Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnson was a guard at the South Dakota State Penitentiary. Inmates Berget and Robert attempted to escape and intentionally murdered Johnson. Berget entered the penitentiary at age 15 after escaping repeatedly from State Training School. Berget amassed convictions for grand theft, burglary, escape, and attempt to escape. He spent most of his life in prison. His last escape attempt occurred in 1987. He did not have a history of institutional violence. Berget was transferred to segregation at times; Johnson’s estate alleges at least some transfers back to general population were negotiated to end hunger strikes. Robert had no criminal history when he arrived at the penitentiary in 2006 to serve an 80-year sentence for kidnapping. In 2007 Robert was discovered preparing for an escape attempt; he threatened a correctional officer. The estate alleges that Robert’s transfer from maximum security was to end his hunger strike. There was some forewarning of the escape attempt. The district court rejected the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the paperwork was not always completed for the discretionary housing decisions, it was within the warden’s power to move the inmates; the Department’s policies on warden discretion do not shock the conscience and the warden did not act with deliberate indifference. View "Estate of Johnson v. Weber" on Justia Law

Petters orchestrated a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme, operating a sham business, PCI, which purportedly purchased electronics in bulk and resold them. Ritchie advanced $189 million to PCI, in exchange for promissory notes. Ritchie assigned notes with face values totaling $25 million to VICIS. PCI and Petters made payments to Ritchie, who used part of the funds to pay VICIS $17,703,227.39 toward the assigned notes. After Petters’s scheme ended in 2008, Kelley was appointed as receiver, sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, and was appointed as trustee. Kelley and the bankruptcy trustee for Petter’s wholly-owned company, Polaroid, entered into a coordination agreement. Kelley commenced an adversary proceeding against Ritchie, VICIS, and others, to recover alleged fraudulent and preferential transfers. VICIS held a claim against PCI for amounts outstanding on the promissory notes. The parties reached a settlement: VICIS paid $7.5 million to Kelley for release of all claims. The unsecured creditors’ committee supported the settlement and Kelley’s allocation, but Ritchie objected to the allocation. The bankruptcy court approved the t agreement, finding the allocation reasonable because Kelley applied an objective mathematical calculation, the unsecured creditors committee participated in the process and approved the allocation, and the circumstances in the case dealt with complex issues, unsettled law, and massively complicated factual disputes. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Former and current employees filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Gilster and other defendants, alleging lung impairment (or potential lung impairment) from exposure to butter-flavoring products, including diacetyl, used in Gilster’s microwave popcorn packaging plant in Jasper, Missouri. Defendants removed the action to federal court. Six weeks later, the employees dismissed all defendants except Gilster. The district court ordered a remand to state court based on the Class Action Fairness Act’s local-controversy exception, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4), under which, a court is required to decline jurisdiction when “greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” determined as of the date of the filing. The district court permitted discovery on state citizenship. For all of the potential class members, except the current employees, plaintiffs provided only last-known addresses, some 27 years old, and did not identify state citizenship. The court ultimately found that 41 percent of potential class members were Missouri citizens. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Because the employees did not meet their burden of proof that a CAFA exception applies, the court erred by resolving doubt in favor of the party seeking remand. View "Hood v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp." on Justia Law

ATF operated a fake tattoo parlor in St. Louis to set up stings for illegal gun sales. At a nearby parking lot an agent saw Sacus make a drug sale. When Sacus later approached, the agent asked Sacus if he had drugs for sale. Sacus indicated that he did. The agent told Sacus to come to the tattoo parlor. Sacus visited twice and sold heroin and cocaine base. Agents asked Sacus about firearms. Sacus returned with Lee. Lee sold the agents 11 firearms; Sacus received a finders’ fee for each sale. Later, Sacus independently sold the agents six firearms. Many had been stolen. The agents regularly talked about fictitious criminal histories to establish their cover identities. Sacus pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing illegal drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(A)(1), and to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Sacus to 144 months for each drug offense and 120 months' imprisonment for the firearm offense to be served concurrently, noting that Sacus had reason to believe that he was selling to prohibited persons. The Eighth Circuit rejected claims that court miscalculated the number of firearms; that Sacus was a victim of sentencing manipulation; and that the drug sentences violated his right against cruel and unusual punishment. View "United States v. Sacus" on Justia Law

