Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Texas officers stopped Bekric while he was driving a semi-tractor pulling a trailer in 2012. The trailer, not owned by Bekric, had a false wall concealing 1,970 pounds of marijuana wrapped in bundles to fit specific voids behind the wall. The government did not prosecute. In 2013, while driving his own semi-tractor pulling his own trailer in Missouri, Bekric exited a highway after seeing signs indicating he was approaching a drug checkpoint. Officers stopped him for a traffic violation. Bekric claimed to have left the highway due to difficulties with his trailer's refrigeration system and that he had documentation of repairs. Conditions on the scene, a functional refrigeration system and documents, did not support Bekric's assertions. During the traffic stop, a drug dog alerted to Bekric's trailer. Officers searched the trailer and discovered 198 pounds of marijuana custom-wrapped in packages to fit specific voids behind a false wall. At trial, the government introduced testimony from an officer involved in the 2012 arrest over Bekric’s objection. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction of possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). Evidence of the prior arrest tended to prove knowledge, intent, planning, and modus operandi, and excluded testimony was hearsay. View "United States v. Bekric" on Justia Law

Ziesmer was driving when Travis threw a cigarette out the window. It flew back in and landed on the back floor. Ziesmer pulled over to retrieve the cigarette. Trooper Hagen approached. Hagen claims and Travis denies that Travis “bent over as if” reaching for something. Hagen claims he saw a hammer. Ziesmer claims the hammer was under the seat, not visible. Hagen reported smelling marijuana. The occupants disagree. Hagen ran their names. No relevant information appeared. Hagen subsequently searched all three occupants and the car. The occupants claim that Hagen began screaming, pulled Ziesmer out of the car, and injured him. Ziesmer claims that he attempted to call 911, but Hagen “hung up my phone and threw it.” St. Paul Police have a record of the call. Hagen denied injuring Ziesmer and claimed that, searching Ziesmer, he found a small amount of marijuana. Ziesmer was cited for possession and released. Charges were later dropped. At home, he took pictures of his bruised face. Five days later, Ziesmer went had x-rays of his spine, head, and neck. Three months later he underwent an MRI and was diagnosed with “minimal disc bulging” and neck and upper-back pain. Almost three years later, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Hagen, finding material issues of unreasonable seizure and that injuries like those claimed are “within the range of common experience,” so the lack of a medical expert was not fatal to Zeismer’s claim. View "Ziesmer v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Grider and his family were at a Taco Bell. An argument occurred between Grider and another patron. Police were called. The Griders crossed the street to eat in their vehicle. Officer Bowling, the first to arrive, approached Grider, who was wearing a knife on his hip, and asked Grider to exit his vehicle. Grider declined. Bowling forcibly removed Grider, placed Grider on the ground with his knee on Grider's back, and handcuffed Grider. Officer Reece arrived, ran toward the two and kicked Grider in the head. Bowling and Reece did not communicate before the kick; Bowling did not act to prevent the kick. Grider had open whiskey in his vehicle, which the officers poured out. Grider suffered contusions and abrasions on his face; the kick caused neck pain and restriction of movement that persisted at least two years. Mrs. Grider suffered emotional distress and problems with her pregnancy. The Griders filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Bowling was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Grider had no evidence that Bowling was aware of the kick before it occurred or had the opportunity "to take action to deescalate." Bowling cannot be liable for nonfeasance under these circumstances. View "Grider v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Diamond filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. February 28, 2012 was the deadline for complaints to determine the dischargeability of certain debts under 11 U.S.C. 523(c). On February 15, Goldstein requested a 60-day “extension of proceedings” and “withholding of the entry of the discharge order,” claiming that he was a creditor but did not receive proper notice. The bankruptcy court found the request to be for “abatement of the case.” Finding no cause for relief, it denied the motion and the request to withhold discharge. The case closed. A year later Goldstein filed a dischargeability complaint in a different jurisdiction, not citing a statute, but captioned “Fraud and Defalcation.” The court transferred the matter to the original court. After a remand, that court entered an order to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed. Goldstein responded. The court took no action on its show cause order, but scheduled a trial. Diamond filed an answer, requesting dismissal. Goldstein responded; the court dismissed, determining that the debt was not excepted from discharge. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Goldstein had adequate time to protect his rights. He used that time to file a proof of claim and move for extension. He cannot , long after the fact, claim to have been hindered by his lack of knowledge of the case. View "Goldstein v. Diamond" on Justia Law

In 2005, Iowa prosecutors convicted Keys of delivering cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to deliver. Keys received a suspended sentence of ten years. Keys was convicted in 2008 of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver as a result of events on February 27, 2008, and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Keys’s third drug conviction occurred in 2009, when he was convicted of delivering cocaine in 2007 and 2008, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Keys was paroled on April 30, 2012. Almost immediately upon his release, Keys resumed supplying cocaine to several individuals, using the same accomplices and modus operandi as before his imprisonment. After law enforcement conducted a series of controlled buys, a federal grand jury indicted Keys, who pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a substance containing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846. The district court determined Keys was a career offender and sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence as substantively reasonable. Keys’s 2008 and 2009 convictions were not relevant conduct to the 2012 offense and, therefore, count under the career offender provision. View "United States v. Keys" on Justia Law

