Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On December 28, Hudson did not attend work as a Tyson supervisor due to illness. Hudson’s girlfriend (a Tyson employee) told Hudson’s supervisor, Beganovic, that Hudson would be late or absent that day. Hudson claims he texted Beganovic before his shift that he was having health issues and would be out a few days. Tyson’s attendance policy requires managers “to personally call their direct supervisor to report an unplanned absence.” Hudson claims that he often texted with Beganovic, and at least once before (acceptably) notified Beganovic of an absence by text. Hudson missed three work days, saw a doctor, and was diagnosed with back pain and depression. On January 3, Hudson went to Tyson with a doctor’s note and requested leave from December 28 until January 7. He intended to apply for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA ) leave. He signed an application, on which the non-FMLA box was checked. He claims someone else checked it after he signed. On January 4, Tyson granted Hudson non-FMLA leave. Hudson returned to Tyson on January 9 and was terminated for failure to comply with notification policy. Hudson sued under the FMLA. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Tyson, noting disputes as to whether Tyson enforced its call-in policy. View "Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc." on Justia Law

Manning, who had a 1997 Texas sexual assault conviction, was arrested in El Dorado, Arkansas, and charged with failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Manning entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss, raising “frequently-litigated” constitutional and statutory issues. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Manning’s argument that SORNA did not clarify whether its registration requirements apply to convictions prior to its enactment. The court rejected specific arguments that delegating to the Attorney General the legislative power to determine the individuals to whom SORNA applies violates the constitutional nondelgation doctrine that is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers” and that SORNA violates the Commerce Clause. View "United States v. Manning" on Justia Law

In Seifert’s chapter 12 bankruptcy petition, sale proceeds from the current year’s crop were described as $134,661 in “farm earnings,” consisting of checks jointly payable to the Farm Services Agency (FSA), CHS, and Seifert. Seifert claimed $91,258 as exempt under Minnesota Statute 550.37(13). FSA was an over-secured creditor and did not object to Seifert’s claimed exemptions or any of the filed plans. CHS and the trustee objected to Seifert’s exemption claim and to each plan, based on 11 U.S.C. 1225(a)(4): A debtor must demonstrate that: “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed … [for[ each allowed unsecured claim is not less than … would be paid … if the estate … were liquidated under chapter 7.” They argued that because Seifert was not entitled to an exemption in the farm earnings, payments to the unsecured creditors must include that value. After the parties reached an agreement that reserved the issue of the exemption for later determination, CHS asserted that the exemption dispute was moot because the checks from the sale of the crop had been given to FSA and Seifert retained no interest in those funds. The bankruptcy court agreed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed and remanded. Payment to FSA did not override the parties’ stipulation and did not constitute a determination of what would be paid to unsecured creditors. View "Seifert v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Zup’s owned a strip mall in Babbitt, Minnesota, where it operated a supermarket and rented space to other businesses. When the strip mall burned down in 2011, Zup’s lost income from its supermarket as well as rent from its tenants. Zup’s had two relevant insurance policies, one from Security National and one from West Bend. Zup’s sought payment from Security for the lost supermarket income and payment from West Bend for the lost rent. Security learned of the West Bend policy and concluded that West Bend also had insured and was primarily liable for the lost supermarket income. The district court determined that West Bend was not liable for lost supermarket income. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The West Bend policy did not mention supermarkets or charge supermarket-specific premiums. The phrase “lessor’s risk only” appeared on the declarations page. Because West Bend’s policy was secondary to Security’s, West Bend need pay only if Security National’s coverage was exhausted. View "Zup's of Babbitt-Aurora, Inc. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A class action complaint alleged that for many years the commercial filmmaking wing of the NFL used the names, images, likenesses, and identities of former NFL players in videos to generate revenue and promote the NFL. It asserted claims for false endorsement (Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125), common law and statutory rights of publicity claims under several states' laws, and unjust enrichment. The court approved a settlement calling for: creation of the Common Good Entity, a non-profit organization; payment of up to $42 million to the Common Good Entity over eight years; establishment of the Licensing Agency; payment of $100,000 worth of media value to the Licensing Agency each year until 2021; (5) Payment of attorneys' fees and settlement administration expenses; a reserve for the NFL's potential fees and costs involving class members who opt out; and class members' perpetual release of claims and publicity rights for the NFL and related entities to use. The Common Good Entity is "dedicated to supporting and promoting the health and welfare of Retired Players and other similarly situated individuals." Six players (the class had about 25,000 members) objected. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate despite not providing for a direct financial payment to each class member. View "Marshall v. Nat'l Football League" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security placed Salas-Caballero, a citizen of Mexico, in removal proceedings. He conceded removability, but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). He has a nine-year-old son in the U.S. His son’s mother lacked legal status but was not in removal proceedings. His son would not accompany Salas-Caballero if he were removed to Mexico, but would accompany his mother if she were removed to Mexico in the future. The immigration judge rejected his claim of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The Board of Immigration Appels rejected Salas-Caballero’s contention that the IJ did not adequately consider country conditions in Mexico and the possibility that his son would move to Mexico The Eighth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial. View "Salas-Caballero v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Salazar was convicted in Missouri state court of possessing and trafficking a controlled substance and was deported to Mexico. Salazar subsequently returned to Missouri. After learning that Salazar had reentered, the United States charged him with illegal reentry following a deportation and conviction of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). Salazar pleaded guilty. The Guidelines range for his offense was 70 to 87 months' imprisonment. Salazar did not object to the calculated Guidelines range; his counsel sought a downward variance to 36 months' imprisonment because Salazar "supported his family," would "have to start his life over after being deported," and was unable to participate in a "FastTrack" program. The court considered his counsel's arguments, and all other relevant sentencing factors, including the nature of the offense and Salazar's lengthy criminal history and multiple convictions for drug-related offenses. The district court imposed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 70 months. View "United States v. Ruiz-Salazar" on Justia Law