Former employees filed a qui tam False Claims suit against Heritage College, a for-profit school, alleging it fraudulently induced the Department of Education (DOE) to provide funds by falsely promising to keep accurate student records as required by 20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(3). They claimed that Heritage altered grade and attendance records from 2006 to 2012 to ensure students made satisfactory progress and to avoid refunds, thereby maximizing Title IV funds. Around 97% of Heritage students receive Title IV aid, accounting for about 90% of gross tuition. From 2009 to 2012, the DOE disbursed $32,817,727 to Heritage. Each relator also alleged retaliation under the FCA and wrongful discharge under state law. For purposes of summary judgment, Heritage did not dispute that it altered records. The district court granted summary judgment to Heritage, finding that any false statements were not material to government funding decisions. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the FCA claim, but affirmed the employment claims. Heritage could not have executed the participation agreement without stating it would maintain adequate records and without the agreement Heritage could not have received any Title IV funds. Heritage's actions with respect to the plaintiffs were not retaliatory. View "Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc." on Justia Law

The district court denied Ragland’s petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 for relief from his conviction and sentence for distribution of heroin resulting in death (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)), which has a mandatory sentence of 20 years to life. On remand, the government conceded it could not prove but-for causation and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Burrage applied retroactively, but argued the district court lacked authority to grant relief because the enhanced sentence Ragland received did not exceed the maximum statutory sentence without application of the enhancement. The district court concluded that Ragland’s claim was not cognizable under section 2255, denied relief, and denied a Certificate of Appealability. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the lesser included offense of distribution of heroin and resentence Ragland. Ragland’s claim under Burrage was a challenge to the validity of his conviction for distribution of heroin resulting in death, and therefore was cognizable under section 2255. View "Ragland v. United States" on Justia Law

Turner, a Missouri inmate, suffered from a neurological disorder but was able to ambulate, stand, and sit by using leg braces and crutches. Although Turner received medical care several times, no physician ordered a wheelchair or transport by wheelchair-accessible van. The facility had a wheelchair-accessible van with a "lift," but restricted its use to wheelchair users. Signage on the van advised that only wheelchairs were allowed on the lift and that standing on it was forbidden to avoid falls. For transport to a medical appointment, Turner arrived with neither a wheelchair nor a physician's order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. Turner alleges that he had to enter the van by crawling; that urine and vomit were on its floor, so that he was unable to eat while traveling; and that, during his return trip the driver stopped near a bridge and stated that the guards could drown Turner and claim that Turner tried to escape., Turner filed an Inmate Resolution Request; according to Turner, prison staff "ransacked" his cell and were verbally abusive in retaliation and that when he was moved to another prison, he was transported in a non-wheelchair-accessible van for part of the trip. The Eighth Circuit affirmed rejection of Turner’s claims of violations the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Americans with Disabilities Act,, 42 U.S.C. 12131; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. View "Turner v. Mull" on Justia Law

In 1991, Nunley pled guilty in Missouri state court to the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Nunley waived his right to jury sentencing, the state court sentenced him to death. He sought to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his sentencing judge had been drinking before the sentencing proceeding. Nunley's motion to withdraw his plea was denied. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed rejection of that motion. He filed an action under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that the state denied his constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to capital jury sentencing as articulated in by the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona (2002), and later applied retroactively under Missouri law. The district court denied Nunley's petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Nunley unequivocally waived his right to jury sentencing when he pled guilty. Nunley acknowledged the court’s warnings and waived his rights. He has since admitted that he made a strategic choice to waive jury sentencing because he believed a court was less likely to be inflamed by the details of his crime than a jury. View "Nunley v. Bowersox" on Justia Law

Miller suffered: a brain injury in a 1998 car accident and had back surgery in 2004. Although his doctor described his brain injury as stable, but Miller complained of memory and balance problems and pan. Miller claims these injuries caused him to become disabled starting in 2007. In 2008, Miller requested disability insurance benefits as well as supplemental security income. He received a hearing before an administrative law judge, who denied his claim, finding that Miller had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The Appeals Council denied Miller’s request for review. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the ALJ’s decision to give “little weight” to some of Miller’s medical evidence. View "Miller v. Colvin" on Justia Law

United operates a nationwide household goods moving network with more than 400 independently owned and operated agents. Since 1993, Chavis has been a full-service United agent. The parties' relationship is governed by a 2007 Agency Agreement. Chavis filed suit for breach of contract, alleging that United breached the Agency Agreement by unilaterally changing the roles that United agents play in servicing shipments by not assigning Chavis to certain roles in the chain of interstate shipments. According to Chavis, it should have been assigned the roles of origin agent and destination agent, based on its status as the "local" or "authorized" agent in the case of non-military shipments, i.e., its status as the agent closest to the original or destination address, and based on its designation as the United agent "authorized" to service Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina for military shipments. The district court entered summary judgment for United, finding the Agreement unambiguous. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. None of the documents that Chavis identified supported its argument that it is the only "authorized" agent for its home market for non-military shipments or the exclusive agent for military shipments to and from Shaw AFB. View "Chavis Van & Storage of Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. United Van Lines, LLC" on Justia Law