Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Trinity operates on its church premises a licensed preschool and daycare, the Learning Center, which has an open admissions policy. It teaches a Christian world view and incorporates daily religious instruction in its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants, a solid waste management program, providing funds for the purchase of recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. In 2012, Trinity applied for a grant, disclosing that the Learning Center was part of Trinity. DNR denied the application, stating that the Missouri Constitution specifically provides that “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity’s application ranked fifth out of 44 applications and 14 projects were funded. Trinity sued, citing the Equal Protection Clause; its right to free exercise of religion; the Establishment Clause, and its right of free speech. The district court dismissed and declined to reconsider in light of evidence that the DNR had previously given Scrap Tire grants to 15 religious organizations, including churches. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, citing precedent that concluding that Missouri Constitution Article I, section 7 does not conflict with the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley" on Justia Law

Sergeant Denver of the Benton County Sheriff’s Office arrested New in 2009 for possession of marijuana after two leaves were found during a consensual search of New’s car following a traffic stop. When the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory tested the leaves and reported they did not contain detectible amounts of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the prosecutor dropped a criminal charge. New filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Denver, alleging he was arrested without probable cause. Denver moved for summary judgment on the merits and based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it could not make “a credibility determination crediting Mr. Denver’s assertions as true in the face of contrary evidence -- a negative lab result and the contrary averments of Mr. New.” The Eighth Circuit reversed: an objectively reasonable police officer with Denver’s training and experience could have reasonably believed that the leaves he found in New’s car were marijuana, giving Denver probable cause to arrest and have the leaves tested for THC. More than evidence of a mistake is required to deny a public official qualified immunity from section 1983 damage liability. View "New v. Denver" on Justia Law

On the first day of his arson trial, Kelley informed the court that Kelley did not want the public defender to represent him. Kelley explained that Kelley had not had a chance to view all the evidence against him and he had communication problems with his attorney. The court denied the request. Kelley then stated, “Since you won’t provide substitution, I would like to move for the court to allow me to represent myself, contingent upon getting a continuance for me to review the evidence and prepare.” The judge replied, “I do not believe that granting a continuance at this point is appropriate or necessary. This case has been set for trial on at least one other occasion. The case is ready to move forward. You have expressed identical, if not very similar concerns with respect to [the public defender] I know for a long period of time now … is it your wish that you proceed pro se and without [the public defender] representing you?” Kelley never answered. The judge then reviewed Kelley’s written submission and denied his requests. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction. “The right to self-representation . . . is not absolute.” Considering the totality of the circumstances, Kelley’s request was neither timely nor unequivocal. View "United States v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Between September 2011 and May 2012, Alaboudi convinced and coerced four women, two minors and two adults, to engage in commercial sex transactions in his apartment in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Alaboudi was convicted of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a child, sex trafficking of a child, and sex trafficking by means of force, fraud, or coercion. The district court issued a life sentence for each count, all running concurrently. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the government’s conduct during his trial deprived him of a fair trial, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and the imposition of four life sentences violated his Eighth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Alaboudi" on Justia Law

Medina police officers arrested Greenman on three separate occasions for, among other things, operating his Segway while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) in violation of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 169A. Greenman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the officers and city prosecutor violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, his due-process rights, and his First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. He further alleged that the city was liable for not properly training and supervising its police officers. He also filed several state-law claims. The district court dismissed all the federal claims, on the basis that the police officers and city prosecutor were entitled to qualified immunity, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Greenman’s state-law claims. The Eighth Circuit concluded that a request for declaratory relief is moot because there is no longer an actual case or controversy.. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has concluded that operating a Segway while intoxicated does not violate Minnesota’s DWI statute. Following that decision, the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office dismissed the pending DWI charges against Greenman. View "Greenman v. Jessen" on Justia Law

