Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, ESI acquired NPA, which provided pharmacy-benefit-management services to health funds created by the police union. In 2003, those funds brought a class action against ESI and NPA. The funds had never contracted with ESI. In 2004, the New York Attorney General sued ESI, resulting in a consent judgment. Based on that consent judgment, ESI moved for summary judgment in the funds’ suit. The district court granted ESI’s motion, applying res judicata. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. ESI argued that the AG “alleged claims on behalf of the” funds, but the funds were not parties to the AG’s suit, nor did the AG allege claims on their behalf. The AG complaint referred to “other New York government plans,” meaning “counties and municipalities that contract with ESI.” The funds did not contract with ESI and are neither a county nor a municipality. They are private trusts. Their trustees are union officers, not city officials with whom they bargain. View "Lynch v. Nat'l Prescription Admin." on Justia Law

The Arkansas Human Heartbeat Act provided that a licensed physician “shall not perform an abortion on a pregnant woman before the person tests the pregnant woman to determine whether the fetus that a pregnant woman is carrying possesses a detectible heartbeat.” Ark. Code 20-16-1303(a) (f). A physician could not perform an abortion on a pregnant woman with the specific intent of causing or abetting the termination of the life of an unborn human individual whose heartbeat has been detected and was 12 weeks or greater gestation. The penalty for violation was revocation of the physician's medical license. The Act provided exceptions to protect the life of the mother, for a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest, or for a medical emergency and required informed disclosures about the existence of a heartbeat and the probability of bringing the unborn to term. Arkansas physicians, on behalf of themselves and their patients, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, seeking a permanent injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction, prohibiting enforcement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that viability of a fetus varies with individuals. View "Edwards v. Beck" on Justia Law

Omar was charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, 18 U.S.C. 2339A(a); providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1); providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim persons outside of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1). Omar moved to suppress any identification evidence. A magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended that Omar’s motion be granted, finding that the pre-trial identification technique used three witnesses was impermissibly suggestive because it amounted to a single-photograph identification and that repeated displays of Omar’s picture “served to dispel any hesitation the witnesses may have had in their original identification[s].” The district court rejected the recommendation and denied Omar’s motion, stating these witnesses “were sufficiently familiar with the Defendant to provide an accurate identification.” The court also denied a motion for disclosure or suppression of evidence obtained from electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.1801. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, upholding admission of testimony by a government terrorism expert concerning global jihad and the court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Omar" on Justia Law

Unison, a South Korean company, manufactures, sells, delivers, and services Wind Turbine Generators (WTGs). JEDI is incorporated and located in Minnesota. In a Turbine Supply Agreement (TSA), Unison agreed to design, manufacture, and sell two WTGs to JEDI for installation in Minnesota for $2,574,900. In a Financing Agreement (FA), Unison agreed to lend to JEDI the TSA contract price. Unison sued JEDI in federal court in Minnesota, asserting 17 claims for relief under the FA. JEDI moved to compel arbitration, based on an arbitration clause in the TSA. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the arbitration clause in the TSA covers the dispute. The court noted multiple cross-references, and the interdependent nature of the parties’ obligations under both the TSA and the FA, and concluded that they are “two parts of one overarching business plan between the same parties.” View "Unison Co., Ltd. v. Juhl Energy Dev., Inc." on Justia Law

Askew, a military veteran and a former U.S. Postal Service employee, underwent a cardiac stent placement at the St. Louis Veterans Administration Medical Center. He was readmitted with an infection and the medical center responded negligently. As a result of the infection and attendant loss of blood, Askew suffered severe anoxic brain injury and amputation of his right leg. In Askew’s suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, the government did not dispute liability. The government requested that the court structure an award for future medical damages as a trust to provide periodic payments to Askew, with a reversionary interest in favor of the government upon Askew’s death. The district court declined to order a reversionary trust, awarded $253,667 in past economic damages, $525,000 in past non-economic damages, $4,000,000 in future economic damages, and $2,000,000 in future non-economic damages to Dirk Askew. The court awarded $1,525,000 to Askew’s wife for loss of consortium. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, describing the reversionary trust remedy as the most reasonable analogy to the relief available against a private individual in like circumstances under Missouri law. View "Askew v. United States" on Justia Law

