Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, the Eighth Circuit held that the Petersons’ claim for rescission under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601, was time-barred by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f) because of their failure to file a lawsuit within three years of their transaction with Bank of America. In 2015, the Supreme Court held that another court had erred in holding that a borrower’s failure to file a suit for rescission within three years of the transaction’s consummation extinguishes the right to rescind and bars relief. Following remand by the Court, the Eighth Circuit vacated it earlier judgment and remanded. View "Bank of America v. Peterson" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed the Kostecki home. Their insurer, AAIC, reimbursed their loss, received an assignment of rights, and filed a products liability action against Omega, the manufacturer of TracPipe, a corrugated stainless steel tubing product that brought propane gas from an underground storage tank into the Kosteckis’ home. The court granted Omega summary judgment on breach of warranty and failure to warn. The case proceeded to trial on claims of negligent design and strict liability for an unreasonably dangerous product. All experts agreed that the fire started when lightning struck a tree near the underground propane tank, causing electric energy to enter the Kostecki home and ignite combustible materials in the space between the basement and the first floor. Fire investigators found holes in the TracPipe running through that space. A jury returned a verdict for Omega, finding that it did not fail to use ordinary care in designing the product or sell the product in an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the opinion of AAIC’s metallurgical expert, that the product was defectively designed, and admitted testimony by a defense expert, criticizing the fire causation theory. View "Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Omega Flex, Inc." on Justia Law

Charged with filing false or fraudulent tax returns, Jett pled guilty to making a false claim against the government, 18 U.S.C. 287. In his plea agreement, Jett expressly waived his right to appeal his sentence, directly or collaterally, on any ground except claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or an illegal sentence. After being sentenced to 24 months in prison, Jett moved to have his sentence vacated or corrected under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel and an improperly high sentence because his sentencing counsel failed to raise various mitigating factors. The district court denied Jett’s motion, noting that Jett’s sentencing counsel filed relevant motions that addressed the precise issues he claimed his counsel failed to address and that the court thoroughly considered the information in those motions in determining the appropriate sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Rule 35(a) may not be used to vacate and amend a sentence based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law

Police searched Mayne’s vehicle, seizing 180 pseudoephedrine pills, methamphetamine, and other items used to manufacture meth. He pled guilty to possession of pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to manufacture meth, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2). Mayne had three prior felonies. The district court determined he was a career offender under section 4B1.1 1 of the federal sentencing guidelines. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the guidelines phrase “controlled substance offense” did not to include the instant offense. A “controlled substance offense” is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” based on a law “that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Application Note 1 does not provide an exhaustive list of “controlled substance offenses.” View "United States v. Mayne" on Justia Law

Mendoza began a five-year term of supervised release in December 2012 after serving a 200-month prison sentence for possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In November 2013, Texas State Trooper Honesto stopped Mendoza for a traffic violation while he was driving a rental car from California to his home in Arkansas. The stop led to a probable cause search of the car and to Mendoza’s arrest when 70 vacuum-sealed bundles containing 85 pounds of marijuana were found in duffle bags in the car’s trunk. Mendoza’s probation officer petitioned to commence revocation proceedings. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court imposed a 37-month revocation sentence. The Eight Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court committed plain procedural error in determining the advisory guidelines range sentence based on a Grade A supervised release violation without making a specific finding that Mendoza possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Linares was held at the Hardin County Correctional Center at the direction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). She alleges that another inmate made derogatory and “threatening statements,” which “alarmed” her; that she reported them to a sergeant and an ICE Agent; and that did not act on her concerns. Within a week, the inmate threw a lightweight, plastic chair at her. Linares said the “assault caused a significant injury on my face,” and “a great deal of head pain” for “at least two days,” and residual “pain in my right cheek for about three weeks.” She took one pain pill. A contemporaneous photo shows an injury consistent with observation of “a little red mark on her right cheek. There was no swelling or puffiness and no bleeding.” Officers did not complete an incident report “because the scratch was so minor, and because [she] was not upset, in pain, [and did not ask] for medical treatment.” Linares brought claims of failure-to-protect; failure-to-train; substantive-due-process violations; and, failure-to-have-a-custody-policy. The court dismissed the federal defendants and granted summary judgment to the county defendants. The court also granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Chavero-Linares v. Smith" on Justia Law

Police received a tip that people were selling crack cocaine from a specified address, that they drove a "new car," and identifying the license plate number. The number provided was registered to a 1994 GMC. Days later, an officer went to the address and collected trash bags next to the alley behind the residence. One contained "2 suspected marijuana roaches with green plant material inside that look[ed] and smell[ed] like marijuana, blunt material, blunt paper, 2 baggie knots, cigarillos wrappers, and a mail document from the State of Iowa … to Shaquandis Thurmond" at the same address. A field test of the suspected marijuana tested positive for THC. During surveillance, the officer saw a van parked behind the residence with the license plate number previously provided by the informant. Police records revealed that Thurmond was arrested a month earlier for possession of a controlled substance and had a juvenile criminal history including an assault and possession of a controlled substance. A search warrant issued. Upon execution, officers seized a sawed-off shotgun, marijuana and paraphernalia, and documents associated with Thurmond. After Thurmond entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. 5845(a), 5861(d), and 5871), the Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Thurmond’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Thurmond" on Justia Law

Hawkes wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by affiliated companies in northwestern Minnesota. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) that the property constitutes “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into the “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7). The district court dismissed a challenge, holding that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decision-making process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that both courts misapplied the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Sackett v. EPA. A “properly pragmatic analysis of ripeness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immediate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality.” View "Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Batemon, represented by court-appointed counsel, pleaded nolo contendere to distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After the court announced his sentence, Batemon complained that his attorney had predicted a sentence of probation and failed to perform adequately, then declared that he was innocent. The district court relieved the attorney of his appointment and sentenced Batemon to 39 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the acceptance of the plea and the conduct of the sentencing hearing. The absence of counsel post-sentencing could not have caused prejudice. The district court apparently did err by failing to provide information required by Rule 11(b)(1)(M), but Batemon did not establish a reasonable probability that he would have proceeded to trial if the district court had satisfied the rule. The court did inform Batemon that he faced a maximum sentence of “not more than 20 years,” and told Batemon that he might “get time in the federal correction institution.” Batemon’s attorney stated that he had reviewed the sentencing guidelines with Batemon, estimated where Batemon would fall in the guidelines, and explained to Batemon how the guidelines work “in a generalized way.” Batemon confirmed counsel’s representation in open court. View "United States v. Batemon" on Justia Law

Law enforcement received information that McMahan was part of a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy that was bringing drugs from Minnesota to Iowa for resale. The next day, an officer observed McMahan driving a red vehicle, and called for a marked patrol unit to stop the car. The unit attempted to make a traffic stop, but McMahan drove off at a high rate of speed. McMahan eventually pulled into a driveway, abandoned his car, and fled on foot. A witness observed him enter a private home. Nobody was home when McMahan entered, but the homeowner later told police that he did not know McMahan and did not give him permission to enter the home. Officers entered the house and located McMahan in the basement, where he surrendered. McMahan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The Eighth Circuit affirmed application of a two-level increase under USSG 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment, and the actual sentence imposed, 196 months’ imprisonment. McMahan’s uninvited entry into a private home created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person that was sufficient to justify the increase. View "United States v. McMahan" on Justia Law