Reid worked as an attorney in Minnesota and received health insurance from Blue Cross through her law firm. In 2008, her son was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. One of the treatments he received was behavioral therapy. Reid’s Blue Cross policy initially covered this treatment. In 2012, Blue Cross informed Reid her policy would exclude coverage for behavioral therapy beginning in 2013. Reid sought an injunction. The district court dismissed most of Reid’s claims under FRCP 12(b)(6) but allowed claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2013, Reid moved to Arizona; she lost her BlueCross coverage some time thereafter. Injunctive relief became moot. The district court then entered an order granting Reid’s motion to dismiss, granting Blue Cross’s motion to the extent it sought dismissal, and denying Blue Cross’s motion to the extent it sought vacatur of its earlier Rule 12(b)(6) ruling. The court provided no explanation for its denial of vacatur. The Eighth Circuit remanded to allow the court to provide an explanation. View "Reid v. BCBSM, Inc." on Justia Law

The Director and the Board sought a preliminary injunction under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), alleging that Southern Bakeries engaged in acts that violate the NLRA. The district court granted the injunction pending the Board’s final disposition of the unfair labor practices allegations. The injunction enjoins and restrains Southern Bakeries and all persons acting in concert with it from failing to recognize the Union and directs Southern Bakeries to allow the Union access to the facility in a manner consistent with past practice and to post copies of the district court’s order in English and Spanish. The court concluded that the district court erred in not first and fully considering whether this case presents a threat of irreparable harm “to the collective bargaining process or to other protected employee activities.” Because the Board did not clear the “relatively high hurdle” of demonstrating irreparable injury, the court need not address the other preliminary injunction factors. The court held that the Board’s normal adjudicatory process will not frustrate the remedial purpose of the Act in this case and therefore concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief. The court vacated the injunction. View "McKinney v. Southern Bakeries, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Administratix of the Estates of Melanie Sorace and Jahneva Cannaday, filed suit against the United States, alleging a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674. Plaintiff's claim was based upon a drunk-driving accident on the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation that killed Melanie and Jahneva. Plaintiff alleged that the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s Police Department (“RST PD”) was negligent in failing to locate and arrest the drunk driver prior to the accident.The district court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege a special relationship as required for a negligence claim under South Dakota law. The district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim for negligence. Plaintiff’s complaint also failed to state a claim under the public duty rule. Plaintiff's complaint failed to allege a specific South Dakota statute or regulation that imposes a mandatory duty on the police to protect a particular person or class of persons. The court found that the RST PD did not increase the risk of harm to Melanie and her children by failing to arrest the drunk driver. Therefore, the district court properly granted the motion to dismiss. Further, the district court did not err as a matter of law in not converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sorace v. United States" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was severely injured from falling off a ladder, he brought claims in state court against the ladder's manufacturers (Versa) and the seller of the ladder (Menard). Gulf, Versa's former insurance company, subsequently moved to intervene in the products liability action. Plaintiff and Versa then entered into an agreement in which Versa admitted liability and permitted plaintiff to seek recovery from Gulf. After trial, the jury returned a verdict for Gulf and plaintiff moved for a new trial, or in the alternative, reconsideration of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting plaintiff's requested spoliation instruction where defendant's destruction of claim files and records was insufficient to show that the files had been destroyed in anticipation of litigation; given that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a spoliation instruction, and did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of plaintiff's lawyer's disciplinary history, a new trial is not required to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and the court did not review the district court's denial of the motion for summary judgment after the trial on the merits, because plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether Versa received the March 2003 letter at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burris v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Papesh had a GED and worked as a bakery helper. She reported long-term, low-back pain, which radiated to her hips and legs. She said the pain “is worse with working” because the bakery has concrete floors. She began treatment in 2009 (the year she turned 50) with Dr. Cash, who observed “tenderness throughout the lumbar spine to palpation, as well as pain with some spasm in the low back.” Papesh was also caring for her mother, who had severe dementia and suffered “worsened depression and anxiety” after her mother’s death. Papesh applied for disability and for supplemental security income in early 2010, alleging she was disabled due to degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and other impairments. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the denial of benefits because the record contained two substantially similar residual function capacity opinions from a treating physician and neutral medical expert plus a consistent opinion from a second treating physician—all consistent with Papesh’s descriptions of her daily functioning. The ALJ’s determination that Papesh can perform light work was outside the available zone of choice. The substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports a finding that Papesh is capable of sedentary work only. View "Papesh v. Colvin" on Justia Law