Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Adame, Gutierrez, and Sanchez were convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), (b)(1)(A), and 846. Adame and Sanchez were also convicted of distributing methamphetamine. Gutierrez did not challenge his money laundering convictions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that, although the indictment charges a single conspiracy, the government's evidence conclusively proved the existence of two separate conspiracies, thereby creating a variance. The court also rejected Sanchez’s challenge to the district court's admission of DEA testimony concerning video footage of a controlled buy. The court declined to consider a claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel. . View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Shields and Wilson are Indians with interests on the Bakken Oil Shale Formation in the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, allotted to them under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Shields and Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs in 2007. After the auction, the women agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and the winning bidders sold them for a large profit. Shields and Wilson filed a putative class action, claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the bidders aided, abetted, and induced the government to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity for the claims and can decide itself when and where it wants to intervene. View "Two Shields v. Wilkinson." on Justia Law

Wagner worked for Gallup for 12 years before his 2011 termination at age 50. Wagner co-authored two books for Gallup. The first became a New York Times bestseller. Gallup still sells both books. Wagner received positive verbal feedback from individuals in management. Gallup presented him with many awards during his employment. In 2011, Bogart became Wagner's supervisor. Bogart was 35, but had worked for Gallup longer than Wagner. Wagner stated that he and Bogart only interacted twice while Bogart was his supervisor. Bogart called Wagner and discussed the ongoing transitional situation of Wagner’s position and Bogart's difficulty finding a place for Wagner on a team given the perception that Wagner was too "self-referential." During a second call, Bogart terminated Wagner, informing Wagner that his position had been eliminated. Wagner sued, alleging age discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and invasion of privacy based on appropriation of his name or likeness. Wagner submitted declarations from two former Gallup employees who had worked with Wagner. Both stated that Gallup had initiated a "youthful movement" and targeted older employees for termination. The district court granted judgment in favor of Gallup. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Wagner was unable to establish a question of fact as to Gallup's motives for his termination and did not establish intentionality with respect to his privacy clam. View "Wagner v. Gallup, Inc." on Justia Law

Webster, on pretrial release for domestic assault, violated a court order not to visit his girlfriend’s residence. A fight broke out between him and her brothers. As the brothers were leaving, Webster retrieved a rifle from the residence and shot at their vehicle, shattering the rear window, puncturing the driver’s headrest, striking the windshield, and narrowly missing the brothers. Webster pled guilty to possessing an unregistered sawed-off rifle, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5861(d), 5871. The court departed from the advisory Guidelines range—70 to 87 months—to the statutory maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Webster had denied being guilty of the pending domestic assault charge. The acts at issue were listed only in the objected-to part of the PSR. A PSR is not evidence and not a legally sufficient basis for findings on contested issues of material fact. The government did not prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. While the no-contact order was based on “probable cause to believe” that Webster had committed domestic assault, probable cause is a lesser standard. There is a reasonable probability that but for the unproved allegations, Webster would have received a shorter sentence. The district court, on remand, may re-sentence only based on the existing record. View "United States v. Webster" on Justia Law

Ideker sued, alleging she developed non-Hodgkins lymphoma from exposure to benzene while working in HD’s paint department. The district court dismissed, predicting that the Missouri Supreme Court would require Ideker to raise her claim before Missouri’s labor and industrial relations commission because it was covered by Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Ideker then filed a workers’ compensation claim, which is pending. The dismissal became final. Less than 30 days later, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion that cast doubt on that prediction. Although Ideker’s counsel was aware of the decision before time to appeal expired, counsel stated that “there was little incentive for Ideker to seek appellate review requiring a second federal court to predict how Missouri courts would rule.” Ideker filed a complaint in state court, reasserting her occupational disease claim. Harley-Davidson removed the case to federal court. The court dismissed without prejudice on collateral estoppel grounds, concluding that its prior decision was binding because Missouri law precluded Ideker “from relitigating issues finally decided in [an] incorrect order[].” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Any purported “mistake” the court made in predicting Missouri law does not enable Ideker to circumvent the dismissal by refiling the same injury claim based on the same historical facts in a second case. View "Ideker v. Harley-Davidson, Inc." on Justia Law

