that its terms would be governed by the law of North Dakota. After changes requested by the Fire Marshal and for compliance with franchise standards, Lightowler submitted revised plans in February, 2004. Construction began in January 2004. In July, 2004, Lidberg of AmericInn led a construction site visit attended by the governors, and Olson, a Lightowler engineer. Lidberg and Olson prepared reports detailing deficiencies. The last act performed by Lightowler on the project was a response to the contractor in September, 2004. Lidberg led a second site visit in October, 2004, produced a report identifying additional deficiencies, and sent it to Siebert and Lightowler. The hotel opened for business in December, 2004, but problems continued. In December, 2009 Cedar Rapids Lodge brought claims against its former governors and others involved in the hotel project and alleging professional negligence by Lightowler. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lightowler, concluding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under either North Dakota or Iowa law. View "Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. Lightowler Johnson Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law