Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carlson took her pets to the Lakeville, Minnesota Southfork Animal Hospital, sometimes daily. Dr. Belisle, a Southfork veterinarian, received letters detailing how she would be kidnapped, tortured, and raped. Eight letters, sent during two months, were hand-addressed to Belisle at Southfork. Two letters were sent to other employees, detailing violence that would be committed against them and Belisle. Three businesses near the animal hospital also received threatening letters, falsely signed in the name of Belisle. Carlson was charged with nine counts of mailing a threatening communication, 18 U.S.C. 876(c); and three counts of mailing a threatening communication with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 876 (b) and (d). Testimony established that Carlson was infatuated with Belisle and had called, threatening to shoot children at a nearby daycare if Belisle did not meet her at a gas station. A handwriting expert concluded that it was “highly probable” that Carlson wrote the letters. The Eighth Circuit reversed her conviction on the extortion count, but affirmed her convictions on the other counts. With respect to an extortion letter sent to a business, there was no way for the jury to determine, without the text of section 876, that the statute’s context implied that “person” could not be a corporation. View "United States v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Avon Bank customer Herdering was contacted by "Gibson," who claimed to be the son of an African associate with whom Herdering had done business; that his father had died, leaving a $9 million estate; that the family wanted to transfer the funds to the U.S.; that the money was tied up in the Netherlands; and that the transfer required up-front payments of taxes and fees. Herdering sent Gibson money and approached Avon Assistant Vice President Carlson, who issued Herdering a loan from Avon, but contributed $60,000 of his own money. Avon’s President expressed concern that the estate might be a scam. Herdering later recruited others, telling them that Avon was making the loans and having both men write checks to Avon. Froseth contributed $405,000; Imdieke contributed $80,000. Carlson wired the money in violation of Avon policy that prohibited wiring money to non-customers. When the scheme fell apart, Avon terminated Carlson and sent the investors letters stating that it viewed their investments as related to Carlson’s personal dealing and not involving the bank. They sued Avon for fraudulent misrepresentation. BancInsure agreed to provide coverage under the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Policy, rather than simply defend Avon, reserving its rights. A jury found that, in the scope of his employment, Carlson had breached his duty to disclose material information. BancInsure asserted that neither the Policy nor a separate Fidelity Bond covered the loss. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court holding that the Bond, but not the Policy, covered the loss, and an award of prejudgment interest. View "Avon State Bank v. BancInsure, Inc." on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

LoRoad, based in Oregon, negotiated to have GXV, based in Missouri, build a custom expedition vehicle. While the parties were exchanging drafts of an Agreement, LoRoad wired GVX $120,000, but subsequently expressed several concerns and requested revisions. GVX promised a final set of documents “incorporating everything we’ve come to agreement on” “for final review and then signatures, so we can get this thing moving.” After several disagreements, LoRoad stated “We do want you guys to create this vehicle however we are no where near having the documents done . . . and while you have our commitment in the form of a $120k deposit, that in no way means that you have an agreement with us until the final documents are signed, sealed and delivered properly.” The relationship further deteriorated and, with the project underway, LoRoad filed suit to compel arbitration, invoking the arbitration provision in the Agreement. GXV denied a valid, enforceable agreement to arbitrate. The district court held that LoRoad failed to accept the Agreement signed by GXV so that it could not enforce the arbitration provision in that Agreement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "LoRoad, LLC v. Global Expedition Vehicles LLC" on Justia Law