An Iowa court entered an order requiring no contact between Peters and her boyfriend. Sioux City police stopped a speeding car being driven by the boyfriend, found that Peters was a passenger, arrested her for violating the no-contact order, and transported her for booking. A security video showed officers attempting to obtain information from Peters, who became agitated, began shouting at the officers, and refused to answer questions, including questions designed to determine whether she presented a risk of harm to herself. The officers escorted Peters to a holding cell, where Peters again refused to respond, yelling “[w]hy the fuck would I want to hurt myself?” Peters was wearing a bathing suit under a shirt and sweat pants. Officers told Peters to remove her clothing, concerned that Peters could harm herself with the swimsuit strings. Peters persisted in refusing to comply and shouting; an officer grabbed and turned Peters’s hand, causing Peters to fall face down onto the bunk. Peters continued to resist. The officers applied pressure to control her, then placed a paper jumpsuit over Peters and removed Peters’s clothing. In her suit under 42 U.S.C 1983, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the officers. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting her claim of unreasonable "strip search." View "Peters v. Risdal" on Justia Law

A neighbor saw a man he later identified as Griffith place a TV and what appeared to be a firearm in the back of a car and called the victim at work. The victim believed a crime was taking place. The victim called police. Police arrived and spoke to the neighbor, who described Griffith and the vehicle, and gave a license plate number. The victim’s door had been kicked in. His TV was gone; two shotguns, a rifle, and cash were missing from his gun safe. About 20 minutes later, another officer spotted the license plate and arrested Griffith. Looing in the hatchback portion of the car, he saw an Insignia brand TV and what appeared to be a shotgun receiver. Police impounded the vehicle and obtained a search warrant. They found the victim's shotgun receiver and television. Griffith was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). At trial, the neighbor testified to seeing Griffith with a firearm. The district court instructed the jury the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Griffith knowingly possessed the firearm. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Griffith’s conviction, finding that there was sufficient evidence of knowledge and that the court did not improperly instruct the jury, View "United States v. Griffith" on Justia Law

Rebouche began working for Deere as a technician in 1977. She claims she was passed over for promotions and asked to train male supervisors. In 1998 she and three others filed a complaint with human resources. As a result a supervisor was sent to sensitivity training. In 2002-2004 Deere engaged a consulting firm and redefined job titles. Rebouche alleges that none of the women in her department received pay grade increases, while men were elevated. Rebouche file a complaint with the EEOC. She was subsequently promoted. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting her claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) and Iowa law. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that allegations concerning events in 1998-2001 were time barred; that Rebouche failed to establish that similarly-situated males were treated differently during the remapping of jobs; and that there was no evidence of retaliation for the EEOC filing. View "Rebouche v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

Rey was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846. The jury found that the conspiracy involved between five and 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court determined that the conspiracy involved between 50 and 150 grams of cocaine base and sentenced Rey to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2009, Rey filed a preprinted form entitled “Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.” The court rejected his claims that he did not receive a fair trial, his trial counsel was ineffective, and the court sentenced him based on a greater drug weight than found by the jury. Later, Rey filed a letter stating that he did not intend to file a motion, but was merely seeking assistance of counsel to help him file a motion. The court responded that it would “await any further filing ... to determine whether it constitutes a second or successive 2255 petition.” In 2014, with assistance of counsel, Rey filed a 2255 motion, arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. The district court dismissed it as an uncertified second or successive petition and found that the motion was untimely because the Supreme Court has not declared Alleyne to be retroactively applicable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Rey v. United States" on Justia Law

Daniel attended a birthday party for a St. Louis County police officer at Gannon's tavern, as an invited guest. Following a confrontation between Lammert and another in the parking lot, Lammert hit Daniel, then drove his vehicle out to the street, running over Daniel's body. Daniel died from complications due to the injuries. Lammert turned himself into the police and pleaded guilty to manslaughter and leaving-the-scene charges, claiming that he thought Daniel was out of the way. In state court premises liability and dram shop claims against Gannon's, its liquor liability insurer defended the dram shop claims, but the general commercial liability insurer, Atain, refused to defend and declined to participate in mediation. Gannon's settled, assigned its claims against Atain, and agreed to a $2 million consent judgment on the premises liability action. The estate sued Atain, alleging equitable garnishment and vexatious failure to defend and indemnify. Atain cited an exclusion precluding coverage for injuries caused by automobiles and an assault and battery exclusion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the estate on the equitable garnishment claim, finding that the exclusions did not apply, but granted Atain summary judgment the vexatious-refusal-to-defend claim, finding that the exclusions arguably could have applied and coverage was a close call. View "Minden v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law