The Belcourt School District operates within the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on Indian reservations. The Tribe and School District have agreed to share responsibility for educating students, both Indian and non-Indian, residing on the Reservation, and entered into agreements in 2006 and 2009 that provided the District with exclusive authority to administer "day-to-day operations" at Turtle Mountain Community High School, including supervision and employment of staff. Tribe members sued, alleging defamation, excessive use of force, and multiple employment-related claims. The Tribal Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the District and its employees for claims related to the employees' performance of their official duties. The Tribal Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the District signed the agreements, subjecting itself to Tribal jurisdiction. The federal trial court concluded that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction, based on the agreements. The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction, reasoning that the District was clearly acting in its official capacity, in furtherance of its obligations under the state constitution, when it entered into the agreements, View "Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Beckmann, convicted for possession of child pornography in 2001, was visited for a routine compliance check. Beckmann consented to a search of a laptop, visible on a table. While Deputy Barbato searched the laptop, Beckmann showed Deputy Thebeau the rest of the residence. Thebeau alerted Barbato that there was another computer upstairs. While Thebeau used a washroom, Barbato looked into the office where Beckmann went. He saw a computer desk with a monitor, with Beckmann underneath working with cords. Beckmann seemed startled at seeing Barbato and consented to have Barbato look at the computer. Barbato saw a computer tower and two external hard drives underneath the desk. Barbato plugged the power cord to the external drive back into the wall and searched the computer, including the external drives. He did not get specific consent to search the external drives or to plug the external drive back into the wall; he considered them part of the “computer” because they were plugged into the computer. Barbato discovered file names suggesting child pornography. Beckmann pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment plus a lifetime of supervised release, and ordered to pay $9,000 of restitution. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding denials of motions to suppress evidence View "United States v. Beckmann" on Justia Law

Fort Yates School District operates within the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on reservations. In 2003, the District and the Tribe entered into an Agreement, providing that both the Standing Rock and the Fort Yates School Boards would govern the school system; that all property or equipment purchased under the Agreement would generally be joint property; and that it "neither diminishes nor expands rights or protections afforded … under tribal, state or federal law." After a fight between two students, A. was suspended and C. obtained a restraining order against A. A. allegedly violated the restraining order by verbally harassing C. at school. The school suspended A. for 10 additional days. Murphy sued on behalf of her daughter, C., a Tribe member, in the Tribal Court, which held that it had jurisdiction. The District did not appeal to the Standing Rock Supreme Court, but filed suit in federal court against Murphy and the Tribal Court. The district court dismissed and remanded to the Tribal Court. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Tribal Court jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal of the Tribal Court on sovereign immunity grounds. View "Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy" on Justia Law