Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After refinancing a home mortgage in 2007, Beukes, mailed a notice of rescission in 2010, which was rejected. Beukes stopped making payments. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee for the lender, published notices of a mortgage foreclosure sale. MERS ultimately purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Beukes sued, seeking rescission and damages under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), claiming that the amount disclosed as the finance charge on the loan understated the amount they were actually charged by $944.31. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit held an appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, (2015), then affirmed the dismissal. Because Beukes mailed notice within three years, the right of rescission had not expired, but the finance charge disclosed in 2007 did not vary from the actual finance charge by more than one-half of one percent of the total amount financed, so it must be treated as accurate. Therefore, the right to rescind expired three business days after delivery of the disclosures. Beukes did not timely attempt to exercise any expanded right to rescind arising from section 1635(i)(2) that might have been available after the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. View "Beukes v. GMAC Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

Slominski (a friend of one of the debtor-partners) and the debtor asserted that the farmland lease between them started as a verbal lease in 2010, but just a few days before the December 6, 2010 involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, the lease was reduced to writing and dated December 1, 2010. In an adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court avoided the lease as a fraudulent transfer and held that Slominski was obligated under 11 U.S.C. 550(a) to pay the Trustee the fair market rent for the time he occupied the land prior to the avoidance, rather than the lower rent called for by the lease. The Trustee claimed that the lease was actually executed post-petition (no earlier than April 2011), and that it had been backdated to make it appear to have been entered prepetition. The court awarded Slominski an offset, as a good faith transferee, for the costs of his improvements to the land: the wheat crops he planted there and certain taxes he paid. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the determination that Slominski owes the estate $431,200 in net fair market rent, but reversed as to Slominski’s setoff. Denial of the Trustee’s motions based on newly-discovered evidence was affirmed. View "Kaler v. Slominski" on Justia Law

In 2006-2009, the five defendants’ partial Ponzi scheme received more than $193 3 million from hundreds of investors. Only $49 million was returned, all from new investors’ money. Some investors lost their life savings. Each defendant took between $432,000 and $12.2 million. Defendants described investing in foreign currency trading, which was guaranteed and had a fixed rate of return. Some money was invested in foreign currencies, but none was invested in a safe, guaranteed currency product. They also promised instant liquidity and that each investor’s account would be “segregated.” Defendants, who used fund names such as “Oxford” and “UBS” were apparently sued by the Swiss bank, UBS. After the scheme collapsed, two pled guilty. A jury found the others guilty of committing or aiding and abetting commission of wire fraud or mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343; conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1957. Defendant Beckman, individually, was also convicted for his interactions with elderly victims; his attempt to purchase an interest in an NHL hockey team; filing false tax returns; and tax evasion. The district court sentenced Beckman to 360 months and the others to 240 months imprisonment. The Eight Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, View "United States v. Beckman" on Justia Law

Weitz contracted with Hyatt to build an Aventura, Florida assisted-living facility, which was completed in 2003. Hyatt obtained post-construction insurance from defendants. Weitz was neither a party nor a third-party-beneficiary. The policies exclude faulty workmanship and mold, except to the extent that covered loss results from the faulty workmanship, such as business interruption losses. The construction was defective. Hyatt notified defendants of a $11 million loss involving moisture and mold at the care center, settled that claim for $750,000, and released defendants from claims relating to the care center. Hyatt next discovered moisture, mold, and cracked stucco at the residential towers. Hyatt gave defendants notice, but bypassed inevitable defenses based upon policy exclusions, and sued Weitz. Weitz sued its subcontractors and its own construction contract liability insurers. Weitz settled with Hyatt for $53 million and was indemnified by its insurers for $55,799,684.69. Weitz sued, claiming coverage under defendants’ policies, based on equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal, recognizing that Weitz, as subrogee, was subject to any defense Hyatt would have faced, and that Hyatt had discharged defendants from liability; that suit was barred by the contractual period of limitations; that Weitz was barred from suing for damage to the plaza because Hyatt did not give defendants notice of that damage; and that Weitz had already collected several million more than it paid. View "Weitz Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, after his third DWI arrest, Scheffler’s driving privileges were cancelled. Scheffler successfully completed a one-year abstinence-only program, and in 1998, was issued a driver’s license with the restriction that he abstain from use of alcohol. After a 1999 cancellation of his license, Scheffler was completed a three-year rehabilitation program and received a restricted license in 2002. In 2010, Scheffler was arrested for DWI and, to obtain a new restricted license, had to either complete a six-year rehabilitation program or submit to an Ignition Interlock Program. Scheffler sued, claiming Americans with Disability Act violations based on perceived alcoholism. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. ADA defines a disabled person as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, having a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment, 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). Alcoholism may qualify when it limits a major life activity. Scheffler did not claim to actually be an alcoholic or that alcoholism limits a major life activity. DWI does not, alone, establish that he is an alcoholic. There was no allegation that Scheffler has ever been diagnosed as an alcoholic or that Scheffler suffers from a substantial limitation to a major life activity. View "Scheffler v. Dohman" on Justia Law