While fishing with his son-in-law and grandson near Gavins Point Dam on the Missouri River in Cedar County, Nebraska, Metter was struck and killed when a parked pickup truck came out of gear and rolled down an unprotected river bank. Metter’s widow, personal representative of his estate, brought survival and wrongful death actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, asserting the Corps negligently maintained the site. The grandson brought a separate suit against the Corps raising the same theories of liability for the mental and physical harms to Justin caused by witnessing his grandfather’s death. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claims barred by the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, and that the United States did not waive sovereign immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Corps removed the guardrails and posts itself to save money and to expedite a project, reasons that reflect the discretionary exercise of choice and judgment “susceptible to policy analysis.” View "Metter v. United States" on Justia Law

The Fond du Luth Casino in Duluth opened in 1986 as a joint venture between the city and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa and is operated by the Band. The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act led to restructuring of agreements between the Band and the city under a 1994 consent decree, under which the Band paid the city $75 million 1994-2009, 19 percent of gross revenues. The Band stopped making payments in 2009, believing that they violated IGRA as interpreted by the National Indian Gaming Commission. In 2011, the Gaming Commission issued a Notice of Violation, determining that the payments violated IGRA requirements that tribes have the sole proprietary interest in casinos and are their primary beneficiaries. The Commission ordered the Band not to resume payments. The Band sought relief under FRCP 60(b)(6) from payments in 2009-2011. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit remanded and again reversed and remanded, finding that the district court failed to consider all of the factors identified in its 2013 order. The court must give proper weight to the congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming and the fact that the city was on notice in 2009 of Gaming Commission policies. View "Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

Law enforcement learned that Montejano and Lopez were supplying methamphetamine from Iowa to Arkansas. During an intercepted telephone call, the two identified Santos as a distributor. In a second intercepted call, Lopez asked Santos if he needed methamphetamine. Santos responded that he would answer later. Another distributor asked for five pounds of methamphetamine. Lopez arranged to have the drugs sent via minivan on March 13, 2010. Lopez called Santos and explained that he had coordinated a delivery to Arkansas. Santos said that he did not need more methamphetamine. Missouri State troopers stopped the minivan. A drug dog alerted to narcotics. A search revealed five pounds of methamphetamine in a hidden compartment. Investigation of the distribution ring revealed that Santos had received five-pound shipments of methamphetamine every few months for two years and sold the drugs. Telephone records showed that Santos had spoken with members of the distribution ring. Santos maintained “stash” houses in Arkansas; another member of the drug ring stated that Santos had obtained cell phones and vehicles for the operation. Santos pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. The district court adopted the PSI drug-quantity determination, including the methamphetamine intercepted on March 13, and sentenced Correa-Santos to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Correa-Santos" on Justia Law

In a 2008 collision on I-40 in West Memphis, McHone, driving a car, was struck by a tractor trailer driven by Whirley. McHone’s State Farm policy included coverage for uninsured motor vehicles with bodily injury limits of $100,000 per person. The trucking company defendants were insured by Gramercy. McHone’s medical bills exceeded $400,000; her physicians estimate future medical care will exceed an additional $400,000. Before trial, Gramercy was placed into Rehabilitation with an automatic stay. In 2013, McHone’s counsel notified State Farm of the problems with Gramercy and demanded $100,000 uninsured motorist benefits. State Farm asserted that no coverage existed. McHone settled her claims against Whirley and the truck’s owner for $300,000 to avoid the claim process with the State Guarantee Fund. Gramercy was liquidated. State Farm again refused to pay uninsured motorist benefits. The district court ruled in favor of State Farm as being entitled to a credit for the settlement proceeds regardless of the date of insolvency. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. State Farm is entitled to a credit for the money McHone received from her settlement. McHone’s argument that the credit is not applicable because the payment was made by the receivership rather than by Gramercy itself is not supported by the policy language nor Tennessee law. View "McHone v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Minneapolis Officers Martin and Englund were patrolling an area that had high levels of narcotics transactions. They saw a car stopped in the middle of the road with Hurd standing next to the driver’s window. Based on the high-crime location, the darkness, the cold temperature, and the absence of buildings on the block, Martin suspected a narcotics transaction. Martin stopped the squad car behind the other car. Hurd approached the squad car with his hands in his jacket pockets. The officers exited their vehicle and ordered Hurd to remove his hands from his pockets. Hurd initially complied, but then put them back in his pocket and continued to approach the officers. The officers grabbed Hurd and placed him over the hood of the squad car. Hurd still refused to take his hands out of his pockets. Martin reached into the pocket and felt the butt of a handgun. The officers removed a loaded, cocked .45-calibur pistol. Hurd was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers had no reason to conduct a Terry stop. The district court denied the motion, noting that a protective frisk for officer safety purposes was appropriate under the circumstances. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hurd" on Justia Law