Schoettle, an insulin-dependent diabetic, was driving when he became lightheaded. He parked on the shoulder, took glucose tablets, and fell asleep or became unconscious. Deputy Hudson approached, knocked on the window, and attempted to identify himself. Schoettle mumbled that he was recovering from low blood sugar. Believing Schoettle to be intoxicated, Hudson radioed for a DWI enforcement officer. Peifer arrived. Schoettle told him to “leave me the fuck alone.” Peifer twice requested that Schoettle exit his vehicle. Schoettle refused. The officers grabbed Schoettle’s legs and pulled him out, causing him to hit the ground. Schoettle attempted to return to the truck. The officers forced him to the ground. While they attempted to handcuff him, Schoettle stated he had a gun in his waistband. Peifer removed the gun and threw it. Schoettle became more agitated because the gun could have discharged, and asked the officers if they were stupid, continuing to struggle. The officers pepper-sprayed and struck Schoettle, trying to subdue him. An ambulance arrived. EMS personnel noted that Schoettle was “very uncooperative.” After treatment for a nosebleed and hypoglycemia, he became calm. Tests on his blood alcohol content were negative. He had a broken rib. Schoettle sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that even if the officers were aware that Schoettle was suffering a hypoglycemic episode, they were still confronted with a belligerent and impaired man who was refusing to comply with orders. View "Schoettle v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Farmer owned Arkat Nutrition, which owned the Plant One feed mill in Arkansas. Arkat Land owned Plant Two, which was leased to Arkat Nutrition, which produced animal feed. In 2007, a tornado damaged Plant One. Arkat decided not to repair the plant because its equipment had little useful life remaining. Debris from the tornado was removed, leaving scrap with potential value. Friedman made an oral contract with Farmer to act as a broker for the remaining Plant One equipment. Arkat Nutrition says that it was understood that it could also continue to attempt to find a buyer on its own. Friedman disagrees. Friedman sold some equipment and received a commission of $25,000. In 2010, Arkat Nutrition and Arkat Land transferred assets to a new company, Animal Nutrition, the equity interests of which were sold to Dad’s Products, which was not to be responsible for any investor or third-party claims against Animal Nutrition. Farmer claims that sale was planned since 2002. Dad’s later changed its name to Ainsworth and hired a third-party to remove remaining Plant One scrap. Friedman sued. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, rejecting alter-ego claims and claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, and noting the limitations period. View "Friedman v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Johnson has severe impairments, including chronic asthma, morbid obesity, borderline intellectual functioning, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She has never worked, has a ninth grade education, and does not have a drivers’ license. At the request of the Social Security Administration, a Ph.D conducted cognitive tests and reported Johnson was not “functioning within or near the mentally retarded range” and could “sustain concentration and persistence in completing tasks,” and Johnson’s “[m]ental impairments d[id] not significantly interfere with her day to day adaptive functioning.” To determine Johnson’s eligibility for Vocational Rehabilitation Services, another Ph.D., conducted a psychological evaluation o and concluded Johnson had a full scale IQ of 67, found that “a Mild Mental Retardation diagnosis [wa]s warranted,” and suggested Johnson “be encouraged to find employment … that is mechanical in nature, as she showed strength on tasks that require ability to analyze and synthesize abstract stimuli.”, Johnson occasionally attended counseling. Johnson’s counselors estimated she was of “low average” intelligence and education. Johnson was denied supplemental security income benefits, 42 U.S.C. 1381; an ALJ denied benefits, finding that Johnson had “residual functional - capacity to perform light work” with some restrictions. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Johnson v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The second time the district court revoked Goad’s supervised release, it sentenced him to five months in prison and ordered him to reside in a residential reentry center for 120 days after his release from prison. Within two months of his residency at the Hinzman Center, Goad absconded. Goad was soon arrested and indicted for escaping from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Goad moved to dismiss, contending section 751(a) does not criminalize his abscondence because he was not in “custody” while residing at the Hinzman Center. The district court denied his motion. Goad conditionally pled guilty. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Nothing in section 751(a) suggests that the purpose of the confinement matters and the use of a residential reentry center during supervised release is no more “transitional” or “non-penological” than pre-release halfway houses. View "United States v. Goad" on Justia Law

The Ibrahims, immigrants from Somalia Have very limited English. In 2011, Oday Tax Service, whose employees spoke Somali, prepared their returns. Ibrahim’s return claimed “head of household” status, which was improper because he was living with his wife. After receiving a notice of deficiency, he filed a petition with the Tax Court, seeking to change his status to “married filing jointly” to receive a credit and refund. The Internal Revenue Code prohibits joint returns after a taxpayer has filed a “separate return,” received a deficiency notice, and filed a petition, 26 U.S.C. 6013(b). Section 6013(b)(1) does not define “separate return.” The Tax Court ruled that head-of- household returns are separate returns, so Ibrahim was prohibited from filing jointly. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that under the Code’s plain language “separate return” refers only to married filing separately, 26 U.S.C. 1(d), 6654(d)(1)(C)(ii), 7703(b). Since Ibrahimdid not file a separate return within the meaning of section 6013(b)(1), section 6013(b)(2)(B) does not prohibit him from amending his status to married filing jointly. View "Ibrahim v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law