Martinez was born in Guatemala to a Mexican mother, who left him in Guatemala when she returned to Mexico. She eventually married an American and moved to the U.S. As a teenager, Martinez was a member of a church youth group in Guatemala. He contends that area gangs committed violent acts and threatened violence against individuals who refused to sell drugs. Martinez entered the U.S. in 1999, at age 17, to join his mother. Martinez was issued a Notice to Appear, missed his second immigration hearing, and was ordered removed, in absentia, in 2000. In 2010, Martinez moved to reopen his removal proceedings. The motion was granted after appeal to the BIA. In 2012, the IJ granted Martinez voluntary departure and alternatively ordered removal. Martinez moved to reopen the removal proceedings, after the 90-day deadline (8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)). The IJ found that Martinez failed to show changed country conditions after his hearing to cure the untimeliness. The BIA affirmed and denied reconsideration. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Martinez failed to “specify the errors of law or fact” in the BIA’s decision affirming denial of his motion to reopen because of his failure to establish changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6)(C). View "Martinez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

K, age 15, went missing. Officers tracked K's cell phone to Mathis's house. Mathis's girlfriend told officers that Mathis was not home and that she did not know K's whereabouts. Mathis, K, and other young males were actually in the house. Later, Mathis took K to his grandmother's house, where K disclosed alleged sexual abuse. Officers executed warrants, finding a loaded rifle and ammunition, and a cell phone containing nearly 6,000 text messages. Many were between Mathis and young males whom he had met on a social networking site; several were sexually explicit and showed that Mathis had traveled far to bring young males to his residence. There was a picture of a nude underage male. Mathis admitted that he owned the rifle and ammunition and that officers might find child pornography on his computer. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that the Armed Career Criminal Act applied and imposed a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. Mathis had five burglary convictions. The court used the modified categorical approach to determine that they were “violent felonies” and found Mathis's conviction for interference with official acts inflicting serious injury was also a violent felony. The Eighth Circuit rejected challenges to the ACCA sentencing and to imposition of a special condition of supervision requiring that is routinely applied to sex offenders. View "United States v. Mathis" on Justia Law

Smith sought a conditional use permit (CUP) to build a 300-foot-tall cellular tower on a Washington County site zoned "Agriculture/Single-Family Residential." There are homes within one-quarter of a mile of the site. The Zoning Code authorizes a CUP upon findings: That the proposed use is compatible with the surrounding area; will not be detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare; and will not be injurious to use and enjoyment of other property in the area for purposes already permitted, nor substantially diminish and impair property values within the area. The Planning Board approved the application. Neighbors appealed to the Quorum Court with arguments focused on "safety," "property values," the tower's "fit" with the area, proximity to their homes, and having purchased their homes specifically because of the surrounding scenery and views. Hearing participants discussed cellular phone reception; potential safety issues, particularly in inclement weather; proximity to residences; and impact on nearby residents' views and property values. The application was rejected. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Washington County failed to provide a legally adequate explanation of its reasons for denial and that the denial was not based on substantial evidence in violation of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B). View "Smith Commc'ns, LLC v. Washington Cnty." on Justia Law

Billiot was convicted in Louisiana state court on three counts of aggravated incest in 1996, and on one count of aggravated incest in 1997. He was released from state custody in 2000. At the time of Billiot’s convictions, Louisiana law required convicted sex offenders to register for 10 years after release from imprisonment. La. Stat. 15:544. Amendments to Louisiana law now impose lifetime registration and notification requirements on certain offenders. Billiot initially complied with the registration law, but in 2012, he moved to Arkansas. Billiot admits he knew he had a duty to register, but he failed to do so after moving. Billiot pled guilty to violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250, but asserted that in 2000, Louisiana officials told him he had to register for 10 years. Only later did an employee of the Louisiana sex offender registry tell him that he must register for life. The district court held that “extension of Billiot’s registration obligation … while he was subject to the original obligation,” did not present a “federal constitutional problem.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Ex Post Facto Clause argument and a challenge to a special condition of supervised release, requiring sex-offender treatment. View "United States v. Billiot" on Justia Law

n 2007, Minneapolis Police Department Lieutenant Keefe was made commander of the Violent Offenders Task Force, involving the FBI, ATF, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The task force conducted a wiretap investigation of a gang. Keefe learned that gang members had threatened to kill police officers. Keefe told a local police chief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would brief the chief’s department about an ongoing investigation. ATF officials believed that this disclosure was inappropriate because the investigation involved a wiretap and notified Keefe that he was “prohibited from entering ATF office space.” In an unrelated investigation, a suspected gang leader identified six MPD officers as corrupt, triggering a corruption investigation. Keefe doubted the claims and confronted the informant. The FBI told his chief that Keefe was harming the investigation. Keefe was removed from the investigation and, after others voice concerns, was removed from the task force only months after his appointment. Keefe lodged a misconduct complaint (later designated unfounded) against an MPD Sergeant who was involved in his reassignment and made an anonymous telephone call to the chief’s wife. Keefe was disciplined for false allegations and demoted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed rejection of Keefe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. View "Keefe v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law