Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Union Pacific Railway, and Stickle, alleging that failure to properly build and maintain railway bridges over the Cedar River caused or exacerbated the 2008 flood and that the decision to attempt to stabilize the bridges by weighing them down with railcars filled with ballast caused or exacerbated the flooding of their properties, either because bridges collapsed and effectively dammed the river and blocked drainage, or because railcars on bridges that did not collapse blocked the free flow of the river and diverted water into low-lying areas. Union Pacific filed Notice of Removal that asserted federal question jurisdiction and stated that attorneys for the co-defendants had no objection to removal, accompanied by a local rule certification that: “co-defendants have given their consent to the removal.” Stickle did not file notice of consent to removal until more than 30 days after Union Pacific was served. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved to remand, arguing that their claims were not completely preempted and that not all defendants had timely consented. The district court denied remand. The Eighth Circuit vacated, finding the consent adequate, but that the state claims were not completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 701. View "Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Jackson claimed to be at work when her house burned. Little Rock Fire Department investigator Baker determined the fire was started by human intervention. Baker detected accelerants in the house; the fire's points of origin were inconsistent with accidental causes. Baker initially believed that Jackson might have been the victim of a hate crime, because he discovered racially derogative graffiti in her garage, but there were no signs of forced entry and the house was largely empty of personal items, food, or furniture. Baker claims that Jackson stated that she was the only person with access to the house and that she was not missing any property. Baker obtained a search warrant for her cell phone records, which indicated that Henson, Jackson's coworker, attempted to call Jackson three times during the period at issue. Henson denied calling Jackson. Baker concluded that Henson may have burned Jackson's home at her request. No criminal charges were filed. Allstate's investigative unit concluded that Henson had burned Jackson's home, noting that Jackson was subject to a divorce decree that ordered her to sell her house and that she tried to sell for several years,. Allstate denied Jackson's insurance claim based on Intentional Acts and Material Misrepresentations Exclusions. A jury found in favor of Allstate. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting procedural challenges and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "Jackson v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A fire occurred at the Ralph Engelstad Arena on July 3, 2011. Arena Holdings alleges the fire started when a Crown Macro-Tech 5002VZ amplifier produced a direct current to a speaker that spread to adjoining speakers located in the catwalk area. Harman is the manufacturer of the alleged defective amplifier. Impulse Group installed the sound reinforcement system at the Arena when it was originally built, and installed the amplifier. The fire caused approximately $5,000,000 of damage throughout the Arena; it directly damaged the arena structure and equipment in the vicinity of the amplifier and speakers. The presence of smoke and soot throughout the Arena after the fire caused additional damage. Arena Holdings sued Harman, alleging negligence, strict liability and post-sale failure-to warn claims. Harman filed a third-party complaint against Impulse Group and others. The district court granted Harman summary judgment, finding that the economic loss doctrine precluded Arena Holdings from recovering tort damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that barring tort claims where a plaintiff seeks economic damages for foreseeable losses for which the plaintiff could have contractually allocated risk is admittedly no longer a "modern trend," but stating that it is neither is an antiquated or disfavored approach. View "Arena Holdings Charitable, LLC v. Harman Prof'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Leonard started drinking and using drugs as a teenager and has eight prior convictions related to drugs and alcohol. In 2002, at age 26, Leonard was in a car accident while driving drunk. In 2003, he was again in a car accident while driving drunk. Leonard contends he sustained a traumatic brain injury from these accidents, though he has never received treatment for such an injury. Leonard continued to abuse drugs and alcohol after his accidents. In 2006, after both car accidents, Leonard began downloading child pornography and engaging in sexual contact with children. He admitted to molesting and raping a 13-year-old girl; and he allegedly molested another girl for approximately four years, beginning when she was 9 or 10 years old. A charge was pending that he had molested a 4-year-old boy. Leonard pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2). The district court sentenced Leonard to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The district court properly considered the section 3553(a) factors in sentencing Leonard and expressly addressed Leonard’s mitigating factors, in particular that his brain injuries may have played a role in his unlawful behavior. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Beltramea solicited investments to open a Subway restaurant franchise, but used the funds for personal expenses and for a real estate development, “Castlerock,” made fraudulent representations to banking institutions, and attempted to avoid paying taxes. Beltramea pled guilty to 16 counts, including: wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(A)(a)(1); money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(i); false statements to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1014; and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. The court imposed additional upward departures for understated criminal history and for dismissed and uncharged conduct. Beltramea's adjusted Guidelines' range was 70 to 87 months, before adding the mandatory 24 consecutive months for aggravated identity theft. He was sentenced to a total of 111 months. The court stated that, even if it erred in granting upward departures, it would impose the same sentence based on the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court entered a forfeiture order, 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 28 U.S.C. 2461(c) and 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1) for rental properties, Castlerock parcels, $125,000 in wire fraud proceeds, and $65,472.02 in money laundering proceeds. The Eighth Circuit reversed the forfeiture order but otherwise affirmed. The government presented no facts connecting the rental properties and the lots to any offense for which Beltramea was convicted. View "United States v. Beltramea" on Justia Law