Rogers’s 2005 mortgage on her Minnesota home was executed in favor of Countrywide and it listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee. In 2008, MERS transferred its interest in the mortgage to a securitized mortgage trust by assigning the mortgage to Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate holders. Bank of New York was party to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement between various entities. According to Rogers, that Agreement governed the mortgage trust and required “that all mortgages to be included in the corpus of the Mortgage Trust were to be transferred into the Mortgage Trust between June 1, 2005 and August 8, 2005.” In 2012, Bank of New York commenced foreclosure proceedings on Rogers’s house, and purchased the house at a sheriff’s sale. Rogers sought a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the 2008 assignment of her mortgage to the trust violated the Agreement. The district court dismissed, holding Rogers did not have standing to challenge the foreclosure on the ground that the defendants violated an agreement to which Rogers was not party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rogers lacked standing. View "Rogers v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Based largely on the testimony of his accomplice, Anderson, Clayton was convicted of stealing $11,284 from Citizens State Bank in Fort Dodge, Iowa. Other evidence included witness testimony and cell phone records. A search of the home of McDonald, the girlfriend of Clayton’s cousin, turned up a roll of cash that contained four of the bait bills that were taken during the bank robbery. Clayton's cousin was connected to Anderson and the men had gone to her home after the robbery. Clayton was sentenced to 129 months’ imprisonment, based on an upward variance due to his prior criminal conduct and the fact that he made violent threats before and during the robbery. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Union Electric is a power company, and EIM is a trade-association-owned excess carrier for power companies. Union, as an association member, is a partial owner of EIM and is the named insured in a $100 million excess liability policy issued by EIM. Union and other power companies drafted the general form policy; Union negotiated the present policy with EIM. The policy requires that coverage disputes go through a mini-trial and arbitration. An exclusive forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause named New York. After failure of a Missouri reservoir caused extensive damage, Union paid to settle claims; EIM paid $68 million of the policy's $100 million limit. Union filed suit in Missouri seeking the remaining $32 million plus damages for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The district court dismissed, based on the forum-selection clause, The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the relationship between the mini-trial requirement, the arbitration provision, and a public policy argument. On remand, the court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that arbitration agreements in insurance contracts are unenforceable under Missouri law and that contractual choice-of-law provisions have been held unenforceable if they would allow enforcement of such an agreement. The Supreme Court, in a different case, subsequently supported enforcement of contractual forum-selection clauses "[i]n all but the most unusual cases." Relying on that case, EIM moved for a transfer stating that it would not seek enforcement of the arbitration provision. The court held that the motion was not untimely and that the forum-selection clause was enforceable. The Eighth Circuit denied a writ of prohibition or mandamus to prevent the transfer, stating that Union did not establish entitlement to extraordinary relief. View "Union Elec. Co. v. Energy Mut. Ins. Ltd." on Justia Law

Galvez pleaded guilty pursuant to a FastTrack plea agreement to illegal reentry following an aggravated-felony conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2), waiving the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Finding that Galvez had previously been deported after a conviction for a felony that was a "crime of violence," (assault with a deadly weapon) the district court applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 37–46 months' imprisonment, and sentenced Galvez to 37 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal. Nothing in the government's evidence or argument that contradicted the parties' factual stipulation or otherwise breached the plea agreement; the appeal waiver was valid and enforceable. View "United States v. Galvez-Quebedo" on Justia Law

Officers obtained a warrant and searched an Arkansas home where an identifiable internet connection and computer had been used to receive child pornography, but did not find the computer. The home’s wireless network was unsecure and could be accessed from neighboring homes. During the search, officers observed Harper leaving a neighboring home in a truck bearing Oklahoma license plates. Officers knew the computer being sought had been used in the vicinity of Owassa, Oklahoma, to download child pornography. Officers ran the plates and discovered Harper had an outstanding warrant for contempt. Officers approached the home and talked to Harper's girlfriend, who stated she and Harper had recently moved to Arkansas from Owassa. Officers eventually located Harper, arrested him, searched his truck, and discovered a computer and a thumb drive in a backpack in a truck-bed toolbox. Later, at the police station, officers gave Harper a Miranda warning, and he signed a consent form to allow search of the computer and thumb drive. After officers discovered child pornography, Harper admitted he had downloaded the images. Harper moved to suppress the materials found in the truck. The parties dispute whether an officer asked for or obtained consent before searching the truck or toolbox. Harper entered a conditional plea agreement to Receipt of Images of Child Pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2); (b)(1). The Eighth Circuit upheld denial of the motion to suppress and his sentence of 121 months' imprisonment. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

Schell filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging Bluebird made false statements to the government to secure a three-year grant from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce for increasing broadband accessibility in northern Missouri and retaliated against Schell, a former Bluebird employee, for reporting fraudulent or illegal conduct. The alleged fraud concerned a requirement for matching funds, changing the purpose of the grant, and disclosure of management. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in Bluebird’s favor. Schell did not show that Bluebird knew that changes would be necessary and obscured the true information or otherwise presented their grant application with the mens rea the FCA requires. View "Schell v. Bluebird Media, LLC" on Justia Law