A Missouri deputy responded to a report of a stolen firearm. Arriving at the Elledge home he discovered that Jackson was reporting the stolen firearm. A Highway Patrol Trooper arrived. Jackson stated that he had purchased a rifle from Elledge and that Jackson’s nephew, Bobby, had stolen the rifle. Outside, the trooper informed the deputy that Jackson was a convicted felon with numerous armed criminal actions in his history. The officers contacted Bobby, who stated that he was in a dispute with Jackson and feared for his life. He stated Jackson had threatened to shoot him and that he had told Elledge this story and asked if he could take the gun to keep the gun away from Jackson. Elledge had agreed. Bobby informed the officers there was a firearm in Jackson’s home. Jackson denied having firearms in his home. Executing a warrant, officers discovered a firearm and ammunition in the Jackson home. Jackson was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in finding that the warrant application failed to supply probable cause, but the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Phillips pled guilty to statutory rape. In 2012, he failed to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. In 2014, two months into his release, the Probation Office moved to revoke supervision. Phillips admitted violating release conditions, including unsupervised contact with minors. The court sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment and supervision for life. As a special release condition, Phillips cannot “possess or use . . . a computer . . . gaming equipment, cellular devices, or any other device with access to any ‘on line computer services,’ or subscribe to or use any Internet service . . . without the written approval of the probation office.” The Eight Circuit affirmed the lifetime supervision, vacated the special condition, and remanded. Phillips made no legal argument rebutting the presumptive reasonableness of lifetime supervision. Because the possibility of possessing child pornography may not necessarily justify a broad ban on Internet access, Phillips only possessed adult pornography. On remand, lesser restrictions on Phillips’s Internet access may be consistent with 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Matthews’s girlfriend, the mother of his child, reported theft of a firearm. She identified Matthews as a suspect and suggested that Matthews was trafficking heroin. Matthews lived in an apartment in a secure building, to which the owner had granted police access by a key in a lockbox. Their apartment was one of 40-50 opening onto a common hallway. Police went, with a trained dog, to conduct a drug sniff in that hallway outside Matthews’s apartment. The dog alerted to drugs. The next month police returned with the same dog and conducted another drug sniff outside Matthews’s apartment. The dog again alerted, but did not alert when police led it to other apartment doors. A state judge issued a warrant. Executing the warrant, police recovered drug paraphernalia, a digital scale, trace amounts of heroin, and the gun Hines had reported stolen. Matthews’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied. He was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 96-month sentence. In conducting the 2013 drug dog sniffs, police reasonably relied on precedent that a sniff of the apartment door frame from a common hallway does not constitute a search. The court properly rejected Matthews’s claims regarding his intent to return the gun and applied a stolen-firearm enhancement View "United States v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Thibeaux, previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 120 months in prison. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected a claim that the evidence was insufficient because a dash cam video showed another individual at the place where the firearm was recovered and that person had a motive to drop the gun because he was a felon then in possession of PCP, who was involved in a similar incident involving PCP and a handgun a few weeks later. Thibeaux argued that no one saw him throw a gun, and the gun’s position on top of the snow suggested it was dropped and not thrown. He challenged credibility of a witness because she was not contacted until a few weeks before trial and did not mention Thibeaux’s conspicuous neon safety vest to the 911 operator. The court stated: “We do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. The jury has the responsibility of resolving conflicts or contradictions in testimony, and we resolve any credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” View "United States v. Thibeaux" on Justia Law

Rosemann hired attorney Sigillito after Sigillito falsely informed Rosemann that he was an expert in international investments. In 2007, Rosemann received a $15.6 million buyout from the sale of his family’s company. Sigillito instructed Rosemann to loan $5 million of the buyout to Metis, a Turkish contractor. When Rosemann resisted, Sigillito told him “the loan was guaranteed by [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] contracts and that Sigillito would structure the deal to protect Rosemann and defer taxes.” Rosemann transferred $15.6 million to Sigillito, who wrote a $5 million check to Metis. For that service, Sigillito charged Rosemann $100,000. Sigillito took some money for his own use and loaned $10.8 million to another party in England. Approximately $2.75 million was repaid. In 2009, Metis defaulted and filed for bankruptcy protection in Turkey. Sigillito filed suit against Metis but the suit eventually was dismissed. The loan remains in default. In 2012, Sigillito was convicted of nine counts of wire fraud, four counts of mail fraud, six counts of money laundering, and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment. Rosemann sued for legal malpractice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal because Rosemann failed to name an expert who would testify about the appropriate standard of care. View "Rosemann v. Sigillito" on Justia Law